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ABSTRACT 
 
Keywords:  behavioural markers, crisis management, assessment of competence,  
  marine engineering officers. 
 
A lack of competence in crisis management has been shown to be a causal factor in a number of 
recent maritime accidents. In safety critical industries other than commercial shipping, such as 
civil aviation, nuclear and petrochemical, research is being undertaken to identify behavioural 
markers that can be used to assess competence in crisis management. Although there is now a 
general acceptance of the core concepts for the non-technical or resource management skills 
required for competence in crisis management, there is also an acceptance that the behaviours 
associated with these skills are context specific. This research programme improves the 
understanding of how a behavioural marker system can be used to assess the competence in crisis 
management of merchant marine engineering officers within the context of a merchant vessel 
engine room control room.  
 
This research reviews the current practice in using behavioural markers for the assessment of 
competence in crisis management within safety critical industries and the military. The differences 
between the assessment frameworks and environments in which behavioural markers are 
currently being used for this assessment of competence are discussed. The influences of these 
differences on the use of behavioural markers for the assessment of competence in crisis 
management within the context of a merchant vessel engine room control room are investigated.  
 
Through the use of ethnographic study, the research presents a set of behavioural markers that 
can be used to assess competence in crisis management within the context of a simulated 
merchant vessel’s engine room control room. The research concludes that these behavioural 
markers can be used as a valid objective assessment framework for the assessment of competence 
in crisis management of merchant navy engineering officers. 
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1    BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE FOR THE RESEARCH  
 
All safety critical organisations consider how they would manage a crisis situation and undertake 
some form of preparedness training. This training concentrates mostly on how to deal with an 
emergency, where a laid down procedure can be put into action. Few of these organisations take 
their training into the realms of a crisis situation, where there is no procedure to call upon, and 
where lateral thinking and rapid decision-making are required of their managers. Even fewer 
organisations try to assess their personnel’s competence in managing a crisis.  
 
On 19th November 1997, the 3,624 grt Bahamian registered vessel “Green Lily” grounded on the 
island of Bressay in the Shetland Isles in Force 10 winds and subsequently broke up. All crew 
members were rescued by a Coastguard helicopter but the helicopter winchman, who remained 
on the deck of the ship, was swept into the sea and lost. One of the reasons for the vessel 
grounding, determined by the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) when 
investigating this incident, was that there had been “inadequate teamwork“ by the vessel's crew. 
 
The MAIB report, recalling previous investigations and noting the “Green Lily” investigation, 
advised that many of the accidents investigated showed that team cohesion failed when non 
standard emergency or crisis situations occurred, leading to rising levels of personal stress. Under 
these stressful conditions:  
 
“engineer officers often show a lack of diagnostic skills, while deck officers fail to operate 
as an effective bridge team” (MAIB, 1999)  
 
One of the recommendations within the MAIB report into the "Green Lily" incident was directed 
towards the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA), and it was:  
 
“to commission a research study into how bridge and engine room simulators can best be 
used for bridge and engine room resource management training that includes escalating 
emergencies and increasing levels of stress. The results should be used to develop effective 
training for handling emergencies at sea” (MAIB, 1999) 
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The UK MCA responded to this recommendation by commissioning a research project to study 
‘simulator training for handling escalating emergencies’ (Habberley et al., 2001). One of this 
research project's recommendations was that: 
 
“Crisis management standards of competence are ill defined and consequently so are 
their ‘behavioural markers’ by which the standard may be assessed. More research is 
needed in this area, particularly in assessing the team working competencies.” 
 
It was this research outcome of the Habberley et al (2001) project that was the catalyst for this new 
research into the field of using behavioural markers for assessing competence in crisis 
management for merchant navy engineer officers. 
 
So how do safety critical organisations assess the competence of their crisis managers?  How do 
they do this objectively, and what are the assessment criteria they use? 
 
Of all the safety critical organisations, the military have taken crisis management training and 
assessment the furthest. This is done for a very good reason, as all combat situations are, by their 
very nature, crises.  
 
Tollcott (1992) states that the two primary components of military decision-making are:  
 
 situation assessment (what is happening); and 
 
 action selection (what to do about it). 
 
The first of these components requires crisis managers to generate hypotheses to account for the 
information that is being received. The second of these components requires the generation and 
evaluation of alternate actions. During a crisis these tasks have to be performed within a highly 
demanding decision-making environment. 
 
In certain circumstances, this demanding decision-making environment may become too 
demanding for the crisis manager, and they may find themselves unable to cope. This is described 
by Salas et al. (1996) as a situation when: 
 
“environmental demands evoke an appraisal process in which perceived demand exceeds 
resources and results in undesirable physiological, psychological, behavioural or social 
outcomes.”    
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Therefore, it is important within any safety critical organisation to try to determine whether the 
personnel placed in the role of potential crisis manager will be able to cope when a crisis arises. 
 
Following their participation in a major US military research project, ‘ Tactical Decision Making 
Under Stress’, Cannon-Bowers and Salas (1998) proposed a set of knowledge, skill and attitude 
requirements for teams to work effectively during crisis situations: 
 
“Team Knowledge Requirements: cue/strategy associations; knowledge of team-mate 
characteristics; shared task models; knowledge of team interaction patterns; task 
sequencing. 
 
Team Skill Requirements: adaptability; shared situational awareness; mutual performance 
monitoring; communication; decision-making; interpersonal skills; team leadership; 
assertiveness; conflict resolution. 
 
Team Attitude Requirements: collective efficacy; shared vision; team cohesion; mutual 
trust; collective orientation; importance of teamwork.” 
 
If indeed these are the requirements for an effective crisis management team; the assessment of 
competence in crisis management based upon these requirements is a daunting task. If assessment 
should be undertaken in an environment that closely resembles the real world situation, the 
capture of data to evaluate against assessment criteria relating to all of these requirements is a 
truly enormous task. 
 
Through their use of war games, the military attempt this task. They use large numbers of 
assessors, dispersed throughout the war-gaming environment during an assessment exercise. 
After the assessment exercise, the assessors meet to discuss their observations during the exercise, 
and to evaluate the actions of the team against set assessment criteria. Examples of these criteria 
are: 
 
“Was there a good flow of information into the control position at all times?” 
 
and 
 
“Was the incident picture well kept?” 
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These criteria are assessed as having been either ‘met’ or ‘not met’. A discussion is then held 
between assessors to give an overall assessment of how the team performed. Due to the severe 
time restraints imposed on the assessment process, because of the operational requirements of the 
military, and the sheer complexity of the war-gaming environment, subjective assessments are 
inevitable. However, because of the large number of assessors used, effective assessments can be 
achieved through moderation. 
 
The civil aviation industry has recently been undertaking research into the possibility of assessing 
the non-technical skills of aircrew. Non-technical skills are defined as those skills, in addition to 
technical skills, required for competence in crisis management. Through the Joint Aviation 
Requirements Translation and Elaboration of Legislation (JAR TEL) research project (JAR TEL 
Consortium, 2001), a methodology for assessing the non-technical skills of aircrew, by observing 
individual overt behaviours, has been proposed. 
 
The cockpit environment is very different to that of a war-gaming environment, but the non-
technical skills of co-operation, leadership and management, situational awareness and decision 
making, as metrics for assessing competence in crisis management, are common to both. 
However, a major difference between the assessment of competence in crisis management within 
the military context and the civil aviation context is that within the military context a team is 
assessed, whereas within the civil aviation context it is the assessment of an individual working 
within a team that is undertaken. 
 
The JAR TEL non-technical skills or ‘NOTECHS’ assessment framework provides definitions of 
the non-technical skills to be assessed and gives the assessor examples of overt behaviours that 
indicate good or poor practice of these skills. 
 
An example skill element under the category of ‘Co-operation’ is “team building and maintaining”. 
 
An example of an overt behaviour indicating poor practice of this skill element is: 
 
“Keeps barriers between crew members.” 
 
An example of an overt behaviour indicating good practice of this skill element is: 
 
“Encourages inputs and feedback from others (lowers the barriers).”  
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Although the ‘NOTECHS’ framework has moved the assessment of competence in crisis 
management, within the context of civil aviation, towards a more objective foundation, the 
experimental results of interrater reliability trials showed that in the more complex assessment 
scenarios there were significantly divergent assessments. 
 
The JAR TEL report states that there are some strongly held reservations, by some members of the 
aviation fraternity, about the very concept of the assessment of non-technical skills. One of the 
prime reservations being that: 
 
“it is felt that the criteria on which assessment is based are largely subjective and thus cannot 
easily be monitored for fairness and accuracy”  
 
Through the Seafarer’s Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) Code, Table A-V/2 
(IMO, 1995), the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has provided the competence 
specification of a minimum standard of competence in crisis management and human behaviour 
for those officers who have responsibilities for passengers. As within the civil aviation industry, 
these competencies relate to individuals working within a team. The required underpinning 
knowledge, understanding and proficiency, are stated for each competence, along with methods 
for demonstrating competence and criteria for evaluating competence. 
 
IMO does not differentiate between crises and emergencies, and the Table A-V/2 relates primarily 
to the management of emergencies, citing the use of procedures and actions in accordance with 
established plans as a criterion for evaluating competence.  
 
The assessment criteria given in Table A-V/2 of STCW 95 are also highly subjective, an example 
being: 
 
“Information given to individuals, emergency response teams and passengers is accurate, 
relevant and timely.” 
 
From the examples above it can be seen that different safety critical organisations undertake the 
assessment of competence in crisis management in very different ways.  
 
Experience within the military context has shown that the crisis management assessment 
framework used has been both fair and effective. However, this has been achieved through the 
use of a huge amount of resources, both within the assessment environment and the assessor 
team. 
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Within the context of civil aviation the use of overt behavioural markers as criteria for assessing 
competence in crisis management skills has been attempted, and has been shown to be successful 
when used to assess personnel within simple, non-crisis, scenarios. However, the current 
assessment framework has been shown to be unreliable when used to assess personnel within 
complex, crisis, scenarios. 
 
Within the merchant marine context, the assessment framework for crisis management and 
human behaviour is too open to interpretation to be effective. 
 
Any framework for the assessment of competence in crisis management within the context of the 
merchant marine would not have the resources available to it that the military has. The civil 
aviation assessment framework for non-technical skills, although feasible to apply within the 
merchant marine context, has not yet been shown to be reliable in assessing competence in crisis 
management. 
 
 
1.2    AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
 
This research has been undertaken in order to provide the international maritime community with 
an understanding of how a behavioural marker system could be applied for the assessment of 
competence in crisis management of merchant marine officers. 
 
The aims of this research were: 
 
 to understand how behavioural markers can be used to objectively assess competence in 
crisis management of merchant navy engineer officers. 
 
 to understand the methods by which these behavioural markers can be elicited and 
assessed. 
 
Data were collected and analysed using ethnographic study techniques during simulated crisis 
scenarios within a high-fidelity ship’s engine control room environment.  
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It should be stated that this high-fidelity ship’s engine control room environment was supplied by 
the use of an engine room simulator. This simulator provided a realistic working environment 
and all of the environmental cues that would be present in a real ship’s engine room control room. 
Without the use of such a simulator it would be impossible to undertake this research as crisis 
scenarios cannot be presented for research purposes in the real world, as this presents too great a 
risk to personnel, material assets and the environment. 
 
This research has led to the development of an assessment framework that can be applied within 
the merchant navy engine room control room context for the fair and effective assessment of 
competence in crisis management. 
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Chapter 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1    THEMES OF A CRISIS 
 
In order to review the literature relating to competence in crisis management, the term ‘crisis’ 
should first be defined, and a differentiation should be made between a crisis and an emergency.  
 
A crisis can be defined as: 
 
“A crucial stage or turning point in the course of something, especially a sequence of 
events” (Makins, 1994).  
 
The implication from this definition is that a crisis situation will demand a decision be made; 
doing nothing is not an option. 
 
An emergency can be defined as: 
 
An unexpected situation that requires the implementation of a previously 
planned procedure in order to prevent its escalation leading to possible harm to 
property, the environment and life. 
 
The implication from this definition is that an emergency also demands that decisions be made, 
the difference being that in an emergency these decisions can be based upon a predefined 
response plan. 
 
A differentiation can be made between emergencies and crises, which can be used to clarify what 
is meant by the term ‘crisis management’.  Habberley et al (2001) highlight the following issues 
that can lead an emergency to become a crisis: 
 
 there is no emergency procedure for the particular situation presented 
 
 the emergency procedure for the particular situation is not known to those involved 
 
 the relevant emergency procedure is incorrectly followed due to a lack of emergency 
preparedness training 
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 there are multiple emergencies occurring simultaneously which have conflicting 
resource requirements 
 
 there are insufficient resources to carry out the relevant emergency procedure 
 
 the personnel involved have insufficient knowledge and / or experience to recognise 
the emergency situation 
 
 the personnel involved have insufficient knowledge and / or experience to carry out the 
relevant emergency procedure. 
 
Habberley et al (2001) also argue that if there is an overall lack of knowledge and experience 
within a team faced with an emergency situation, aspects of group polarisation and groupthink 
can play an important part in the escalation of an emergency to a crisis. Group polarisation being 
the observable fact that teams tend to be more extreme in their decision-making than individuals. 
Groupthink being the term used to describe the problem in decision-making where highly 
cohesive teams tend to strive for the unanimity of decisions, rather than appraising different 
courses of action (Janis, 1982).  
 
A crisis could therefore be further defined as a situation that has developed from the escalation of 
an emergency, due to an inability to respond effectively to that emergency. This inability to 
respond effectively may be due to a lack of knowledge, experience, or resources, or any 
combination of these. In the American Bureau of Shipping review and analysis of maritime 
accident databases (American Bureau of Shipping, 2004) it is shown that in up to 28% of maritime 
accidents, the primary causal factor is the crewmembers’ lack of awareness of the situation they 
are in.  If there is a lack of awareness of the emergency situation facing a team, it will much more 
readily develop into a crisis. This is because the emergency may well have escalated outside the 
limits of any applicable emergency procedure, or the abilities of the team to deal with the 
emergency, before the team becomes aware of the emergency situation they are facing.  
 
Borodzicz and van Haperen (2002) propose that a crisis is an ill-structured and complex event that 
requires the respondents to interactively create a solution. This supports the view that in a crisis 
the respondents do not have the luxury of following an already laid down course of action in 
order to recover the situation. 
 
Barnett et al (2002) summarise the difference between a crisis and an emergency as: 
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“A crisis differs from an emergency in that successful decisions and actions may not 
necessarily be based on documented procedures. Appropriate pre-defined responses may 
not exist, and even if they do, in practice they may have conflicting requirements.  Those 
responsible for handling crises will have to think through the situation, and respond in 
creative and flexible ways.” 
  
What are therefore the skills required to handle a crisis? They must be skills that enable the crisis 
manager to think through the situation they find themselves in, to move towards an 
understanding of the situation, and to respond in creative and flexible ways as the situation 
develops, in order to facilitate a successful outcome. If the crisis managers have these skills, how 
are we then to assess their competence in managing a crisis? 
 
The assessment of competence in crisis management could be undertaken in a number of different 
ways. It has been argued that the way in which any phenomenon is assessed is dependent upon 
the way that phenomenon is initially conceptualised and defined (Kuhn, 1970). If competence is 
conceptualised as consisting of knowledge and skills, and the ability to apply these in the context 
where the competence is required, then its assessment must also relate to these dimensions. 
Although some form of examination can be used to assess the level of underpinning knowledge 
and the level of knowledge of skills, and even the level of knowledge about the application of 
these skills, it cannot assess the ability to practically apply these skills. In order to be able to assess 
the practical application of the underpinning knowledge and skills of competence, some form of 
performance-based assessment is required. 
 
In order to be able to undertake a performance-based assessment for competence in crisis 
management it is first necessary to define the set of knowledge and skills that are required for a 
candidate to be a competent crisis manager.  It is against this “standard” that any assessment of 
performance will be made. It is then necessary to design some form of assessment regime in 
which the candidate being assessed can demonstrate their ability to apply their knowledge and 
skills, in order to show they can perform to a level that is acceptable when measured against the 
predefined standard of competence. It is the capability of the assessment regime to elicit a 
performance by the candidate that resembles as closely as possible their performance in the real 
world that will ultimately determine if the assessment regime is successful or not. However, the 
assessment regime not only needs to elicit this ‘real’ performance, but it also has to capture and 
evaluate the markers against which this performance will be assessed. 
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The construct validity of any assessment framework is very important. Does the method of 
assessment actually measure that which it is trying to measure? In the case of competence in crisis 
management, could a paper and pencil test, a computer based assessment exercise, or viva voce 
type examination, be a valid method of assessing competence?  
 
In order to answer this question it is first necessary to define what is meant by competence. There 
are many various definitions of competence, but most relate to the application of knowledge to 
perform a required skill to a predetermined standard. The UK Health and Safety Executive (2003) 
states that: 
 
“competence is equated to an ability to perform to the expected standard. Hence, 
competence assessment entails measuring a person’s performance against a standard.” 
 
If it is a person’s ‘performance’ that needs to be measured, the assessment environment must 
allow the person being assessed to ‘perform’. This ‘performance’ will have to include the elements 
that are set down within the standard against which the competence is being assessed.  
 
Gipps (1994) argues that “there is an intimate connection between skills and the contexts in which they 
are used”. If competence in crisis management is a skill, and it is this skill that is to be assessed, the 
context in which this skill will be measured against a standard would appear to be very 
important. 
 
Resnick and Resnick (1992) argue that: 
 
“We cannot teach a skill component in one setting and expect it to be applied 
automatically in another. This means, in turn, that we cannot validly assess a competence 
in a context very different from the context in which it is practiced or used.” 
In order to ensure the construct validity of the assessment, it would therefore seem appropriate to 
assess competence in crisis management in the context of a simulated crisis scenario. This would 
provide a context that was as close as possible to the context in which the competence of crisis 
management was used.  
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Following an extensive study into competence assessment methods used in different hazardous 
industries the UK Health and Safety Executive (2003) concluded that in relation to the competence 
assessment of interpersonal skills, team management skills and safety behaviours and attitudes, 
whilst psychometric personality tests may provide a prediction of these skills, behaviours and 
attitudes: 
 
“Observation of actual behaviour in the work setting using behavioural markers tends to 
provide a more valid measure.”  
 
It will be seen from the discussion later in this chapter that the management of crises requires the 
application of interpersonal skills and team management skills, as well as safety behaviours and 
attitudes. Because of this, the observation of actual behaviour in a setting that is as close to the 
work setting as possible is thought to be the best way of assessing competence in crisis 
management. 
 
If we are to assess competence in the management of crises, we need to be able to in some way 
observe the crisis manager at work. We need to be able to ascertain what actions the crisis 
manager takes as elements in a process towards the outcome of the crisis scenario. The actions 
taken can be characterised by the behaviours exhibited during their enactment. It is therefore 
feasible that by relating these overt behaviours to the outcome of a crisis scenario, some measure 
of competence in crisis management may be possible. The following sections will discuss the 
relative merits of the use of behavioural markers, verbal protocols, and cognitive analysis, as 
metrics for the assessment of competence.   
 
 
2.2    THE USE OF OVERT BEHAVIOURAL MARKERS FOR ASSESSMENT 
 
Behavioural marker systems were first developed in the aviation industry for the training and 
assessment of flight crews (Helmreich et al, 1994). Behavioural markers systems have 
subsequently been developed in other safety critical industries and organisations such as nuclear 
power generation, the military and medicine. In the report from the Kolleg Group Interaction in 
High Risk Environments Behavioural Markers Workshop (Klampfer & Jochum, 2001), a series of 
statements were made proposing what the workshop participants considered to make a good 
behavioural marker: 
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 it describes a specific, observable behaviour, not an attitude or personality trait, with clear 
definition (enactment of skills or knowledge is shown in behaviour); 
 it has demonstrated a causal relationship to performance outcome; 
– it does not have to be present in all situations; 
– its appropriateness depends on context; 
 it uses domain specific language that reflects the operational environment; 
 it employs simple phraseology; 
 it describes a clear concept. 
 
Although helpful when considering whether a particular behaviour should be used as a marker, 
these statements are open to some interpretation. Within the context of a crisis scenario, whether a 
particular behaviour can be demonstrated to have a direct causal relationship to the overall 
performance outcome of the crisis may be difficult. Whereas, the causal relationship between a 
particular behaviour and the performance outcome of a discrete task or subgoal within the overall 
management of the crisis, might be more easily established. One of the statements makes the point 
that behavioural markers have a contextual specificity, implying that behavioural marker systems 
are not directly transferable between domains. The workshop report goes on to state, “behavioural 
marker systems do not transfer across domains and cultures without adaptation”. This is because 
behavioural markers are directly related to the overt behaviours exhibited by the persons 
undertaking tasks within their working environment, and these tasks are context specific. 
 
Klampfer and Jochum (2001) also discuss the characteristics of good behavioural marker systems, 
and propose the following:   
 
 Validity: in relation to performance outcome; 
 Reliability: interrater reliability, internal consistency; 
 Sensitivity: in relation to levels of performance; 
 Transparency: the observed understand the performance criteria against which they are being 
rated, availability of reliability and validity data; 
 Usability: easy to train, simple framework, easy to understand, domain appropriate language, 
sensitive to rater workload, easy to observe; 
 Can provide a focus for training goals and needs; 
 Baselines for performance criteria are used appropriately for experience level of rater (i.e., ab 
initio vs. experienced ratees); 
 Minimal overlap between components. 
 
Chapter 2                                                                                                                             Literature Review 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Behavioural Markers for the Assessment of Competence in Crisis Management                               19  
The relationship between the validity of the behavioural marker system and the performance 
outcome raises the interesting question of whether this performance is overall performance, or 
performance related to subgoals. If using a behavioural marker system to assess performance in 
the workplace, then relating the assessment to overall performance outcome may indeed be 
worthwhile and indeed necessary. However, if using a behavioural marker system to assess 
competence in a simulated environment, could the validity of the system be related to the 
successful completion of subgoals, and not to overall performance outcome? This issue will be 
discussed later in section 2.15. 
 
Any behavioural marker system that is used must be reliable, objective and unambiguous if it is 
going to provide consistent assessments when used by different assessors. As with all assessment 
frameworks, the interrater reliability and agreement are powerful metrics for measuring this 
reliability. The reliability of the assessment framework will stem from its usability. If raters find 
the system is easy to understand and use, it will be reliable. 
 
The sensitivity of any assessment framework to the level of performance is also very important, 
especially when assessing competence. On the one hand, the assessment framework must ensure 
that those who are not competent are not assessed as being competent, and on the other hand, 
those who are competent should not be assessed as being not competent. Many competency 
assessment frameworks only have two assessment levels, “competent” and “not yet competent”. 
Therefore, in order for these systems to give a fair and objective assessment, they have to be very 
sensitive in relation to the levels of performance of candidates. Also, if candidates of differing 
levels of experience are to be assessed, the assessment criteria used must be shown to be valid for 
those differing levels of experience. 
 
The transparency of the performance criteria is also an important issue, and it can be argued that 
it would be unfair, and unethical, for a candidate to be unaware of the criteria against which they 
were to be assessed. However, in relation to a behavioural marker based assessment system, it 
does raise the issue of whether candidates can learn how to exhibit the correct discrete behaviours 
that are the behavioural markers, rather than learning to be wholly competent in the task being 
assessed. The argument against this issue being a problem is that, if a candidate exhibits the 
behaviours that are the behavioural markers of a competent performance, it follows that they are 
competent. However, this also goes to show how necessary it is that the behavioural markers used 
are indeed valid, and can be shown to be valid.  
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The characteristics proposed by Klampfer and Jochum (2001) for the provision of focus for 
training goals and needs, and the minimal overlap between components of the behavioural 
marker system, are generic characteristics of any good assessment system. 
 
Klampfer and Jochum (2001) go on to suggest that behavioural marker systems are limited 
because they “cannot capture every aspect of performance and behaviour” due to the: 
 
 limited occurrence of some behaviours 
- these are important but infrequent behaviours, such as conflict resolution; 
 
 limitations of human observers 
- distraction, overload (e.g., in complex situations, or when observing large teams). 
 
It is true that during any competence assessment based in the workplace it may not be possible to 
observe all of the behaviours that make up the assessment framework because the opportunities 
for those behaviours to be exhibited may not arise. However, if the assessment is undertaken in a 
simulated environment, the assessment exercise can be designed to ensure that opportunities are 
presented for all of the behaviours within the assessment framework to be exhibited. 
 
The limitations of the assessors to be able to fully capture, and interpret, all of the behaviours 
being exhibited during the assessment is a serious limitation to the use of behavioural markers 
systems, in both workplace and simulated environments. However, at least in simulated 
environments it may be possible to capture most aspects of candidates’ performance and 
behaviour, with the use of video recordings. As long as time and resources then permit, even the 
behaviours exhibited during complex situations, and amongst large interactive teams, could then 
be captured and assessed. 
   
The behavioural marker assessment framework must, as far as possible, be designed to ensure 
that it is capable of capturing the fullest context of the environment in which the assessment is 
taking place. This must include the interaction between the candidate being assessed and the rest 
of the team members within the assessment environment. It must also capture any aspect of the 
assessment environment that might impact upon the candidate’s performance, such as the cues 
being generated within the environment, the hardware that makes up the environment, and the 
complexities of the assessment scenario. Klampfer and Jochum (2001) give an example where the 
candidate being assessed is part of a team. They make the point that the behaviour of any one of 
the other team members within the candidate’s team, could have either an adverse or positive 
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affect on the assessment of the candidate. They argue that behavioural marker based assessment 
frameworks should be designed to detect and record such effects.  
 
The argument that if a candidate is being assessed when performing as part of a team, then their 
assessment may be affected by the actions of the other team members, is based upon the premise 
that the behavioural markers being used within the assessment framework may be affected by the 
other team members. Some behaviours of the candidate will surely be affected by the actions of 
other team members, however, it might be possible to determine some behavioural markers that 
are not affected by the actions of other team members. It is these markers that would be the most 
efficacious in forming an assessment framework for assessing a candidate performing as part of a 
team, as they could lead to an assessment that was independent of the actions of other team 
members. However, dealing with difficult or disruptive team members is a reality, and so could 
be treated as just another element of the assessment environment. In fact, the actions of other team 
members could be viewed as bringing more ‘real-world’ fidelity to the context in which the 
assessment is being undertaken. 
 
Oser et al (1989) determined a set of overt behaviours that discriminated between more and less 
effective teams. This set of indicative behavioural markers comprised:  
 
 Thanking another team member for pointing out a mistake; 
 
 Helping other team members having difficulty; 
 
 Making motivating statements; 
 
 Praising other team members; 
 
 Suggesting ways to find an error. 
 
 
This study by Oser et al. is evidence that a relatively small set of behavioural markers can be used 
to successfully assess the level of effectiveness of a team. If these overt behaviours are metrics that 
can be used to discriminate between more or less effective teams, they could also be useful in 
assessing competence in crisis management. A team that is effective is more likely to be good at 
managing a crisis, and more likely to have a competent team leader.  
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The use of behavioural markers is generally accepted as a valid approach to the assessment of 
competence in many safety critical industries and organisations. However, the way in which these 
various industries and organisations both use and validate their behavioural marker based 
competence assessment frameworks can be quite different.  A number of these assessment 
frameworks, and their associated problems, are discussed in chapter 3.  
 
Throughout this literature review, any potential behavioural markers that could be used in the 
assessment of competence in crisis management will be recorded and evaluated in more detail in 
chapter 5.   
 
The use of overt behavioural markers as assessment criteria is a way of directly observing the 
outputs of the cognitive processes taking place within the minds of those being assessed. 
However, there are also assessment methods that try to assess the cognitive processes themselves, 
by using techniques to infer the cognitive processes that lead to the decisions that produce the 
observable behaviours. One such technique is the analysis of verbal protocols. 
  
 
2.3    THE USE OF VERBAL PROTOCOLS FOR ASSESSMENT 
 
Another method of assessing competence in crisis management is to try to assess the cognitive 
processes used by crisis managers to reach their decisions. Although we do not have direct access 
to the cognitive processes of crisis managers (Miller, 1962), verbal protocols have been used to 
infer the cognitive processes that have led to decisions within crisis situations. Competence is then 
assessed by subject matter experts analysing the inferred cognitive processes and comparing these 
to the cognitive processes expected to be used by an expert. However, the use of concurrent verbal 
reporting, or ‘thinking aloud’, during team based crisis management exercises can be very 
disruptive to the management task. Team members can become confused between the 
communication required to undertake the task and the concurrent verbal reporting. During a 
crisis situation there can often be a greater level of communication between team members, and it 
can be more critical that this communication is effective. Therefore, the use of concurrent verbal 
reporting to facilitate assessment can have a very detrimental affect on the performance of the 
team, by getting in the way of essential communications that are required in order to effectively 
manage the crisis situation.  
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Bainbridge (1974) argues that in order to infer cognitive processes from concurrent verbal reports, 
it is necessary to assume that there is an undistorted mapping between the cognitive processes 
and the verbal protocols. Two of the cognitive processes that might be inferred from the use of 
verbal protocols are “feedback control”, a reactive management approach, and “predictive 
control”, a proactive management approach. Bainbridge proposes that inexperienced process 
operators use feedback rather than predictive control when undertaking a process task. 
Experienced operators use a greater degree of predictive control. If it is assumed that predictive 
control is necessary for the effective management of a crisis, then the ratio of the degree of 
feedback control exhibited to the degree of predictive control exhibited may be a behavioural 
marker that can be used to assess competence in crisis management.      
 
Bainbridge also observed that even when some operators have correctly verbalised the next action 
to take, they have difficulty in committing to taking the action. It is suggested that the depth of 
consideration given to the decision to take an action is related both to the amount of processing 
time available and to the level of knowledge of the task. If time is short, such as during a crisis 
situation, there may be trade-off between the speed of decision-making and the efficacy of the 
decision. It could therefore be argued that the use of concurrent verbal reporting will inevitably 
use up some of the time available to the crisis manager for decision-making, and could therefore 
affect the efficacy of the decisions made, possibly resulting in a poorer outcome and consequently 
a poorer assessment.  
 
In order to overcome the problems of concurrent verbal reporting mentioned above, some 
researchers have used a methodology that only analyses the communication between team 
members, and does not require team members to also try and concurrently verbalise their thought 
processes. Serfaty et al (1994) proposed a system for analysing and assessing team communication 
and coordination by mapping message destinations against message type and content. The system 
utilised a trained observer who recorded the direction, type and content of each utterance onto a 
matrix. Instances of type referred to whether, for example, the message was a request or a transfer. 
Instances of content referred to whether, for example, the message was providing information, 
calling for a specific action or calling for a complete task to be undertaken. These metrics were 
analysed to see where improvements could be made in the team’s performance through what the 
researchers called “Team Adaptation and Coordination Training” (TACT). 
 
Communication patterns were measured by the TACT research team in both high and low stress 
scenarios. The areas where it was found that teams were weak and required training were: 
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 lack of information flow towards the team leader from other team members; 
 
 low level of anticipation of future required actions and the needs of other team members. 
 
The research team cited these deficiencies as support for their hypothesis that: 
 
“Implicit team coordination mechanisms are essential to effective adaptation to stress.” 
 
Communication direction diagrams, such as that shown in Figure 1., were used to map 
information flow within teams. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Figure 1:  Communication Direction Diagram (Serfaty, Entin and Deckert, 1994) 
 
 
Serfaty and Entin (1997) proposed that reciprocal monitoring and backup behaviours between 
team members can lead to each team member learning about the other team members’ needs, 
proclivities, and tasks, and thereby develop highly congruent mutual mental models of the 
situation they are working in. Once a congruent mental model has been established the team 
members’ communications can shift from being explicit to implicit, and they can start to anticipate 
the needs of the other team members. By giving periodic situation assessment updates to the other 
team members, a team leader can improve the congruence and validity of the mental model 
shared by the team. They go on to argue that such behaviours increase team performance and 
efficiency, particularly during emergency or crisis situations. 
 
The level of anticipation of a team member, or team leader, to the needs of other members of the 
team, and of future action and task requirements, can therefore be seen as a metric that could be 
used for the assessment of competence in crisis management. This metric could consist of the 
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amount of relevant information communicated in anticipation of need, as a ratio of the amount of 
relevant information available, and could be used as a behavioural marker. However, this type of 
behavioural marker may be found to be difficult to use during live assessments, where the 
assessor is making observations solely during the assessment scenario and not from a recording of 
the scenario, because of the amount of data the assessor would have to keep track of.  
 
Breaking a complex task down into easily managed sections, each with its own goal, has been 
shown to be a cognitive process employed when a complex task is undertaken, and has been 
termed ‘subgoal formation’ (Resnick, 1987). Empirical evidence for this has come from studies of 
industrial plant operators actually undertaking complex dynamic tasks where records have been 
made of the verbal interaction between the operators (Pew, Miller, & Feeher, 1981; Rasmussen, 
1986; Reinartz & Reinartz, 1989). In these studies the authors propose that the moment-to-moment 
thinking of the operators can be inferred by their verbal commentary as the operators interact 
with the industrial process to achieve the goals of the task. 
 
By an analysis of the verbal transcripts of operators responding to a process fault, Pew et al. (1981) 
inferred that a number of different types of cognitive processes occurred such as interpretation, 
expectation, intention, and action. A distinction was made between the task goals and the 
cognitive goals involved in meeting the task goals. For example, the task goal may be to maintain 
a steam pressure of 20 bar. The cognitive subgoals involved in meeting this may be to find out 
what the pressure is now, to determine if this is within acceptable limits, and to determine, if 
required, how the pressure can be restored (Bainbridge, 1992). The overall task goal is therefore 
broken down into manageable cognitive goal modules (i.e. subgoal formation takes place). It is the 
identification of these cognitive processing modules that the studies of operator’s verbal 
commentaries have tried to achieve. Although the specific goals associated with these modules 
may vary from task to task, these studies have proposed that the cognitive processing within the 
modules can be seen to be applicable to any task. 
 
The analysis of verbal protocols is one way of analysing the cognitive processes of the crisis 
manager. However, as discussed above, this analysis is complex, and in order to infer the 
cognitive processes, extremely detailed studies of the verbal protocols need to be undertaken. This 
means that the assessment of competence in crisis management by the use of verbal protocols 
could only be achieved through a detailed analysis of a recording of the assessment scenario, and 
could not be carried out in real time.  
 
Chapter 2                                                                                                                             Literature Review 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Behavioural Markers for the Assessment of Competence in Crisis Management                               26  
A further method of assessment is to infer the cognitive processes by analysing the metacognition 
of a person. This method is known as cognitive analysis, and uses interviews to codify the 
knowledge a person has about their own cognitive processes and the factors that may have 
influenced these processes.  
 
 
2.4    THE USE OF COGNITIVE ANALYSIS FOR ASSESSMENT 
 
In order to evaluate the possible use of cognitive analysis for the assessment of competence in 
crisis management, a number of theoretical perspectives related to cognition need to be reviewed. 
This section will first discuss theories of cognitive processing and will then discuss the cognitive 
skills in which competence may be required to allow complex dynamic tasks to be undertaken 
successfully. The discussion will then move on to our understanding of the way we structure and 
use knowledge to meet our cognitive goals when undertaking a complex dynamic task. The final 
part of this section will look at the way in which these cognitive skills might be used for the 
assessment of competence in crisis management. 
 
 
2.4.1 Cognitive Processes 
 
The analysis of any cognitive processes involved in the management of a crisis is made difficult by 
virtue of the fact that cognitive processes are covert. There have been a number of theories that 
place the cognitive processes within an information-processing model of input-processing-output 
(McCormick, Jeanneret, & Mecham, 1969; Miller, 1974; Cunningham, Boese, Neeb, & Pass, 1983). 
These theories attempt to distinguish the cognitive processes occurring at different stages of the 
information processing sequence. Reinartz and Reinartz (1989) observed process operators 
undertaking complex dynamic tasks during the operation of a nuclear power plant. These authors 
attempted to relate the overt activities of the operators to the covert cognitive processes behind 
them. They categorized the cognitive processes into five activity groups: 
 
 data/information collecting; 
 information processing; 
 planning and strategy; 
 actions; 
 team specific: information distribution, task allocation, and management. 
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If the overt behaviours relating to the exemplary performance of these activities can be identified, 
they could be used to assess competence in undertaking complex tasks. When different complex 
tasks, such as the management of crises, are analysed, it has been found that the same types of 
cognitive processing skills are used (Simon, 1976). This suggests that if it were possible to train 
crisis managers to improve their performance in using these cognitive processes, operational 
performance could be improved across a range of different complex tasks. Some of the common 
cognitive processes employed when a complex dynamic task is undertaken have been identified 
as: 
 
means-end analysis: comparing the desired outcome of a task with that which may be achieved by 
current actions (Resnick, 1987); 
 
subgoal formation: breaking the task down into easily managed sections each with its own goal 
(Resnick, 1987); 
 
generate and test routines: generating actions to test hypothesis (Resnick, 1987); 
 
symptom matching: matching symptoms to a related condition (Rasmussen, 1984); 
 
application of heuristics: applying known rules or procedures (Patrick, 1989). 
 
These information-processing models are highly discriminating, breaking down the cognitive 
processes into discrete psychological aspects. Because of their discrete nature, these aspects are 
not dependent upon the context of the task in which they are involved. The failure of these 
models is that they do not identify any interaction between the discrete psychological aspects of 
the overall cognitive process. This interaction is thought to be controlled by some higher-order 
cognitive activity (Sternberg, 1980; Feuerstein, 1980). For example, the psychological aspects 
associated with responding to an industrial process alarm may be: 
 
 activation (detection of the need for action); 
 orienting response; 
 information seeking; 
 hypothesis testing (Reinartz & Reinartz, 1989). 
 
These aspects follow a logical sequence, but to direct this sequence it seems reasonable to assume 
that some controlling influence will be required. The processes that make up this controlling 
influence have been termed ‘metacognitive’ processes. When attempting to analyse any complex 
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dynamic task it is therefore necessary not only to identify the discrete psychological aspects, but 
the controlling metacognitive processes as well (Patrick, 1992). Brown, Bransford, Ferrara, & 
Campione, (1983) view a person’s ability to control the discrete psychological aspects of a task in 
terms of metacognitive skills. They propose that these skills are used to keep track of one’s own 
understanding. They also relate these skills to the effectiveness of learning, by the organisation of 
attention. However, some theories have suggested that these metacognitive skills appear to be 
dependent upon specific knowledge (Voss, Greene, Post, & Penner, 1983; Glaser, 1984). If these 
theories were correct, then it would be best to develop these skills within the context of their use 
where the specific knowledge is available. These theories therefore also bring into question the 
degree to which metacognitive skills can be developed within one context of use and then be 
transferred for use within a different context.  
 
So what are the cognitive skills required to effectively undertake a complex dynamic task such as 
the management of a crisis, and how do we go about the analysis of these skills in order to 
facilitate their assessment? The following section will  discuss these issues. 
 
 
2.4.2 Cognitive Skills 
 
If the performance of a team leader undertaking a complex dynamic task, such as the 
management of a crisis, is to be accurately assessed, it will first be necessary to analyse the 
cognitive skills required by the operator. Patrick (1992) proposes three areas of study for this 
analysis: 
 
 identifying the specific knowledge associated with the task; 
 determining alternative representations of the same knowledge; 
 assembling types of knowledge and their representations into a complete and 
coherent model of expert performance. 
 
Knowledge can be categorized into two types, declarative and procedural (Anderson, 1985).  
Declarative knowledge is factual; it can be stated and made explicit and is not context related. 
Procedural knowledge relates to how a task is performed and is often implicit and is context 
specific. Anderson (1985) proposes that cognitive skills are acquired by the transformation of 
declarative knowledge into procedural knowledge. He suggests that this transformation initially 
uses general problem solving procedures and analogies to allow the plant operator to develop 
appropriate procedures while actually doing the task. He, further, proposes that the acquired 
cognitive skills are improved through the practice of these procedures. During this practice, the 
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procedures are tuned, and each time they are successfully used makes them more likely to be 
activated again in the future. The implication from this process is that any assessment of a 
candidate’s specific procedural knowledge of the elements within a complex dynamic task, such 
as crisis management, can only be obtained by an ‘in-context’ practical demonstration of 
competence.  
 
The procedural knowledge is a set of rules relating to how a task is performed. The construction 
of these rules is accomplished by doing the task (Anzai & Simon, 1979). Even if a plant operator is 
told in advance the rules that relate to the performance of a task, until that task is performed, the 
operator will not be able to internalise them. Cognitive skills are developed by “doing” (Patrick, 
1992). 
 
Depending upon the domain in which a task is undertaken, there will be many different types of 
declarative knowledge. This knowledge will be internally structured by the plant operator in 
some way. Certain theories have indicated that this structure takes the form of a mental model 
(Gentner & Stevens, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 1983). As this declarative knowledge is transformed into 
procedural knowledge, the mental model becomes dynamic (Bainbridge, 1993). The operator uses 
knowledge of plant constraints, inferences of process state to response required, process time 
constants, plant variable associations, and typical event sequences to build this dynamic model. 
Gentner and Stevens (1983) propose that these mental models will provide predictive and 
explanatory abilities for the operator to understand their interaction with the plant. These abilities 
will be especially important if the operator finds himself or herself leading the response to a crisis 
situation. 
 
Depending upon the context in which the crisis manager structures any knowledge and their own 
perspective of that knowledge, the same knowledge may be represented in different ways 
(Ohlsson, 1986). Wittgenstein (1963) proposed that the aspect of an object that we perceive is not a 
property of the object, but an internal relation between it and other objects. This can be graphically 
demonstrated by looking at reversible figures such as that shown in Figure 2. How we internally 
relate particular elements of this drawing affects the way in which we perceive it. The drawing 
offers two aspects, one of an ugly old woman and one of a beautiful young woman. By internally 
relating the individual elements of this drawing in two different ways, our perception is radically 
changed, to the extent that what we perceive to be the eye of the ugly old woman, becomes the ear 
of the beautiful young woman. 
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Figure 2:  The ‘wife/mother-in-law’ reversible figure. 
 
 
The way in which we perceive cues from the environment may, therefore, be said to be influenced 
by the context in which we see them. The same could be said to be true of the crisis management 
process. How the crisis manager structures the cues from the environment that he or she retrieves 
will determine what interpretation he or she may place upon them. The crisis manager must, 
therefore, be aware of this so that he or she can prevent any misinterpretation by guiding their 
transformation of knowledge and questioning their interpretation of the knowledge gained. 
 
Observations during machinery space simulator training courses have shown evidence of the 
benefit of crisis managers questioning their interpretations of knowledge. When working as a 
team, team members can be taught to review their interpretations of knowledge. Through their 
individual perceptions, the members of the team will have different interpretations. By discussing 
these differences of interpretation the trainees often arrive at an improved shared interpretation. 
Fewer misinterpretations have been observed when this team review is carried out  (Gatfield, 
1999).  
 
This team review process uses two alternate representations of the same knowledge, the pattern-
type representation of the visual stimuli from the plant instrumentation, and the semantic type 
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representation of the discussion between the team members (Bainbridge, 1988). Both 
representations are used together to arrive at an interpretation of knowledge upon which an 
action may be based. The idea that the way in which we group stimuli and knowledge, causes us 
to interpret and structure them in a certain way, has been put forward as part of the Gestalt 
Theory (Wertheimer, 1959). One of Wertheimer’s hypotheses is that in order to be a successful 
problem solver, a person requires the skill to be able to see the overall structure of a problem. He 
proposes that the problem solver first characterises a certain region of the problem structure as 
being crucial. By focusing on the interaction of the different parameters of the problem with the 
crucial region, the structure of the problem becomes better understood. This understanding 
enables the problem solver to make reasonable predictions to test his or her hypotheses for a 
solution. The cognitive skill of being able to structure a complete and consistent picture of the 
problem situation is seen as essential to the success of problem solving behaviour. Gestalt Theory 
is, therefore, a way of looking at how cognitive processes are organised and structured overall, 
and how this overall organisation and structure affects the cognitive skill of a person. 
 
In the process of analysing cognitive skills, reference can be made to a model of best performance. 
This is the model of how an expert in a particular field performs within that field. The expert will 
use numerous types of knowledge in many different ways when undertaking the skilled 
performance of a complex dynamic task (Singleton, 1989). In an example of an operator 
diagnosing a fault with an industrial process, Singleton observes the following: 
 
 most of the information used during the diagnosis does not come from stimuli 
or cues, but from their absence; 
 the operator relies on a hybrid model of the plant using heuristics, mental 
pictures, and symbolism; 
 there is little conscious guidance to the cognitive process, it takes more the 
form of a chain of events, each cognitive or physical event leading on one to 
another. 
 
The overt nature of operators’ interaction with the stimuli, or absence of stimuli, from the plant, 
has been observed during exercises within a machinery space simulator. Gatfield (1999) observed 
that plant operators will commonly take actions to test hypotheses concerning the plant, based on 
the implicit information given by the lack of an abnormal stimuli or cue. Singleton’s (1989) 
observation that most information comes to the operator by virtue of an absence of stimuli can, 
thus, be confirmed. In an attempt to categorise the types and levels of knowledge used when an 
expert undertakes a complex dynamic task, Rasmussen and Lind (1981) put forward five levels of 
abstraction to represent the functional properties of a system: 
Chapter 2                                                                                                                             Literature Review 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Behavioural Markers for the Assessment of Competence in Crisis Management                               32  
 
 system purpose—objectives, constraints, inputs/outputs 
 abstract function—representation of system function such as ‘mass energy flows’ 
 generalised function—process description — feedback loops, heat transfer 
 physical function—mechanical, electrical or chemical processes 
 physical form—actual physical appearance of the system 
 
They imply that these levels of abstraction can be used when considering the plant in different 
unit sizes, from a whole plant overview, down to individual equipment component parts, to 
follow the operator’s cognitive processes. During observations of the performance of a complex 
dynamic task, Rasmussen (1986) plots the level of abstraction being applied to the particular plant 
unit in an attempt to map the cognitive sequence of events. Although this methodology is useful 
in showing that different types and levels of knowledge are used when undertaking a complex 
dynamic task, this map fails to incorporate the metacognitive processes that make the map 
dynamic. Our observations of complex dynamic tasks are limited to the overt behaviour of the 
operator and the articulation of the cognitive process by the operator. 
 
From the discussion above it can be seen that the way in which knowledge is structured and used 
is very important in the management of complex dynamic tasks, as are the cognitive goals that 
make up the ‘waypoints’ on the task manager’s cognitive sequence map. The following section 
will discuss theories of knowledge management and cognitive goal modules, and relate these to 
the assessment of competence in crisis management. 
 
2.4.3 Cognitive Goals 
 
One view of the structures of knowledge is given by Bainbridge (1992). She looks at the structures 
at a higher cognitive level than Rasmussen, relating them to memory function and metacognition. 
She proposes three ways in which knowledge is used in cognitive processing: 
 
 knowledge of permanent or potential characteristics of some part of the external 
world (long term memory or knowledge base); 
 
 temporary inferred knowledge about the present or predicted state of the external 
world (short term memory, operational memory, working memory); 
 
 knowledge of the outcomes and properties of the operators own behaviour 
(metacognition). 
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The concepts of a knowledge base, working memory, and metacognition can be useful in trying to 
understand the cognitive processes that occur when undertaking a complex dynamic task such as 
the management of a crisis. Bainbridge (1992) suggests that skilled plant operators build up and 
maintain an overview of the present state of the plant in their working memory. She proposes that 
they will form an idea about the way they expect the plant to perform dynamically and will 
formulate plans for any future actions they may need to take to maintain plant safety and 
performance. This overview will provide the context for the operator’s future decision-making 
and maintains their situational awareness. The same cognitive processes can be expected to be 
used during a crisis situation to inform any “critical thinking”, the formulation of plans for future 
actions, leading to the generation of multiple options, from which the ‘best’ option can be chosen. 
 
In order to maintain this overview, Bainbridge proposes that reference is made to the knowledge 
base held within the plant operator’s long-term memory. This includes experiential knowledge, 
which is important for testing hypotheses relating to future actions. The operator’s previous 
experience is the basis for the explanatory hypotheses he or she suggests (Bainbridge, 1995).  
 
Because of the many different ways in which complex dynamic tasks within a crisis situation can 
be undertaken, the crisis manager has a degree of flexibility in choosing the way in which he or 
she undertakes any given task. There may indeed be different appropriate working methods, even 
within the framework of applicable procedures. If the knowledge of alternate working methods is 
available to the crisis manager, their behaviour in choosing one of these methods is an aspect of 
metacognition. The way an operator will behave is a product of their past experience (Bainbridge, 
1992). This has implications for training and assessment, in that by giving crisis managers 
experience with safe and efficient behaviour, by choosing different working methods, they will 
have a greater knowledge base to assist them in making future choices. 
 
The studies referred to above have put forward many possible cognitive processing modules, each 
of which has a particular cognitive goal. This goal is related by Bainbridge (1992) as “to build up a 
temporary structure of information about the current state of the task.” Some of the proposed modules 
are: 
 
 identify; 
 predict state; 
 review task goals; 
 review present state; 
 review action availability/effect; 
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 evaluate state; 
 predict task goals; 
 infer present state. 
 
These modules make reference to information available from the operator’s knowledge bases and 
the operator’s mental models within their working storage memory, as well as directly from the 
plant itself. Figure 3. shows the proposed interaction of the ‘identify’ module with the operator’s 
working storage and knowledge bases. We can see from this model that, in order to identify the 
stimulus from the plant or to obtain information to use in the testing of hypotheses relating to the 
stimulus, reference is made to the operator’s knowledge bases. Required responses to the state of 
the plant, and set procedures to be followed to make these responses, are also referenced from the 
knowledge base. Information about the previous and predicted state of the plant is also used by 
the processing module, drawn from the operator’s working storage memory, where a mental 
model of the plant is maintained. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Cognitive processing module relationships with working storage and knowledge bases 
(after Bainbridge, 1992). 
 
 
Depending upon the knowledge held concerning the stimulus received, it may be necessary to 
draw upon further information from the working storage to complete the identification of the 
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stimulus. If the stimulus is identified from the knowledge base, this information can be passed to 
the working storage to be incorporated into the dynamic mental model of the state of the plant. 
Also, any predefined responses to the stimulus held within the knowledge bases can be 
incorporated into the model. 
 
The way in which these cognitive processing modules are structured together into some rational 
sequence will constitute the working method of the operator. In order that this structure of 
modules will achieve the necessary task performance the operator must have the associated 
knowledge bases and be able to maintain an overview of the state of the task (Norman, 1986). 
 
The sequence of cognitive processing modules a crisis manager uses in undertaking a task shows 
their strategy for achieving the task. If these sequences can be mapped through the observation of 
crisis managers within a plant simulator, the effectiveness of the chosen strategy should become 
apparent to an assessor and this could form the basis of an assessment framework. Initially, 
novice crisis managers may follow set rational processing module sequences to achieve set task 
goals. More experienced crisis managers may reduce the number of processing modules in their 
sequences by the use of appropriate preset responses and prelearned cues, allowing certain 
modules to be circumvented (Rasmussen, 1986). If the processing module sequence can be 
mapped, the crisis manager’s choice of subgoals could be analysed and compared against models 
of expert behaviour for assessment. Any significant deviation from expert behaviour could be 
addressed as part of a training programme. Patterns of errors that become evident through 
viewing crisis manager’s performance at a macroscopic level are useful when designing these 
training programmes (Patrick, 1992). 
 
Samurcay & Rogalski (1988) argue that the strategies used by crisis managers to achieve their 
subgoals could also be analysed by the observation of crisis managers within a plant simulator. By 
analysing a crisis manager’s strategy when using a cognitive processing module, such as 
retrieving the current state of the plant, it may be possible to infer the level of the competence of 
the crisis manager. The next section will explore this potential use of cognitive skills as part of a 
competence assessment framework. 
 
 
2.4.4 Assessing Cognitive Skills 
 
There have been a number of training programmes produced that aim to improve the higher 
order cognitive skills of the trainees within a specific context (Woods, 1983; Wales & Nardi, 1985). 
Chapter 2                                                                                                                             Literature Review 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Behavioural Markers for the Assessment of Competence in Crisis Management                               36  
These programmes use a number of techniques to try and improve the trainees higher order 
cognitive skills such as problem solving. Some of the techniques used are: 
 
 extensive practice of solving problems; 
 the use of heuristic strategies; 
 use of graphical representations to show the structure of problems; 
 having team members justify their solutions to one another; 
 having team members evaluate other team members solutions. (Resnick, 1987). 
 
The use of these techniques to effectively manage a crisis situation may be evidence of a crisis 
manager’s competence in using higher order cognitive skills. 
 
Other studies have been directed at trying to generate training programmes to improve general 
problem solving skills that would be transferable into different contexts of application (de Bono, 
1985; Covington, 1987). These programmes aim to improve the trainees planning of their cognitive 
and metacognitive strategies. They use a different set of techniques to the contextualised 
programmes, namely: 
 
 considering multiple sides of an issue (lateral thinking); 
 considering consequences; 
 selecting goals and planning strategies; 
 prioritising factors involved in a situation; 
 generating and evaluating evidence; 
 using perceptual rather than logical thinking (Resnick, 1987). 
 
 
The idea behind the use of perceptual thinking is to make problem-solving strategies more 
practical and less theoretical. However, system faults do not always present adequate stimuli to 
allow a successful problem solving strategy to be formed by perceptual thinking alone. In these 
cases, a strategy involving a logical thinking process using theoretical knowledge bases may be 
required to solve the problem by developing a new working method from first principles. Despite 
the claims made by these programmes, there has been little research to provide the empirical 
evidence necessary to prove their efficacy in facilitating the learning of transferable cognitive 
skills. However, these techniques, as with those used in the contextualised training programmes, 
could be used as assessment criteria for assessing competence in crisis management; the criteria 
being evidence of the effectiveness of the candidates’ cognitive and metacognitive strategies. 
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In order to be able to analyse the cognitive processes of a person by getting that person to report 
on their metacognition, it must first be assumed that people have an awareness of their own 
metacognition. However, there have been many hypotheses proposing that humans are unaware 
of their own cognitive processes. If this is the case, the use of post assessment scenario interviews 
to try to determine the cognitive processes that led to a person making a particular decision could 
be misleading and certainly not suitable for assessing competence. 
 
Miller (1962) states that,  “it is the result of thinking, not the process of thinking, that appears 
spontaneously in consciousness”. If this is the case, any analysis by a person of their own 
metacognition will only result in them reporting their own pre-conceived ideas about their 
thought processes and the factors affecting their thought processes, not an account of their actual 
thought processes and the factors affecting them.  This is also a powerful argument against the use 
of verbal protocols for the assessment of competence in crisis management, as any verbalisation of 
cognitive processing would probably just reflect the result of thinking, and would not necessarily 
describe the processes of thinking. 
 
Neisser (1967) agues that the constructive processes of encoding perceptual sensations never 
appear in consciousness, it is only the products of these processes that appear. Mandler (1975) 
concurs with this view, stating that the analysis of situations, and the appraisal of the 
environment in which these situations occur, goes on mainly at the non-conscious level. If this is 
correct, we could never hope to deconstruct any situational analysis, as we would be unconscious 
of the processes that constructed it.  
 
Nisbett and DeCamp Wilson (1977) argue that humans apprehend many more stimuli than can be 
stored in short-term memory or transferred to long-term memory. This infers that our conscious 
memory of an event is the result of some sort of selective filtering within our subliminal 
perception. They go on to propose that:  
 
“Some stimuli may affect ongoing mental processes, including higher order processes of 
evaluation, judgement, and the initiation of behaviour, without being registered in short-
term memory, or at any rate without being transferred to long term memory.”  
 
If this were the case, then if subjects were asked to report on the reasoning behind their decisions, 
their report would necessarily contain omissions. Nisbett and DeCamp Wilson make the 
following proposal relating to this type of report: 
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“When people are asked to report how a particular stimulus influenced a particular 
response, they do so not by consulting a memory of the mediating process, but by 
applying or generating causal theories about the effects of that type of stimulus on that 
type of response.” 
 
They go on to further argue that even if a subject’s subjective report about their own cognitive 
processing is correct, this would only be due to the “incidentally correct employment of a priori causal 
theory”, not due to any “direct introspective awareness”. 
 
However, it has been argued that certain metacognitive skills are required for proficient decision-
making. Cohen et al (1996) propose that in order to be a good decision maker in a time stressed 
situation the following metacognitive skill set is required:  
 
 “going beyond pattern matching in order to create plausible stories for novel situations; 
 
  noticing conflicts between observations and a conclusion; 
 
 elaborating a story to explain a conflicting cue rather than simply disregarding or discounting the 
cue; 
 
 having sensitivity to problems in explaining away too much conflicting data; 
 
 attempting to generate alternative coherent stories to account for data; 
 
 having a refined ability to estimate the time available for decision-making.” 
 
Although these metacognitive skills in themselves are unobservable, the application of these skills 
may lead to some directly related overt behaviours. For example, a crisis manager may advise 
their team of a number of alternative hypotheses that could account for the available data, or they 
might advise their team of the time available before a decision has to be made about a particular 
situation. Once these related overt behaviours have been determined, they could then be used as 
markers for the assessment of competence in decision-making. It is widely accepted that one of 
the attributes of a crisis manager should be competence in decision-making.  
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2.4.5 Cognitive analysis for assessment - Conclusions 
 
It can be concluded from the above discussions that cognitive analysis, either through the use of 
verbal protocols, or ‘reporting on metacognition’, is neither a very suitable or effective way of 
undertaking the assessment of competence in crisis management. Both of these techniques for 
inferring cognitive processes can be seen to interfere with the assessment process. The verbal 
protocol technique reduces the time available for decision-making, thus affecting any assessment. 
The ‘reporting on metacognition’ technique raises questions about what is actually being reported, 
introspective information about the cognitive processes, or a conscious formation of a pre-
conceived causal theory about the cognitive processes that might have taken place. However, both 
of these techniques have been shown to generate overt behavioural markers that may be suitable 
for use in the assessment of competence in crisis management. An analysis of verbal protocols has 
been used to highlight overt patterns of communication between team members, and the 
application of metacognitive skills has been shown to generate certain overt behaviours, such as 
generating alternative coherent stories to account for data.  
 
In summary, the concept of cognitive goal modules has been shown to be a useful tool in the 
analysis of the competency requirements of crisis managers who undertake complex dynamic 
tasks during the management of crises. The cognitive skill of a crisis manager has been shown to 
be dependent upon the crisis manager’s ability to select goals and to formulate subgoals as part of 
an overall task strategy. By the observation of crisis managers undertaking these tasks, an analysis 
of the crisis manager’s sequence of cognitive processing modules and subgoal formation can be 
made. From this analysis, it has been proposed that an assessment framework could be designed 
to assess the competence of crisis managers in relation to expert performance.  
 
Theories have been discussed proposing that the cognitive skill of a crisis manager relies upon the 
crisis manager’s contextualised knowledge base and their ability to maintain a dynamic mental 
model of the state of the crisis situation within working storage memory. Although the same types 
of higher order cognitive processing skills have been shown to be used across different complex 
tasks, because of the reliance upon specific contextualised knowledge bases, transferability to 
different contexts is not assured unless other relevant knowledge bases are already present. This 
would tend to suggest that the assessment of competence in crisis management, a competence 
based upon the application of contextualised knowledge bases, would also have to be context 
specific. 
 
Chapter 2                                                                                                                             Literature Review 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Behavioural Markers for the Assessment of Competence in Crisis Management                               40  
A number of common cognitive processes used when undertaking complex dynamic tasks have 
been identified. The nature of these processes, such as the application of heuristics, would appear 
to make them suitable for use in assessment frameworks. However, caution must be drawn to the 
fact that these processes are discrete psychological aspects and as such, any assessment dealing 
with these aspects in isolation would appear too reductionistic to achieve an overall assessment of 
cognitive skills. For this to happen, the controlling metacognitive processes would have to be 
considered as well, and it has been shown that these would be difficult to assess. Cognitive skills, 
such as problem solving, have been shown to be built up from a whole network of interacting 
cognitive processes from the discrete psychological aspects such as subgoal formation, to the 
metacognitive processes such as cognitive goal module sequencing, and are thus very difficult to 
assess directly. 
 
It would appear from the evidence discussed in this section that cognitive analysis could be used 
to assess the competence of crisis managers, but only if that assessment framework is designed 
within the correct scope. If too holistic, the relevant cognitive processes may be overlooked. If too 
reductionistic, the controlling metacognitive processes may be overlooked. However, considerable 
research is still required before cognitive analysis could produce any certainty about the cognitive 
processes involved when an operator undertakes a complex dynamic task. Until there is this 
certainty, any assessment framework would have to rely upon assessing performance against 
models of expert behaviour to measure competence. 
 
Therefore, in themselves, verbal protocols and cognitive analysis have not proven to be successful 
techniques for the assessment of competence. However, the related overt behaviours arising from 
the analysis of these techniques may possibly be useful metrics for the assessment of competence. 
 
In order to be able to determine which behavioural markers might be relevant for assessing 
competence in crisis management, some discussion should first take place to determine the 
attributes of a crisis manager that make them competent in managing crises. The following section 
will discuss these attributes. 
 
 
2.5    THE ATTRIBUTES OF A CRISIS MANAGER 
 
There are a number of attributes that have been shown by researchers to be exhibited by 
competent crisis managers. Regester and Larking (1997) propose that although the “human 
participative manager” is generally the most effective leader, this leader’s participatory style can 
sometimes inhibit the rapid decision-making necessary during a crisis. Whereas, the rapid 
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decision-making of an authoritarian leader can lead to the demotivation and stifling of creativity 
amongst other team members, which may in turn lead to a lack of feedback of information to the 
leader, thus restricting the leaders overall awareness of the situation. This lack of situational 
awareness has been shown to lead to poor decision-making (American Bureau of Shipping, 2004; 
Pekcan et al, 2005). Regester and Larking suggest that a competent crisis manager will recognise 
their team members’ different attributes and values, and will utilise these to maximum advantage 
during a crisis. This may require a form of adaptive leadership style, the leader recognising the 
type of follower being interacted with, and adapting their style of leadership in order to maximise 
each individual team members performance (Blanchard and Hersey, 1969).  
 
Similarly, Flin (1996) argues that to be effective, a leader needs to be able to diagnose not only the 
tasks or problems associated with the situation they are in, but also the mood, competence and 
motivation of the team they are leading. She argues that an effective leader should have a range of 
leadership styles available, such as delegative, consultative, coaching, facilitative or directive, and 
should be able to match the style they employ to the situation they are in and the team they are 
leading. 
 
Fredholm (1997) argues that in order to be effective at making decisions a leader needs to have the 
ability to use both of the main accepted forms of decision-making; the more immediate 
recognition primed decision-making process, and the consciously analytical processing type of 
decision-making. Orasanu (1997) provides a comprehensive definition of the recognition primed 
decision-making process: 
 
“Its basic principle is that experts use their knowledge to recognise a problem situation as 
an instance of a type, and then retrieve from their store of patterns in memory an 
appropriate response associated with that particular problem type. The response is 
evaluated for adequacy in the present context, and if it passes, it is adopted. If it is found 
wanting, either another interpretation of the situation is sought or a second level response 
is retrieved and evaluated.” 
 
Fredholm states that a leader also requires the ability to switch between these two types of 
decision-making processes, as there is a need to function in both these ways depending upon the 
situation. Fredholm calls this a cognitively parallel approach to decision-making. The time 
available to make a decision plays an important part in which decision-making process the leader 
uses, with the analytical processing type of decision-making generally accepted as taking more 
time to reach a decision than the recognition primed decision–making process.  
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The manager of a crisis situation within a safety critical industry can be said to be operating as 
part of a complex system. Rasmussen (1990) argues that individuals who are in control of complex 
systems need to be flexible in their resolution of problems. This flexibility can be brought about by 
the individual having “multiple degrees of freedom for action”, and “many possible ‘right’ answers”. 
Rasmussen goes on to argue that because humans have a tendency to reduce degrees of freedom 
by reducing the available alternative choices, occasional errors are bound to result. It therefore 
follows that in order to resolve those conflicts of resource demand that occur during a crisis 
situation, the crisis manager needs the skill to be able to dynamically shift between alternative 
strategies. The method of generating multiple explanations for situations, and generating multiple 
courses of action to manage those situations, is well accepted as a way of ensuring effective 
decision-making. This method is often given the term ‘critical thinking’ and is regarded as a skill 
required for effective decision making in atypical situations (Cohen et al, 1997). It therefore 
follows that these should be attributes exhibited by a competent crisis manager. 
 
Cohen et al (1996) argue that during a time stressed situation, proficient decision-makers will 
dedicate more resources to resolving any uncertainty about the situation. They argue that this is 
done by the decision-maker ‘explicitly asking how much time they have before they must commit to a 
decision.’ They further argue that the proficient decision-maker can estimate this ‘time to commit’ 
more precisely. Cohen et al also propose that the more experienced a decision-maker is, the more 
sophisticated will be the way that they analyse and critique their current mental model of a 
situation. They suggest that the experienced decision-maker will question what is wrong with 
their mental model, especially what might be missing from it. He or she will also try to modify 
their mental model to explain any conflicting evidence, and then evaluate any assumptions 
required by alternate models. This leads to them constructing a more plausible model of the 
situation by revising the most unreliable assumptions in their current model. 
 
Research into emergency decision-making in the offshore oil and gas industries noted that much 
of an offshore installation manager’s information gathering activity was confined to monitoring 
the information exchange between other team members, rather than from direct requests for 
information (Flin et al, 1996).  The degree to which a crisis manager monitors the information 
exchange between members of their crisis management team could therefore be a possible overt 
behavioural marker for assessing competence in crisis management. 
 
McIntyre and Salas (1995) showed that effective team leaders exhibit model team-working 
behaviours of effectively backing-up other team members, both accepting and providing 
feedback, and a willingness to listen to others. 
 
Chapter 2                                                                                                                             Literature Review 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Behavioural Markers for the Assessment of Competence in Crisis Management                               43  
The following individual attributes could therefore be considered necessary for the competent 
crisis manager: 
 
 the ability to recognise their team members’ different attributes and values; 
 
 the use of an adaptive leadership style to maximise team performance; 
 
 the ability to switch between the consciously analytical and the recognition primed 
types of decision-making process; 
 
 the ability to maintain multiple degrees of freedom for action; 
 
 the skill to be able to dynamically shift between alternative strategies; 
 
 the ability to improve their mental model of a situation through analysis and 
critiquing; 
 
 the use of model team-working behaviours. 
 
It can be seen from the above that the interactions between the crisis manager and the crisis 
management team play an important part in the effective management of a crisis. The following 
section looks at these interactions and how the behaviours exhibited within the team environment 
may be used as markers for assessing the team leaders competence in managing crisis situations. 
 
 
2.6    THE ATTRIBUTES OF A CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM 
 
It has been stated that superior crisis management teams have one common quality: 
 
  “the ability to adapt to task demands” (Serfaty and Entin, 1997)  
 
Under increasing levels of stress, it has been argued that high performing teams will adapt their 
decision-making and co-ordination strategies, and even their organisational structure, in order to 
maintain a high level of performance, and to keep perceived stress levels within tolerable limits. 
The co-ordination mechanisms that support any adaptation by the team may either be ‘explicit’, 
based on specific communications, or ‘implicit’, based on a shared mental model of the situation 
(Serfaty and Entin, 1997).  
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Serfaty and Entin  (1997) propose that the following features are characteristic of high performing 
teams: 
 
 the team structure is ‘adaptive’ to changes in the task environment. The same individuals may 
play completely different roles under different circumstances; 
 
 the team maintains ‘open and flexible communication’ lines;  
 
 team members are extremely ‘sensitive to other members’ workload and performance in high 
tempo situations.  
 
Serfaty and Entin further propose that highly effective teams will have developed a high level of 
congruence between the mental models of the individual team members. The team members are 
able to make use of these models to anticipate the way the situation will evolve and the needs of 
the other team members, as well as to generate expectations about how other team members will 
behave. They argue that both the explicit and implicit co-ordination mechanisms will generate 
observable communication patterns. Serfaty, Entin and Volpe (1993) hypothesised that highly 
effective teams would adapt to stressful situations by changing their co-ordination strategy from 
explicit co-ordination mechanisms to implicit co-ordination mechanisms as the workload 
increased. Serfaty and Entin (1997) state that: 
 
“Communications that provide information to a team member in the absence of requests 
for that information indicate an implicit co-ordination mechanism at work.”  
 
The relevance and timeliness of this information to the situation would seem to be a good 
indication of the degree of congruence of the mental models of the individual team members. 
 
Urban et al (1996) showed that teams with a high workload communicated less than did teams 
with a low workload. They suggested that this reduction in communication was a coping strategy 
employed to allow teams to cope with high workloads. It could therefore be suggested that some 
teams could remain highly effective under stressful conditions, despite their level of 
communication falling, by switching instead to implicit co-ordination mechanisms. However, 
other teams might become ineffective under stressful conditions because as their level of 
communication fell, there was no corresponding increase in their implicit co-ordination; the team 
falls apart. 
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Urban et al (1996) proposed a method of measuring communication by counting the frequencies 
of communication behaviours that were relevant to resource allocation in a team task. The 
definitions of these behaviours are shown in table 1 below: 
 
Behaviour 
 
Definition Example 
Interrogative supply. Questions regarding the availability of 
resources. 
Alpha, how many 
resources do you have? 
 
Declarative supply.  
 
 
Interrogative demand. 
Statements regarding the availability of 
resources. 
 
Questions regarding the resources 
required to complete the task. 
 
I have 4Xs and 5Ys 
 
 
How many Xs do we 
need? 
 
Declarative demand Statements regarding the resources 
required to complete the task. 
 
Task needs 2Xs. 
Request/interrogative 
exchange. 
Questions or requests relating to the 
transfer of resources among team 
members. 
 
I need someone to send 
me 2Xs. 
Respond/declarative 
exchange.  
Statements relating to the transfer of 
resources among team members. 
 
I am sending you the 
2Xs. 
 
Table 1:   Communications Behaviours (Urban et al. 1996) 
 
 
Stout et al (1994) state that a consequence of high time pressure within a situation will lead an 
ineffective crisis manager to focus on their individual tasks rather than the teams’ tasks. Further 
research in this area suggested that, during demanding high workload situations, team members 
revert to working as individuals at the expense of the team task requirements  (Urban et al, 1995). 
This may be seen as another coping strategy. It also implies that during a crisis situation there 
must be some optimum distribution of effort between individual tasks and team tasks in order to 
best manage the crisis. 
 
In a research programme studying how teams use shared mental models the researchers codified 
the teams’ verbal interaction in order to determine the degree of overlap of the team members’ 
mental model and the organisation of the division of the model between team members (Banks 
and Millward, 2000). Each verbal interaction between team members was coded using one of the 
following designators: 
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 request 
 offer 
 question 
 propose 
 hone 
 support 
 widen 
 other 
 not relevant 
 
 
Some research has shown that there appears to be a range for the level of useful communication 
between team members within which the team is most likely to be effective at managing a crisis 
situation (Tollcott, 1992;  Urban et al, 1996). The team becomes ineffective if the level of useful 
communication between the team members is either below or above this level. If this is the case, 
then an analysis of the verbal interaction between team members in order to determine if the level 
of useful communication lies within the effective range may be an overt behavioural marker that 
can be used to assess competence in crisis management. It may therefore be useful to codify the 
verbal interaction of the team, using designators such as those used by Banks and Millward, in 
order to determine the level of useful verbal interaction between the crisis management team. This 
level of useful interaction could then be used to determine if there is an optimal range of 
communication level related to the successful management of crises, which if shown, could be 
used as a behavioural marker.  
 
Oser et al (1989), in their study of critical team behaviours, showed a significant correlation 
between their indices of “team member confidence in other team members” and “team members’ liking of 
others” with the effectiveness of the team. This again shows that it is possible, even with only a 
small set of behaviour markers, to make a valid assessment of the effectiveness of a team. 
 
McIntyre and Salas (1995) discuss the behaviours exhibited by effective teams. They propose that 
the development of teamwork is encouraged by interdependence between all of the members of 
the team, so that the team views their success as being dependent upon their own interaction. 
They argue that teamwork involves effective communication, and that this often needs to be 
closed-loop communication, with relevant feedback to the originator of any communication. They 
also argue that effective teamwork requires team members to have a flexible repertoire of 
behavioural skills that they can call upon, depending on the circumstances they are presented 
with. 
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It may be useful to further deconstruct the crisis management team so that the individual team 
member attributes can be identified. This should give further insight into the interaction between 
team leader and team member, so leading to a better understanding of the behaviours exhibited 
by the team leader during a crisis situation. The following section will discuss the individual 
attributes of crisis management team members. 
 
 
2.7    THE ATTRIBUTES OF A CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM MEMBER 
 
There are some generally accepted types of team members, whose attributes can be used to 
advantage by the team leader during a crisis. Regester and Larking (1997) propose that the styles 
of team members may include 
 
“The Ideas Person: a creative member who is constantly injecting new ideas and 
suggestions. Some of these may be far-fetched but some may 
have real merit. It is vital for the leader to filter out the viable 
ideas and discard the remainder without discouraging the flow; 
 
The Communicator:  the individual who helps the flow of information both within 
and outside the team (not necessarily the team leader, although 
the team leader should possess strong communications skills 
also); 
 
The Doom Merchant: the devil’s advocate who brings out the negative aspects of each 
proposed idea or solution; 
 
The Book Keeper: the neat and orderly member who wants the records and logs 
maintained to perfection. This individual is more comfortable 
in such a role than as a decision maker. Nonetheless, it is a 
vital role; 
 
The Humanist: the people-oriented member whose solutions always focus on 
the human aspects of the problem – an important visionary in 
the heat of the moment.”  
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During training exercises within the engine room simulator at Warsash Maritime Academy the 
author has noted that some of these attributes, far from being an advantage to the team leader, 
have been seen to be very disadvantageous.  
 
If an assertive “ideas person” is in the team of an inexperienced and unassertive leader, then ‘verbal 
disruption’ can occur. This type of behaviour has been noted where one team member has been so 
vocal during the simulation exercise that they have disrupted the team task. In an effort to be 
helpful to the team, these team members will continually verbalise the situational assessment, as 
they perceive it. They will offer many varied hypotheses for any perceived problem, they will 
continually offer advice to the other team members and they have also been observed thinking 
aloud. By continuously talking, they make it very difficult for other members of the team to 
communicate, and consequently the performance of the team suffers. It also been observed that an 
inexperienced leader, who is possibly seeking assistance from his team to manage the situation, 
will sometimes take up the suggestions made by the “ideas person” even though the idea they put 
forward is erroneous, just because of the level of conviction with which the idea is proposed. 
When the team member who was causing the verbal disruption was given a non-participative role 
of observer within a simulator exercise, the performance of the remainder of the team was seen to 
improve dramatically. 
 
In a similar way the “doom merchant”, although valuable for highlighting the risks associated with 
any intended course of action, if they are both inexperienced in assessing the risks, and assertive 
in the way they communicate the possible risks, may adversely influence the decisions of the team 
leader. 
 
Regester and Larkin (1997) suggest that members of a team subject to a crisis situation can 
sometimes exhibit a misplaced belief in the competence of their leader or leaders, and this can 
assist in the development of the crisis. However, it has also been noted by the author, during 
simulator based crisis management exercises, that if a leader is seen to lack the competence to 
manage the situation, another team member will often come forward and actively assist the 
leader, or in some cases, take over the leadership role. 
 
Brannick et al (1993) showed that ‘cooperation’ and ‘giving suggestions’ were behaviours that 
showed a high degree of correlation with successful team performance, and as such are important 
attributes for a crisis management team member. They also showed that when these behaviours 
were used as assessment metrics, assessors consistently rated them. They also showed that these 
behaviours were useful metrics because assessors found that they could assess them relatively 
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independently of one another, promoting a higher degree of interrater reliability. However, 
‘cooperation’ is a very ‘high level’ behavioural term, consisting of a complex set of behaviours. 
Although assessors may have been observing overt ‘cooperation’ within a team, which of the 
simple ‘low level’ behaviours that go to make up ‘cooperation’ they were in fact observing, is not 
made clear. The consistency of the rating of the behavioural marker termed ‘cooperation’ could in 
fact have been made up of many very inconsistent sets of much simpler lower level behavioural 
markers. 
 
Table 2 below shows how the complex ‘high level’ behaviour of ‘cooperation’ might be 
decomposed into a number of less complex ‘lower level’ overt behaviours. If assessments are 
undertaken based on criteria that are comprised of complex ‘high level’ behaviours, it is likely that 
there will always be a level of subjectivity, and interrater reliability and agreement is likely to 
always be adversely affected. 
 
‘High Level’ 
Behaviour  
Associated ‘Mid Level’ Behaviours Associated ‘Low Level’ Behaviours 
Cooperation Cordial intra-team communication; Smiling when communicating; 
Even tone of voice; 
Normal voice level; 
 
Consonance with commands; Pleasant acknowledgement; 
Prompt response; 
Nodding of head; 
 
Attentive listening; Forward leaning posture; 
Nodding of head; 
Quiet mouthing of affirmations; 
 
 
Table 2:   The decomposition of a complex ‘High Level’ behaviour.    
 
After discussing some of the attributes of the crisis management team, the following sections will 
discuss some of the behaviours arising from these attributes that can influence the decisions made 
by a crisis manager within a team based environment. 
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2.8    BEHAVIOURAL BIAS AND OPTION GENERATION 
 
In analysing the USS Vincennes incident, where a US naval vessel shot down an Iran Air 
commercial airliner, Collyer and Malecki (1998) argue that given a belief that an attack was 
underway, the team onboard the USS Vincennes may have misinterpreted the facts and selectively 
attended to facts that supported this hypothesis. This behaviour they term an ‘expectancy bias’; 
the hypothesis of what is happening becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 
Tollcott (1992) suggests that in the decision-making process hypotheses are generated to account 
for the information being received, and then alternate actions are generated and evaluated. The 
number of alternative hypotheses and actions communicated to team members could therefore be 
considered as a metric for assessing competence in crisis management. It would seem reasonable 
to suppose that if a team leader only came up with one possible hypothesis to account for the 
information being received, this may not be correct, and the actions taken on the basis of this 
incorrect hypothesis would not lead to a resolution of the problem. Conversely, if a plethora of 
hypotheses were proposed, it may take too much time to generate and evaluate the possible 
actions.  There is probably a range of numbers of alternative hypotheses and actions that, when 
evaluated, lead to the most efficient and effective outcome of a crisis situation. 
 
Simon (1957) demonstrated that in many situations people do not attempt to evaluate all available 
response choices, but rather consider only as many alternatives as needed to discover one that 
satisfies them. Simon refers to this process as ‘satisficing’. Within a team environment the level of 
‘satisficing’ is an overt behaviour and might therefore be a suitable metric for the assessment of 
competence in crisis management. 
 
Another form of behaviour that leads to a limitation of the generation of options, or even to the 
complete lack of options, is termed ‘framing bias’ or ‘paradigm paralysis’. This behaviour is 
characterised by the decision maker placing an artificial boundary around the problem, and only 
generating hypotheses and actions relating to what they perceive as being within this artificial 
boundary, even if the solution to the problem can in reality only be found outside the boundary 
they have imposed. A clear example of this behaviour was exhibited by the engineer officers 
onboard the vessel Green Lily during the incident that led to her grounding in November 1997.  
Given a situation where water was splashing onto the electrical control panel of the main engine 
control system, the engineer officers wrongly assumed that this was the cause of the main engine 
tripping, and proceeded to concentrate all of their efforts into this option. By placing an artificial 
boundary around the problem as they saw it, i.e. water on the electrical control panel, the 
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engineer officers failed to generate any other options to explain the tripping of the main engine 
that lay outside of their self imposed boundary.  In fact, the investigation into the grounding 
found that the vessel’s main engine had tripped due to the operation of the main engine 
mechanical over-speed trip, which was totally independent from the electrical control panel 
(Marine Accident Investigation Branch, 1999).  
 
In order to be able to observe the overt behaviours that are associated with the decision-making 
processes of crisis management, it is important to have the correct research environment. The 
following section will discuss the requirements for the decision-making research environment. 
 
 
2.9    THE DECISION-MAKING RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT 
 
Competence in crisis management requires good decisions to be made within apposite time limits. 
Therefore, factors that either assist or hinder the decision-making process will affect competence 
in crisis management. The study of these factors is therefore very relevant to the field of crisis 
management.  
 
Current models of decision-making have moved away from the classic model of the reasoned 
optimisation of choices to arrive at the ‘best’ option, to models that better reflect the way decisions 
are made by decision makers in the real world, i.e. more naturalistic models. The most influential 
of these models is the naturalistic decision-making model, which has been defined as follows: 
 
 “The study of naturalistic decision-making asks how experienced people, working as 
individuals or groups in dynamic, uncertain, and often fast-paced environments, identify 
and assess their situation, make decisions and take actions whose consequences are 
meaningful to them and the larger organization in which they operate.” (Pruitt et al, 
1997) 
 
This definition reveals a number of characteristics of the situations in which naturalistic decision-
making takes place: 
 
 the situations in which decisions are made are uncertain, unpredictable and 
dangerous; 
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 knowledge of the situation is incomplete, and constantly changing; 
  
 the consequences of decisions and actions based on poor situational awareness are 
potentially catastrophic; 
 
 experienced people, not novices, generally conduct decision-making in such 
situations. (Barnett et al, 2003) 
 
It has been suggested by many naturalistic decision-making theorists that in order to conduct 
research into how decisions are made, the study participants, their experimental tasks, and the 
research environment in which these tasks are undertaken, must be selected or constructed so that 
the performance within the research environment can closely resemble how performance occurs 
in the real world (Cannon-Bowers et al, 1996; Cohen, 1993; Zsambok and Klein, 1997).  
 
Cannon-Bowers and Bell (1997) assert that naturalistic decision-making relies on the appropriate 
cue strategy relationships being embedded in the task. Therefore, when a particular cue, or set of 
cues, is presented within the task environment, the decision-maker adopts a decision strategy 
from memory that they identify as satisfying the needs of the task. They argue that naturalistic 
decision-making skills are contingent upon the context in which they are applied, with the 
decision-making environment required to provide the necessary cues. It could therefore be said 
that the overt behavioural markers that indicate competence in crisis management are also 
contingent upon the context in which they are exhibited, as these behaviours are the overt 
expression of the decision strategy adopted. It therefore follows that when undertaking research 
that involves participants making decisions, it is necessary that as much of the context of the real 
world task environment as possible is provided to the participants in order for these cues to be 
present.  
 
It is generally accepted that performance within a ‘full mission simulator’ during competence 
assessments will not predict exactly performance during an actual incident scenario. A full 
mission simulator being a simulated representation of an actual working environment in which a 
significant number of the cues that are within the real environment are recreated. However, it is 
also generally accepted that simulator based competence assessment does enable the identification 
of those individuals who would not be effective emergency or crisis managers (Flin, 1996). 
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It can therefore be argued that when undertaking research that relies upon the abilities of 
participants to make decisions, the research environment should be as realistic as possible, 
providing as many of the cues that would be in the real world as possible to facilitate the choice of 
decision strategies. The use of a high fidelity simulator would seem to be an appropriate way to 
provide such a research environment. 
 
In order to be able to assess “natural” decision-making, it is first necessary to understand the 
factors that typify this process. 
 
 
2.10  FACTORS TYPIFYING DECISION-MAKING IN NATURALISTIC ENVIRONMENTS 
 
Orasanu and Connolly (1993) propose that it is the following factors that typify decision-making 
in naturalistic environments: 
 
 ill-structured problems; 
 uncertain dynamic environments; 
 shifting, ill defined or competing goals; 
 multiple event-feedback loops; 
 time constraints; 
 high stakes; 
 multiple players; 
 organisational norms and goals that must be balanced against the decision-makers personal 
choice. 
 
In order to undertake the assessment of naturalistic decision-making, the decision-making 
environment in which the assessment will be undertaken should provide as many of these factors 
as possible. Simulator exercise scenarios should be developed that can provide these factors. 
 
Pruitt et al (1997) contend that naturalistic decisions can be characterised on the basis of at least 
three sources of variables: 
 
 those associated with the decision or task; 
 those associated with the decision maker; 
 those associated with the environment [in which the decisions are made]. 
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From the above it is clear that many domain specific factors and variables affect the decision-
making process. Research that seeks to analyse and assess the naturalistic decision-making skills 
of persons that work in a specific domain should therefore ensure that the variables associated 
with the task and the decision-making environment are as representative as possible of those in 
the real domain. Without the domain specific cues being available, a domain expert may not be 
able to call upon the appropriate decision strategies that their experience within the domain has 
given them.  
 
Breznitz and Ben-Zur (1997) state that decision-making strategies that utilise all available 
information within the environment are necessarily more time consuming, and demand greater 
effort, than those that are based on a few dimensions only. They go on to argue that under time 
pressure, such as during an emergency or crisis situation, subjects tend to emphasise the 
importance of negative dimensions, and if the information received is too discouraging, 
insufficient resources are deployed, the situation can turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Their 
research showed that with a combination of high workload and time pressure, decisions became 
based almost exclusively on short-term considerations. The behaviours exhibited when handling 
‘discouraging’ information could therefore be important markers when assessing competence in 
crisis management. The making of decisions with long-term considerations when under 
conditions of high workload and time pressure could also be seen as a criterion for the assessment 
of competence in crisis management. However, any assessment of such a criterion would have to 
be made by an evaluation of the decision itself, as it would probably not be possible to link any 
specific overt behavioural markers to this criterion.  
 
Cohen et al (1996) argue that proficient decision makers are ‘recognitionally skilled’, in that they 
have, in long-term memory, a large repertoire of familiar situations, for which they have 
appropriate responses. This relates closely to other theories of naturalistic decision-making (see 
Zsambok & Klein, 1997). The response to ‘discouraging’ information outlined above could 
possibly be explained by the decision-makers lack of repertoire of familiar situations. If this large 
repertoire of familiar situations exists, then it is more likely that the decision-maker will be able to 
come to a good decision, using less information from the environment, and in a shorter time. The 
behavioural marker of quick decision-making, if it leads to good decisions, could therefore be an 
indication of the decision-makers large repertoire of familiar situations in memory.  
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The previous sections have discussed the environment in which naturalistic decisions are made, 
and the factors that typify these types of decisions, and the consequences for research. However, 
even if the decision-making environment is conducive for naturalistic decision-making to occur, it 
is still necessary to understand how the crisis manager can control the crisis situation. The 
following section will discuss this.  
 
 
2.11  CONTROL OF COMPLEX DYNAMIC TASKS 
 
Research undertaken by Kerstholt et al (1996) showed that the complexity of a task, as defined by 
the occurrence of multiple events, as occurring in a crisis situation, degraded the performance of 
those undertaking the task in a number of ways. They found that successive system disturbances 
were detected significantly later, and some disturbances were completely ignored. They also 
found that there was a tendency to concentrate on single disturbances, while ignoring the rest of 
the system. This is often termed ‘tunnel vision’ and leads to a lack of overview of the situation by 
the crisis manager.  Kerstholt et al argue that in order to ensure that a subject’s mental model of 
the system state is kept updated, and that any disturbances are detected, those subgoals under 
their control should be regularly sampled, and they call this action ‘sampling behaviour’. However, 
by limiting the sampling to only those subgoals that are under the control of the crisis manager, 
only a limited overview would be achieved. The sampling of any other tasks, systems and goals 
that are associated with the crisis, but not directly under the control of the crisis manager, should 
also be considered if a true overall awareness of the situation is to be maintained. 
 
Kerstholt (1997) goes on to suggest that people are not very good at controlling dynamic systems 
because they: 
 
 ignore feedback delays; 
 
 focus too much on the reduction of uncertainty by requesting information; 
 
 are not very accurate in timing the right moment of intervention. 
 
 
Rapid and reliable feedback is essential for good decision-making. If feedback delays are ignored, 
errors may not be picked-up, understood or corrected (Croskerry, 2003). If, in order to reduce the 
level of uncertainty, there is an undue level of information sought before a decision is made, the 
situation may have escalated before any action is taken. Similarly, unnecessary delays in decision-
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making can lead to intervention actions being undertaken at inappropriate times, so rendering 
them less effective, or in the worst case, totally ineffective. All three of these behaviours have 
overt aspects, which could be used as markers for the assessment of competence in crisis 
management.  
 
Kerstholt proposes that there are two reasons for sub-optimal performance of people controlling 
complex dynamic tasks. The first being ‘cognitive lockup’, the tendency to focus on one sub-system 
at a time, thereby ignoring the dynamics of the complete system.  The second being a lack of 
knowledge concerning the relation between symptoms and causes. Therefore, although the crisis 
manager may well perceive the majority of cues from the environment that are relevant to the 
crisis situation, they cannot readily relate those cues that are symptomatic of a problem, to the 
problem itself. 
 
 Endsley (1995a) suggests that: 
 
 “In complex dynamic environments operators must do more than simply perceive the 
state of their environment. They must understand the integrated meaning of what they 
are perceiving in the light of their goals.” 
 
Endsley goes on to suggest that the first step in achieving situational awareness is to perceive the 
status, attributes and dynamics of the relevant elements within the environment. In a further 
paper (Endsley 1995b), she goes on to codify three levels of situational awareness: 
 
“Level 1: the perception of relevant information; 
Level 2: the integration of various pieces of data in conjunction with operator goals to 
provide an understanding of the meaning of the perceived information; 
Level 3: based on this understanding, future events and system states can be predicted, 
allowing for timely and effective decision-making.” 
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It has been suggested that if the realism of a simulation is altered it can fundamentally change 
the way the operator conceptualises the underlying information (Manktelow and James, 1987). If 
this is the case it follows that this change in conceptualisation of information could 
lead to change in the understanding of the information, and hence to a change in the level of 
situation awareness. The integrity of the realism in any simulation used to study behavioural 
markers of crisis managers would therefore appear to be of the highest importance. 
 
Endsley (1995b) also notes that an operator’s perception of a situation is only overtly observable 
through their actions and imbedded or elicited verbalisations by the operator. Although the level 
of situational awareness is a very important factor in the control of complex dynamic tasks, much 
of this awareness does not necessarily lead to specific overt behaviours being displayed. This 
makes the use of the ‘level of situation awareness’ a difficult metric to use for the assessment of 
competence in crisis management, as it can only be subjectively implied by the observer.  
 
So, if it is accepted that competence in decision-making is one of the important criteria for 
assessing competence in crisis management, what methodologies can be employed in order to 
determine how a situation can affect the decision-making skills of a crisis manager? 
 
 
2.12  EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGIES FOR RESEARCH INTO DECISION-MAKING 
 
During a crisis, there will be many stressors placed upon the crisis manager, and the effect of these 
stressors on the decision-making process is of particular interest if competence in crisis 
management is to be determined. When researching the impact of complex stressors on decision–
making Johnston et al. (1998) used a full-mission simulator in the following way: 
 
Stage 1. The participants were given a ninety-minute simulator familiarisation training 
session, which included team role familiarisation, practice with control systems, 
and two by fifteen-minute training scenarios for team practice. The participants 
were then given a short written test to establish their level of knowledge of the 
simulator. A list of procedural artificialities of the simulator was also given to 
each participant.  
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Stage 2.  The participants received a pre briefing on the assessment exercise. 
 
Stage 3.  The participants undertook a sixty-minute assessment exercise. 
 
Stage 4.  The participants were debriefed on their performance. 
 
Stage 5. The participants were asked to complete a stress perception questionnaire that 
applied Likert scale ratings to:  
   scenario workload 
   time pressure 
          ambiguity 
          overall stress level 
 
 
Johnston et al. state that simulator scenario development should consist of designing ‘events’ that 
elicit the behaviours of interest. They propose that in order to effectively assess the impact of 
complex stressors on tactical decision-making, scenario ‘pairs’ should be developed that use the 
same events, but which are carried out under more stressful conditions. In this way, they propose 
that comparisons of performance can be made under similar, but more stressful conditions. One 
way of increasing the level of stress during a simulator scenario is to present the team with some 
imminent danger. For example, if the simulated environment is a ships engine control room, 
following a total power loss, a call from the Master of the vessel to the engine control room stating 
that at the present rate of drift the vessel will be aground in thirty minutes will increase the 
workload, time pressure and overall stress level of the Engineer Officers. 
 
Salas, Driskell and Hughes (1996) define stress as:  
 
“a process by which certain environmental demands evoke an appraisal process in which 
perceived demand exceeds resources and results in undesirable physiological, 
psychological, behavioural or social outcomes”. 
 
 If a situation arises where the actual, or perceived, demand for resources exceeds the available 
resources, the situation could be said to be uncontrollable, and beyond the scope of any laid down 
emergency procedures. In this case, the situation could be defined as a crisis. From this it could be 
argued that stress may be a precursor to a crisis, and stressors the building blocks of the crisis 
situation. 
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Cannon-Bowers and Salas (1998) define a number of stressors that can affect decision-making: 
 
 multiple information sources 
 incomplete or conflicting information 
 rapidly changing or evolving scenarios 
 requirement for team coordination 
 adverse physical conditions 
 performance pressure 
 time pressure 
 high workload or information overload 
 auditory overload or interference 
 threat 
 
All of these stressors can be presented to teams within a full mission simulator at varying levels. 
Therefore, by the control of these stressors, it is possible to control the overall level of stress 
presented to the team leader during a simulator exercise. Cannon-Bowers and Salas propose that 
certain stressors are most suitable to be used for the manipulation of subjects in experimental 
studies, namely: 
 
Task-related Stressors: 
 
 workload  / time pressure 
 
 uncertainty  / ambiguity 
 
 auditory overload 
 
Ambient Stressors: 
 
 auditory interference 
 
 performance pressure 
 
 fatigue / sustained operations 
 
The use of stressors will be discussed in Chapter 4, Research Methodology. 
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In order to make any valid judgements on the affect of certain stressors on the decision-making 
capabilities of a crisis manager, assessments of these affects have to be validated by showing 
consistency when using a number of different observers.  Fowlkes et al (1994) argue that team 
performance measuring techniques that use human observers to make ratings historically had 
chronically low interrater reliability. They argue that assessment techniques are required that 
minimise the observers judgement, so that more objective and hence more reliable and useful 
assessments may result. They go on to propose an experimental methodology that first identifies 
stimulus events that can be used as cues to initiate task responses from team members that have 
been identified as being exemplar responses within a certain scenario. By having a set of 
previously identified exemplar responses to specific scenario events as a checklist for the observer, 
they argue that more reliable assessments can be carried out. The problem with this methodology 
is that it limits the assessment to a pre determined task response set, thus precluding any 
successful novel or atypical responses from the team members’ assessment rating. 
 
Instead of assessing exemplar responses to stimulus events, it may be possible to determine 
behavioural markers that give a measure of competence that is not only applicable to typical, 
exemplar responses, but also to the atypical responses as well. It is how factually based a 
behavioural marker is that will determine its objectivity during use in an assessment. The 
characteristics of behavioural markers could be said to be inter-dependent and on different ends 
of a scale of interrater agreement, as shown in Figure 4 below. 
 
 
 
                        Objective       Subjective 
                         Specific        Generic 
            Simple / single-faceted                    Complex / multi-faceted                 
       Observable        Obscure 
                  
  
          High interrater agreement       Low interrater agreement 
 
 
Figure 4:  Relationship between behavioural marker characteristics and interrater agreement. 
 
One method of validating any assessment framework is to show that it has a high degree of 
interrater agreement when used by a number of assessors to assess the same evidence. 
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2.13  NON-TECHNICAL SKILLS (NOTECHS) 
 
During 1998, the first stage of a European Union funded research project was completed that had 
been tasked to develop a feasible and efficient method for assessing the non-technical skills of 
multi-pilot aircrew during flight and simulator checks (Avermaete and Kruijsen, 1998). This 
research project was given the title ‘NOTECHS’. The study proposed that there were four primary 
categories that could be used for the assessment of competence of pilots’ non-technical skills. 
These categories were co-operation, leadership and managerial skills, situation awareness and 
decision-making. The study went on to further sub-divide these primary categories as shown in 
Table 2. below. 
 
 
Primary Category 
 
Elements 
Co-operation Team Building and Maintaining 
Considering Others 
Supporting Others 
Conflict Solving 
 
Leadership and managerial skills Use of Authority and Assertiveness 
Providing and Maintaining Standards 
Planning and Co-ordination 
Workload Management 
 
Situation Awareness Systems Awareness 
Environmental Awareness 
Anticipation 
 
Decision-making Problem Definition / Diagnosis 
Option Generation 
Risk assessment / Option choice 
Outcome Review 
 
 
Table 2:   NOTECHS framework (Avermaete and Kruijsen, 1998) 
 
 
The NOTECHS project put forward five guiding principles related to the way in which non-
technical skills should be assessed. These principles were: 
 
i) Non-technical skill cannot be rated and cannot provoke a FAILED condition out of the 
context of a related objective technical consequence leading to compromised safety in the 
short or long term. 
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ii) The assessment framework for non-technical skills should use a two-point rating scale of 
either ACCEPTABLE or UNACCEPTABLE. 
 
iii) For each unacceptable rating on a non-technical skill category, the assessor should 
provide the candidate with an explanation in free text. 
 
iv) A certain leitmotif of similar detrimental behaviours during an assessment exercise would 
have to be recognisable to conclude that a candidate had a problem in this area. 
 
v) Any assessment should only be based on observable behaviours. The assessment should 
not make any reference to the candidates’ personality or emotional attitudes. 
 
These principles can be seen to be relevant to any assessment framework that uses behavioural 
markers as assessment criteria. However, the first principle could be seen to pose a difficult 
philosophical issue, i.e. whether the demonstration of a leitmotif of detrimental behaviours, 
within a process that leads to a successful outcome, should in any way lead to an unacceptable 
competency rating. It may be the case that although in a particular scenario the team leader 
demonstrated such a leitmotif, it was only due to the actions of the other team members that the 
team leader’s behaviours did not lead to a unsuccessful outcome. The same team leader, in the 
same situation, might well exhibit the same detrimental behaviours, but with a different set of 
team members, the outcome would be unsuccessful. This issue will be further explored in section 
2.15.  
 
By 2001, the NOTECHS research project had defined a range of behavioural markers that it used 
within an assessment framework to assess the non-technical skills of candidate aircrew pilots (JAR 
TEL Consortium, 2001). This research highlighted one of the difficulties in using behavioural 
markers to assess competence in crisis management. The results of the experiments to validate the 
proposed NOTECHS assessment framework showed very good interrater agreement when 
assessing competence in straightforward, non-complex scenarios using a 2-point scale (pass/fail). 
When assessing pilots within these scenarios, the mean within-group interrater agreement 
coefficient (rwg)1
                                                     
1 The within-group interrater agreement coefficient (rwg) is defined as the proportional reduction in error variance of a 
distribution of obtained ratings compared to a distribution representing a random response pattern (James, Dameree and 
Wolf, 1984 & 1993). An rwg  of 1 indicates complete agreement between raters, whereas an rwg  of zero indicates that the 
raters agree no more than they would by chance.  
 varied between approximately 0.95 and 1. However, when using the proposed 
assessment framework to assess pilots within complex scenarios, using the same 2-point scale, 
there was much poorer interrater agreement. When using these complex types of scenario the 
within-group interrater agreement coefficient  (rwg) varied between zero and 0.2. The NOTECHS 
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project authors propose the following explanation for the poor interrater agreement measured 
when assessing the non-technical skills of pilots within complex scenarios: 
 
“Although the original experimental plan demanded a mix of simple and more 
challenging scenarios for the Raters to evaluate, this requirement has created difficulties 
in interpreting some of the data. It would be expected that marginal performances of either 
technical or non-technical skills would generate a broad spectrum of responses from 
raters.” (JAR TEL Consortium, 2001) 
 
The implications from this statement are that if a scenario is challenging, such as a crisis scenario, 
one can expect marginal performances from some of the candidates being assessed. When 
presented with such marginal performances, raters require highly objective and discriminatory 
assessment criteria in order to maintain a high degree of interrater reliability and agreement. The 
broad spectrum of responses from raters using the NOTECHS assessment framework for the 
assessment of pilots within complex scenarios would tend to suggest, that for this type of 
scenario, the assessment criteria are not sufficiently discriminatory. 
 
The following behavioural marker is an example of those used for the assessment of non-technical 
skills within the NOTECHS assessment framework: 
 
“Talks about possible risks for course of action in terms of crew limitations” 
 
It could be argued that this behavioural marker may be interpreted in many different ways. 
Different raters may well have different ideas about the possible risks, biased possibly by their 
own personal experience. The raters may also have differing views about the limitations of the 
crew. Together, these different interpretations can lead to the “broad spectrum of responses” alluded 
to by the NOTECHS project authors.  The use of the NOTECHS assessment framework will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
 
The NOTECHS project report also states that one of the basic tenets of resource management is 
that team members should communicate in a manner that reveals their mental models and 
thinking processes to the other members of the team. Assuming that competence in crisis 
management requires the effective management of resources, the ability to communicate in a 
manner that reveals ones mental models could be a possible behavioural marker for the 
assessment of competence in crisis management. 
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The NOTECHS project was “designed to build on existing knowledge in the field of human factors, 
enhancing flight safety through improved non-technical skills training” (Avermaete and Kruijsen, 1998). 
It is generally accepted, in many different domains, that human errors, arising from human 
factors issues, are involved in 80% of incidents and accidents. Therefore, training that attempts to 
reduce the frequency of human errors is addressing the biggest threat to safety. Assessment 
frameworks that provide for the valid assessment of competence in the skills that reduce human 
errors can be used to ensure that this training is effective. These human errors form part of the 
causal chain of events leading to an incident or accident. The next section will discuss how these 
causal chains can be related to an assessment framework for assessing competence in crisis 
management.  
 
 
2.14  CAUSAL CHAINS 
 
Research has shown that most incidents or accidents do not occur because of some erroneous 
high-risk decision, or some catastrophic system failure, but because of a chain of relatively minor 
errors and faults, that together form the causal chain that can lead to some disastrous incident 
(Reason, 1990).  Crises have often been shown to be propagated by the complexity of a situation 
characterised by a large number of minor faults occurring simultaneously leading to the team 
being overwhelmed, rather than by a single serious fault.  (Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 1987). 
 
If a crisis can be categorised by its complexity arising out of a large number of simultaneous 
disturbances that depart from normal operations, the way in which the crisis manager copes with 
these disturbances could be seen as a way of assessing the crisis manager’s competence. Kerstholt 
et al (1996) proposed a number of behavioural markers that could be used to determine how 
effectively a control task supervisor coped with such disturbances: 
 
 the disturbance detection time, defined as the time between the onset of a disturbance and 
the first time a related action was carried out or a related information request was made; 
 
 the time span between the first information request or action related to a disturbance and 
the correction of that disturbance; 
 
 the number of information requests made about a particular disturbance; 
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 the number of times a supervisor inspected systems through their graphical control 
interface, as indicated by the number of mouse clicks on the control screen; a 
measurement of monitoring behaviour. 
 
Kerstholt et al (1996) went on to discuss how the performance of a control task supervisor 
degraded when a situation became complex. They defined a complex situation as one in which 
there is an occurrence of multiple events or multiple simultaneous disturbances. Their 
experiments showed that within a complex situation, successive disturbances were detected 
significantly later and that some disturbances were ignored altogether. They argued that these 
findings supported the cognitive lock-up hypothesis in that there is a tendency for task 
supervisors to focus on a single system disturbance, to the exclusion of the rest of the system. 
They further argued that in order to meet the overall goal, a task supervisor requires an efficient 
strategy that allows their time and effort to be divided between different sub-goals.  They suggest 
that some task supervisors adaptively switch between the processing of information about 
different sub-goals, whereas others have to completely finish one sub-goal before considering 
another. 
 
Incident or accident causal chains consist of multiple events in series, or if very complex, multiple 
events both in series and at times in parallel. How the crisis manager copes with these events to 
ensure a safe outcome can be seen to be measures of his or her competence. However, what if the 
crisis manager manages most of the individual events in a causal chain competently, but does not 
achieve a successful overall outcome? Can a reductionist approach to the assessment of 
competence, which looks at discrete elements of performance, ever be a valid method of 
assessment if the overall outcome of the crisis manager’s performance is not successful? The next 
section will discuss this issue further. 
 
 
2.15  PROCESS VERSUS OUTCOME 
 
When endeavouring to determine competence in the management of a complex environment such 
as that presented by a crisis within the machinery spaces of a vessel, arguments can be raised as to 
whether it is competence in the crisis management process that should be assessed, or competence 
in achieving a successful outcome. If using a behavioural marker system to assess competence in a 
simulated environment, could the validity of the system be related to the successful completion of 
subgoals, and not to overall performance outcome? 
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Smith-Jentsch et al (1998) discuss the differences between process measure and outcome measures 
in relation to the measurement of team-related expertise in complex environments. They put 
forward the following definitions for process and outcome measures: 
 
Process Measures: Measures that describe the strategies, steps, or procedures used to  
   accomplish a task.  
 
Outcome Measures: Measures that assess the quantity and quality of the end result. 
 
 
They go on to describe process measures as measures of performance, often used to evaluate the 
human factor involved in complex systems. They describe outcome measures as measures of 
effectiveness that are influenced by much more than just human performance. They argue that 
this means that outcome measures do not specify which elements of human performance are 
deficient. It could also be argued that outcome measures do not specify which elements of human 
performance were effective. The outcome of any crisis scenario may be influenced by factors that 
are beyond the direct control of the crisis manager, such as the actions of outside agencies, or the 
weather. If, as Smith-Jentsch et al argue, outcome measures are indeed influenced by much more 
than just human performance, it would seem to follow that if human performance is being 
measured, it is the process that is more important than the outcome. An assessment framework 
that uses human behavioural markers to assess process measures should be able to measure 
competence in crisis management, as this is an aspect of human performance. 
 
Smith-Jentsch et al stated that they were not able to determine any consistent relationships 
between processes and outcomes, even though they systematically evaluated both at multiple 
events within a scenario. This may be because, as others have argued (Reason, 1990; Besnard and 
Baxter, 2003), there need not be consistent relationships between processes and outcomes. 
 
It is of course possible for a crisis management team to be ‘lucky’ and to achieve a successful 
outcome despite the use of incorrect processes. If an assessment were to be only based upon 
outcome, these incorrect processes would not be considered. Conversely, although a crisis 
management team may have used the correct processes, the outcome may be unsuccessful.  
 
Incorrect processes that lead to a successful outcome may be viewed as beneficial violations of 
correct processes (Reason, 1990; Besnard and Baxter, 2003). The question is should these beneficial 
violations be assessed positively or negatively. On the one hand, they are a departure from the 
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accepted ‘best practice’ and therefore could be assessed negatively; on the other hand, they have 
contributed to a successful outcome and so could be assessed positively. 
 
Besnard and Greathead (2003) argue that it does not matter whether a process is correctly carried 
out, or violated, but it is the cognitive environment in which the process is undertaken that is 
important. They propose that this cognitive environment is comprised of a number of dimensions, 
namely: 
 
 “the knowledge that operators have about the limitations of the system; 
 how compatible their mental model is with the functioning of the system; 
 the extent to which future events can be anticipated; 
 the understanding of the consequences of the actions performed.” 
(Besnard and Greathead, 2003) 
 
They go on to argue that it is the accuracy of the operators’ mental model of a situation that plays 
a key role, allowing some process violations to improve system safety during a crisis. Therefore, if 
there are no consistent relationships between processes and outcomes, and some process 
violations are beneficial, the use of complete models of the expert behaviour exhibited when 
undertaking a process, as assessment criteria, would not seem to be a viable option. Instead, the 
behavioural markers that support and facilitate successful processes, beneficial process violations 
and successful outcomes, would seem to be the most relevant assessment criteria. 
 
Kirijan and Mancuso (1995) stated that situational awareness was a process. They argued that by 
specifically focusing on the processes within crew resource management, rather than the outcome, 
two distinct benefits could be gained. Firstly, it is possible to train crews to perform processes that 
can be applied to different situations. Secondly, it is possible to design assessment instruments 
that isolate process deficiencies, regardless of the outcome. However, when dealing with a crisis, 
an atypical situation, it may be the case that atypical solutions are required that are outside the 
normal process repertoire of the crisis manager. If such an ‘atypical’ response is used to reach a 
successful outcome of a crisis scenario, where does that leave the assessment instrument that was 
designed to isolate ‘typical’ process deficiencies? The next section discusses the characterisation of 
behaviours that are related to these ‘atypical’ responses and how these can be used to develop a 
more flexible assessment instrument, one that does not just try to isolate ‘typical’ process 
deficiencies.   
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2.16  BEHAVIOURAL MARKERS AND THE ASSESSMENT OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
 
Regester and Larkin (1997) propose that during a crisis there are some specific behaviours that are 
commonly exhibited.  Persons within a crisis situation may see the situation around them as some 
surreal image rather than as the reality they are experiencing. They may have a belief that because 
this situation has not happened in the past, it cannot be happening to them now. They may have 
the hope that because emergency procedures have been written, the situation will rapidly be 
brought under control. They may also find that, due to the stress of the situation, their 
communication skills fail them, just when they need them the most.  
 
Within the assessment process the assessor has to make a judgement about the competence or 
otherwise of the candidate being assessed. Although some crisis management skills, such as 
situational awareness and decision-making, are cognitive, Seamster et al. (1997) argue that 
cognitive skills can be analysed using non cognitive methods and that these skills can be 
identified and linked to observable behaviours. Other crisis management skills, such as leadership 
and co-operation, are social skills, and as such can be characterised by observable behaviours. 
Tourville (1997) determined key overt behaviours that were exhibited by team members who 
successfully managed ‘crisis’ situations. These behaviours have been characterised as follows: 
 
 Delegation of tasks based upon known crewmember strengths. 
 
In order to ensure the most effective response to a crisis situation the crisis 
manager must know the strengths and weaknesses of their individual team 
members in order that this can inform their decision-making when delegating 
tasks. 
 
 High degree of crewmember integration within the team. 
 
Crewmembers participate fully and actively within the team’s tasks and are not 
left isolated from other members of the team. Crewmembers are kept fully aware 
of what is happening, and are regularly updated on the status of the team’s task. 
 
 Information backup provided during periods of ambiguity. 
 
When a team leader tries to assimilate ambiguous information, their level of 
situational awareness is affected, which in turn can lead to poor decision-making. 
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Therefore, during periods of ambiguity, the team leader must seek alternate 
sources of information in order to reduce the degree of ambiguity towards a 
degree of certainty.  
 
 Regular soliciting of information between crewmembers. 
 
In order that the level of awareness of the situation is maintained across all 
members of the team, information should be regularly shared between team 
members. This should lead to better decision-making and a better acceptance of 
decisions by the team. 
 
 Integration of real-world operations experience, rather than a reliance on procedures. 
 
If one of the definitions of a crisis is that there is no emergency procedure for the 
situation presented, the crisis manager must be able to call upon their experience 
in order to aid their decision-making and guide their actions. This is the basis of 
recognition-primed decision-making, where experts use their experience to 
recognise a situation as a certain type of situation and then, through a process of 
internal evaluation, retrieve from their memory an adequate stored pattern of 
response (Orasanu, 1997). 
 
 Extensive “what-if” analyses undertaken. 
 
The crisis manager should be generating multiple options for explaining the 
situation they are in, how the situation might develop in the near future, and 
courses of action to take to address the situation. If this is not done, and the crisis 
manager follows a course of action that is based upon only one interpretation of 
the situational cues, extensive time and effort can be wasted, if this sole option is 
either incorrect, or unsuitable. 
 
 Task prioritisation carried out. 
 
During the crisis situation the crisis manager should be prioritising the tasks to be 
undertaken so as to manage the crisis most effectively. Secondary tasks should 
not hinder primary task completion. 
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 Adaptation of plan to take into account evolving events. 
 
As the crisis develops, the crisis manager’s awareness of the situation should be 
sufficiently good so as to allow changes to be made to the planned course of 
action after taking into account how the situation is likely to develop in the near 
future. 
 
 Distracting information coded and assigned level of urgency for attention. 
 
As the crisis manager assimilates information about the situation from different 
sources, the information is prioritised, so that information of little current 
significance does not distract attention from information required for more 
immediate higher priority decision-making. 
 
 Maintain a focused attitude to task objectives. 
 
During a crisis, the crisis manager’s attention is not drawn away from the primary 
task objectives. 
 
 Contingency plans developed on an ongoing basis. 
 
Although contingency plans should be in place for many emergency situations, 
by its very nature a crisis is a situation for which a specific contingency plan will 
not have been developed. It is therefore necessary for the crisis manager, through 
a high level of situational awareness, to predict possible future events, and to 
develop contingency plans to handle these events on an ongoing basis. 
 
 Overt awareness of time as a finite resource by questioning time management status. 
 
The crisis manager will overtly question and update other team members in 
relation to the time criticality of tasks in order to maintain a shared temporal 
overview of the crisis amongst the team. 
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 Demonstrates awareness of ‘big picture’ context. 
 
The communications and decisions made by the crisis manager show an 
understanding of the whole crisis situation and an ability to maintain and update 
this overview throughout the crisis. 
 
 Closely co-ordinates actions with others. 
 
The crisis manager maintains an awareness of the actions of other parties 
involved in the crisis situation and takes these into account when making 
decisions about future actions. 
 
 Gives consideration to the needs of others. 
 
The crisis manager maintains an awareness of the activities and state of other 
team members in order to be considerate towards them when making further 
decisions. 
 
 Utilise team briefings for specific threats. 
 
During the course of the crisis situation the crisis manager will call the team 
together to discuss specific threats that have arisen. 
 
 Provide a large range of response options to threats. 
 
When faced with specific threats the crisis manager will use a team review in 
order to propose a large range of possible response options. 
 
 Crewmembers performance thoroughly questioned and crosschecked. 
 
The crisis manager will ensure that all of the decisions and actions taken by team 
members are crosschecked, and if necessary questioned by other team members. 
This should include the crisis manager’s own decisions and actions. 
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 Prompts for timely response to correct any crewmember-induced errors. 
 
Through a high level of awareness of the actions being taken by other members of 
the team, the crisis manager is able to crosscheck their actions and intervene in a 
timely manner to prevent any errors made from having a detrimental impact on 
the situation. 
 
  Prompts for timely response to any change in situation. 
 
Through a high level of situational awareness the crisis manager is able to make 
decisions to ensure that the required responses to any changes in the crisis 
situation are effective. 
 
 Keeps crewmembers focused on the accomplishment of the task. 
 
The crisis manager maintains the team members focus on achieving the required 
tasks.  
 
 Communication kept succinct. 
 
The crisis manager maintains the succinctness of all communications between 
members of the team. 
 
 Effectively increases work rate to cope with escalation of crisis. 
 
The crisis manager motivates the team to effectively meet the challenges 
presented by any escalation of the crisis situation. 
 
 
Although these behaviours were observed during simulated air combat mission training sessions, 
they would appear to be generic in nature, and may well be found to be relevant to the merchant 
marine domain. It is assumed that this list is not exhaustive. If, as suggested by Tourville, overt 
behavioural markers can be used as the basis of an assessment framework for assessing 
competence in crisis management in the air combat mission domain, how such markers could be 
used to assess competence in crisis management within other safety critical organisations would 
need to be established.  
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One of the factors that may be important in determining if these behaviours can be used to assess 
competence in crisis management in other domains is ‘time’. The time available to the crisis 
manager during the crisis situation, in which it might be possible to exhibit the behaviours 
described above, is an important consideration for the validity of any assessment framework. If 
crisis situations, within the domain for which assessments are to be undertaken, occur over a very 
short timescale, then it will be difficult to provide an assessment framework based on observable 
behaviours. Within the short time of the crisis situation, too few overt behaviours may be 
exhibited to make a valid assessment of competence.   
 
Within the merchant marine domain it can be noted from the industry’s casualty report data that 
crises usually occur over many hours, or even days. It is therefore anticipated that there will be 
sufficient time within the simulation scenarios within this research for assessors to observe a 
sufficient number of relevant overt behaviours in order to assess a candidate’s competence in 
crisis management. However, this does raise the question of how many discreet observable 
behaviours are required to be assessed before a valid overall assessment of competence in crisis 
management can be made. 
 
It is commonly argued that behavioural markers cannot be used to assess competence because the 
candidate for assessment will just learn the behaviours that are required to be exhibited in order 
to achieve a good assessment, and not the skills that should underpin and elicit those behaviours. 
The generally accepted counter argument to this is that if exemplar behaviours are being 
exhibited, then the candidate must be using the skills required to elicit those behaviours. If 
competence in crisis management skills leads to exemplar crisis management behaviours, it could 
be argued that, exemplar crisis management behaviours arise from competence in crisis 
management skills. 
 
However, when an assessor undertakes an assessment based on behavioural markers, the 
assessment is usually not solely based on the exhibition of behaviours, but on how the exhibited 
behaviours relate to the success of the processes and/or outcomes of the situation. It could be 
argued that a single behavioural marker cannot be taken in isolation as an indication of good 
performance, but that an assessment should be based upon the exhibition of a related set of 
indicative behavioural markers, observed in the context of the assessment scenario. This again 
raises the question of how many behavioural markers need to be in this assessment set. 
Theoretically, it might be possible to find a single behavioural marker that was indicative of 
competence in crisis management. 
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In research studying the assessment of teamwork dimensions of teams working in complex 
environments (Smith-Jentsch et al, 1998), it was shown that dimensions requiring raters to infer a 
state of mind, such as team monitoring and situation awareness, were less reliable than those that 
were based on the observation of overt behaviours. The research showed that a number of 
teamwork behaviours were distinct and objectively observable measures of performance. These 
behaviours were: 
 
“Information exchange - Seeking information from all available sources 
    Passing information to the appropriate persons before being asked 
    Providing big picture updates 
 
Communication  - Using proper phraseology 
    Providing complete internal and external reports 
    Avoiding excess chatter 
    Ensuring communications are audible and ungarbled 
 
Supporting Behaviour - Correcting team errors 
    Providing and requesting backup or assistance when needed 
 
Team Initiative and - Providing guidance or suggestions to team members 
Leadership   Stating clear team and individual priorities.”  
(Smith-Jentsch et al, 1998) 
 
   
In experiments, Smith-Jentsch et al showed that for some behaviours, there were high correlations 
between the ratings of a team across a range of scenario events. They argued that this was 
evidence of the relatively stable nature of these behaviours as an assessment tool. They referred to 
this as ‘convergent validity’ and proposed that this was an indication that these behavioural 
markers were diagnostic measures. 
 
They argued that correlations between different behaviours within a particular scenario event 
should be low. If these correlations are high, they concluded that the ratings were biased because 
the raters were probably limiting the range of their assessment criteria. They proposed that for a 
set of behavioural markers to be truly diagnostic, multiple ratings of these behaviours should be 
relatively independent of one another. They referred to this as ‘discriminant validity’. 
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Smith-Jentsch et al’s research showed that it was difficult to rate some behavioural markers 
consistently at both the individual and team levels. They state that: 
 
“Raters are believed to have a limited cognitive ability to discriminate among multiple 
performance dimensions. Raters are often prone to decision biases, such as halo error, in 
which judgements of one dimension are coloured by impressions formed on other 
dimensions.” 
 
They hypothesised that any correlation between different behavioural markers within a scenario 
exercise may represent true ‘exercise effects’ that mirror stable dispositions towards behaviours 
exhibited in particular situations in the real world. They found that the behaviours of information 
exchange, communication and team initiative/leadership were directly related to the quality of 
team decisions across different scenario events.  
 
Following their research, Smith-Jentsch et al recommended that team performance assessment 
dimensions should be “defined in terms of specific behaviours that are objectively observable and or 
audible to raters”. They state that regardless of the number of dimensions assessed, three to five 
dimensions are generally sufficient to account for subject variability. 
 
They propose that raters should evaluate instances of specific behaviours within an assessment 
dimension. These ratings, they suggest, can then be combined mathematically to give an overall 
rating. They recommend this assessment methodology as a way of preventing the bias that they 
state is associated with trying to give an overall rating directly. Using this methodology, they 
were able to find a strong relationship between accurate decision-making and effective 
information exchange, communication and team initiative/leadership. They stated that this 
relationship remained strong even with contextual differences across the scenario events. 
 
Schwab et al (1975), however, cautioned against the use of any behaviourally anchored rating 
scale if that scale was not defined by a large number of examples. They argued that if the rating 
scale is not defined clearly enough by using a large number of examples of behaviour the assessor 
may have difficulty in assigning observed behaviours to specific assessment dimensions. They 
also argued that without sufficient examples the assessor would have difficulty in deciding the 
scale value of the effectiveness of the observed behaviour. Errors by the assessor in either 
assigning behaviours to dimensions, or rating the effectiveness of the behaviour, could both be 
significant sources of assessment variance. Williams et al (1997) stated that there is a dilemma 
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associated with any assessment task and that is to distinguish bias or cognitive distortion from 
truth. 
 
If assessors are to give consistent, reliable and accurate ratings, then they will need to agree on 
both their behavioural observations and their performance ratings when they assess the same 
assessment scenario. This is because assessors should be interchangeable; the assessment rating 
should in no way be dependent upon which particular assessor undertaking the assessment 
(Brannick & Pearce, 1991; Baker et al, 2001).   
 
Baker et al (2001) define two types of rater accuracy: 
 
 Observation Accuracy - the extent to which raters can correctly identify 
     and record behavioural information. 
 
 Rating Accuracy - the extent to which raters assign the correct rating 
     (i.e. on a defined rating scale) to the particular level 
     of performance that was observed. 
 
Baker et al point out that there is a critical distinction between the process of observation, that 
involves detection, perception and recall, and the process of assessment, that involves 
categorising, integrating and evaluating. Both of these processes can be a source of assessment 
error. They go on to advocate a regime of assessor training which they suggest should reduce 
assessment error and lead to high levels of interrater reliability and agreement. The forms of 
assessor training they discuss are: 
 
Rater Error Training - used to familiarise raters with common rating errors such as: 
 
 Halo          -    where the judgement of one dimension is affected by the   
   impressions formed on other dimensions;  
 Leniency             -     where the judgement is always overly lenient; 
 Severity              -     where the judgement is always overly severe; 
 Central tendency   - where the judgement is always average. 
 
Performance Dimension Training – used to train raters to recognise and use the appropriate 
performance dimensions and rating scales, and to rely on these dimensions and scales when 
making observations. 
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Behavioural Observation Training – used to provide raters with strategies that focus on observing 
and recording behaviour. Raters are trained to take detailed notes during observations. 
 
Frame-of-Reference Training – used to provide raters with different standards of performance on 
dimensions. This training includes rating practice and feedback so that raters can adopt a common 
frame of reference. Raters are given samples of varying levels of performance on behaviours that 
represent each dimension. These samples are provided on videotape and the raters can then 
practice, and get feedback on, the use of the performance standards. Subject matter experts are 
used to give a ‘true’ rating of performance against which the rater can gauge their own assessment 
performance. 
 
Baker et al argue that any videotapes used for rater practice should be of actual performance, as 
opposed to a scripted performance. They suggest that this is because actual performance typically 
contains more subtle variations that are harder for raters to observe and distinguish. 
 
In a review of the use of behavioural markers for the assessment of crew resource management 
skills within the civil aviation industry, Flin and Martin (2001) categorise resource management 
skills into either cognitive or inter-personal. Within the cognitive category, they place the skills 
related to situation awareness, workload management, planning and decision-making. Within the 
inter-personal category, they place the skills related to crew coordination, communication, 
leadership/followership, and group-climate. They go on to discuss the wording of behavioural 
markers for use in assessing these categories of resource management skills. They argue that 
behavioural markers should be concise and use simple wording, and that the verb of any 
behaviourally anchored assessment criteria should relate to a ‘clearly observable’ behaviour such as 
‘monitor’ or ‘ask’. They give an example of an unobservable behavioural marker -  ‘made a decision’; 
and an example of an observable behavioural marker – ‘communicates a decision’.  However, when 
developing any assessment framework relating to resource management skills, it should be noted 
that Seamster et al (1994) argued that a significantly greater proportion of the problems associated 
with the assessment of resource management skills came from the cognitive category rather than 
the inter-personal category. One reason for this is that inter-personal skills are more easily 
identified with specific overt behaviours than cognitive skills.  
 
Birnbach and Longridge (1993) suggested some guidelines for enhancing the reliability of any 
crew resource management (CRM) assessments. Firstly, they suggest that any measurement of 
CRM should be based on observable behaviours that could be clearly defined and explicitly 
identified so that no ambiguity can exist in the assessment process. Secondly, they suggest that 
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CRM assessments should occur within standardised environments to ensure that all assessments 
are evaluated in the same way, under the same conditions. Lastly, they suggest that assessors 
should be ‘calibrated’ so that they are consistent in their assessments. They suggest that assessors 
should be trained and periodically assessed to ensure that high levels of interrater reliability are 
achieved. 
 
The degree of awareness that a candidate has of the skills and associated behaviours being 
evaluated during an assessment exercise has been given the term ‘skill transparency’. It has been 
argued that during an assessment exercise, the higher the level of skill transparency a candidate 
has, the more they will introduce characteristics into their performance to meet the demands of 
the assessment criteria and thereby remove the variability in their performance that is due to their 
natural disposition (Kleinmann, 1993).  
 
Smith and Smith-Jentsch (2001) suggest that even candidates for assessment who, for example, 
would not normally use assertiveness to handle a particular type of situation, may do well in an 
exercise where they knew they were being assessed on their ability to be assertive. They suggest 
that the resulting measure may be an excellent indicator of the candidate’s pure skill at using 
assertiveness, or what one can do, while being a poor indicator of typical real world performance 
in similar situations, or what one will do. They argue, “the degree of skill transparency associated with 
a situational exercise should be considered when interpreting behavioural assessments”. They suggest that 
when developing situational exercises for assessment using behavioural markers, the purpose of 
the assessment should be carefully considered. If the purpose of the assessment is to determine 
the candidate’s level of skill or ability, then they argue that the behavioural markers can be 
transparent to the candidate, and that this type of exercise may be useful to assess the 
effectiveness of a training programme in developing skills. However, if the purpose of the 
assessment is to determine how a candidate might typically perform on-the-job in a real situation, 
they argue that the behavioural markers should not be transparent to the candidate. If the result of 
any assessment were to be only either ‘competent’ or ‘not yet competent’, it would not be necessary 
to disclose the behavioural markers used in the assessment process to the candidate. 
  
Seamster et al (1995) proposed that when assessing competence related to crisis management the 
overall assessment scenario should be broken down into discrete “event sets”.  They describe 
event sets as: 
 
“a group of complex related events designed into an assessment scenario to 
stimulate the candidate to perform specific crew resource management 
skills.” 
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They argue that assessors should rate candidate’s performance in each of the event sets, and not 
their overall performance.  Their research showed that if assessors rate performance for the whole 
assessment scenario, they give a much higher mean rating, relating to better performance, than if 
they assess the discrete event sets. They argue that the lower mean ratings, relating to poorer 
performance, resulting from the “event set” method of assessment may more accurately reflect the 
actual performance in the real world.  
 
From the literature, it would appear there are certain overt behaviours that can be directly related 
to the skills required by successful crisis managers. Even though these skills may be both 
cognitive and non-cognitive, they can be identified and linked to observable behaviours. It would 
also appear that some of these behaviours could be used to objectively assess competence in crisis 
management, with good levels of interrater reliability and agreement, as long as raters are 
suitably trained. For competency assessment that is relevant for the work place, it would appear 
that behavioural marker based assessment frameworks should not be made transparent to the 
candidate. 
 
 
2.17  SUMMARY OF RELEVANCE OF LITERATURE REVIEW TO RESEARCH 
 
The use of behavioural markers is generally accepted as a valid approach to the assessment of 
competence in many safety critical industries and organisations. 
 
The use of overt behavioural markers as assessment criteria is a way of directly observing the 
outputs of the cognitive processes taking place within the minds of those being assessed. 
However, considerable research is still required before cognitive analysis could produce any 
certainty about the cognitive processes involved when an operator undertakes a complex dynamic 
task.  
 
The interactions between the crisis manager and the crisis management team play an important 
part in the effective management of a crisis. Therefore, it is the behaviours that define these 
interactions within the team environment that may be used as markers for assessing the team 
leaders competence in managing crises. By deconstructing the crisis management team, so that the 
individual team member attributes can be identified, further insights into the interaction between 
team leader and team member can be obtained, leading to a better understanding of the 
behaviours exhibited by the team leader during a crisis situation. 
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The literature has shown that when undertaking research that relies upon the abilities of 
participants to make decisions, the research environment should be as realistic as possible, 
providing as many of the cues that would be in the real world as possible to facilitate the choice of 
decision strategies. The integrity of the realism in any simulation used to study behavioural 
markers of crisis managers would therefore appear to be of the highest importance. 
 
The literature would appear to support the argument that because there are no consistent 
relationships between processes and outcomes, and some process violations are beneficial, the use 
of complete models of the expert behaviour exhibited when undertaking a process, as assessment 
criteria, would not seem to be a viable option. Instead, the behavioural markers that support and 
facilitate successful processes, beneficial process violations and successful outcomes, would seem 
to be the most relevant assessment criteria. It would also appear that it is how factually based a 
behavioural marker is that will determine its objectivity during use in an assessment.  
 
Throughout the literature review, many overt behavioural markers have been proffered that 
would seem to be potentially useful in the assessment of competence in crisis management. These 
behaviours are shown in Table 3 below. They will be evaluated in Chapter 5 to determine their 
suitability for inclusion within a behaviour based assessment framework for assessing competence 
in crisis management within the domain of a merchant naval vessel’s engine room control room 
environment. 
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 Behavioural Marker 
 
1 Ratio of degree of feedback control to degree of predictive control 
 
2 Integration of team member attributes and values to maximum advantage 
 
3 The number of alternative hypotheses and actions communicated to team members 
 
4 The level of ‘satisficing’ exhibited 
 
5 Communicating in a way that reveals ones mental models 
 
6 Relevance and timeliness of unsolicited information passed between team members as 
measures of the degree of congruence of their mental models 
 
7 The level of anticipation of the needs of other team members and of future action and 
task requirements 
 
8 The amount of relevant information passed in anticipation of need, as a ratio of the 
amount of relevant information available 
 
9 The periodicity of situation assessment updates to the other team members 
 
10 Ignoring feedback delays 
 
11 Focus too much on the reduction of uncertainty by requesting information 
 
12 Inaccuracy in timing the right moment of intervention 
 
13 Tendency to focus on one system at a time, thereby ignoring the dynamics of the 
complete system 
 
14 Lack of knowledge concerning the relation between symptoms and causes 
 
15 The number of dimensions upon which a decision is based 
 
16 The length of term of considerations upon which a decision is based 
 
17 Amount of sampling behaviour exhibited 
 
18 Time between the onset of a disturbance and the first time a related action was carried 
out or an information request was made; defined as the disturbance detection time. 
 
19 The time span between the first information request or action related to a disturbance 
and the correction of that disturbance 
 
20 The number of information requests made about a disturbance 
 
21 The number of times a supervisor inspected systems through their graphical control 
interface, as indicated by the number of mouse clicks on the control screen giving a 
measurement of monitoring behaviour 
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22 The division of time and effort over different essential sub-goals 
 
23 The ability to switch between the processing of information about different sub-goals, 
as opposed to the need to completely finish one sub-goal before considering another 
 
24 Explicitly asking their team how much time they have before they must commit to a 
decision 
 
25 Communication behaviours (see Table 1) 
 
26 The degree to which a crisis manager monitors the information exchange between 
members of their crisis management team 
 
27 Seeking information from all available sources 
 
28 Passing information to the appropriate persons before being asked 
 
29 Providing big picture updates 
 
30 Using proper phraseology 
 
31 Providing complete internal and external reports 
 
32 Avoiding excess chatter 
 
33 Ensuring communications are audible and ungarbled 
 
34 Correcting team errors 
 
35 Providing and requesting backup or assistance when needed 
 
36 Team leader focuses on individual tasks rather than the teams’ 
 
37 The level of useful communication amongst the team 
 
38 Providing guidance or suggestions to team members 
 
39 Stating clear team and individual priorities. 
 
40 Delegation of tasks based upon known crewmember strengths. 
 
41 High degree of crewmember integration within the team. 
 
42 Information backup provided during periods of ambiguity. 
 
43 Regular soliciting of information between crewmembers. 
 
44 Integration of real-world operations experience, rather than a reliance on procedures. 
 
45 Extensive “what-if” analyses undertaken. 
 
46 Task prioritisation carried out. 
 
47 Adaptation of plan to take into account evolving events. 
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48 Distracting information coded and assigned level of urgency for attention. 
 
49 Maintain a focused attitude to task objectives. 
 
50 Contingency plans developed on an ongoing basis. 
 
51 Overt awareness of time as a finite resource by questioning time management status. 
 
52 Demonstrates awareness of ‘big picture’ context. 
 
53 Closely co-ordinates actions with others. 
 
54 Gives consideration to the needs of others. 
 
55 Utilise team briefings for specific threats. 
 
56 Provide a large range of response options to threats. 
 
57 Crewmembers performance thoroughly questioned and crosschecked. 
 
58 Prompts for timely response to correct any crewmember-induced errors. 
 
59 Prompts for timely response to any change in situation. 
 
60 Keeps crewmembers focused on the accomplishment of the task. 
 
61 Communication kept succinct. 
 
62 Effectively increases work rate to cope with escalation of crisis. 
 
63 Thanking another team member for pointing out a mistake. 
 
64 Helping other team members having difficulty. 
 
65 Making motivating statements. 
 
66 Praising other team members. 
 
67 Suggesting ways to find an error. 
 
 
Table 3:   Behavioural markers potentially related to competence in crisis management.
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Chapter 3. REVIEW OF EXISTING ASSESSMENT PRACTICE 
 
This chapter will review some of the existing practice for the assessment of competence in crisis 
management from a range of safety critical industries and organisations. The review will detail 
some of the assessment criteria used and will discuss the behavioural markers related to these 
criteria, and how objectively these markers can be assessed. A discussion on the current state of 
assessment of competence in crisis management within the commercial shipping industry will 
also be presented. The chapter will conclude with some direct comparisons between the different 
assessment frameworks reviewed, and a discussion of their relevance to any assessment 
framework developed for assessing competence in crisis management of merchant marine 
engineering officers. 
 
 
3.1 MILITARY  
 
In the literature review it was argued that the assessment of competence of crisis management 
should be undertaken in an environment that resembles the real world situation as closely as 
possible, in order to ensure that, as far as possible, all of the required cues for decision-making are 
available. Through their use of war games, utilising real hardware, the military attempt to provide 
this environment.   
 
The observation of behavioural markers in such large and complex environments is a great 
challenge. To meet this challenge the military use large numbers of assessors, dispersed 
throughout the war-gaming environment during an assessment exercise. After the assessment 
exercise, the assessors meet to discuss their observations during the exercise, and to evaluate the 
actions of the team against set assessment criteria. This gives the advantage of a moderation 
process within the assessment.  
 
The assessment is for the command team as a whole, and not for individuals within the team. 
Within military navies, the practice is for the command and control team to be kept together for a 
tour of duty onboard a vessel, which may be as long as two years. This therefore allows the team 
to be assessed together, rather than there being any necessity for individuals to be assessed within 
the team. 
 
The following observations were made by the author during the assessment of a warship’s 
command and control team taking part in a major war game exercise: 
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 There were twenty assessors used throughout the vessel. 
 
 The assessment was divided into specific areas; initial actions, firefighting, containment, 
re-entry, mechanical aspects, electrical aspects, command and control. 
 
 Assessors attempted to get candidates to verbalise their thought processes and to state 
priorities during the assessment exercise. This seemed at times to hinder the candidates’ 
performance. 
 
 Assessors would give ‘hints’ to candidates at times during the assessment exercise in 
order to prevent one mistake affecting too many other aspects of the exercise. However, 
there were also indications that some of these ‘hints’ were an extension of the training, 
and that training and assessment were therefore at times being undertaken 
simultaneously.  
 
 There was at times some dissatisfaction exhibited by the assessors towards the set 
assessment criteria. This dissatisfaction was borne out of the openness to interpretation of 
some of the criteria used. An example of this was if a failure was critical or not critical to 
the task. 
 
 The assessment had to be made under strict time limitations. This led to single point 
interpretations by the senior assessor if the moderation discussion between assessors was 
taking too long. 
 
 On some occasions there was no positive outcome from the moderating process and this 
led to an ‘average’ assessment being given.  
 
Some examples of the behavioural markers used as assessment criteria by a military navy are 
shown in Table 4 below. These criteria are assessed as having been either ‘met’ or ‘not met’. A 
discussion is then held between assessors to give an overall assessment of how the team 
performed. Due to the severe time restraints imposed on the assessment process, because of the 
operational requirements of the military, and the complex nature of the assessment criteria, 
subjective assessments are inevitable. However, because of the large number of assessors used, 
fair and effective assessments can be achieved through moderation. Support was given to the 
overall assessment process by a number of candidates who said that in general they thought that 
the assessment of their performance was fair. 
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Command and Control 
 
Did the Command team quickly close up at HQ1. 
 
Was a comprehensive set of check cards  / aide memoirs provided and used. 
 
Were smoke boundaries established and effectively maintained. 
 
Was there a good flow of information into the control position at all stages. 
 
Was the incident picture well kept. 
 
Was an alternative control position considered. 
 
Were hands piped to emergency stations in good time. 
 
Was there an organisation for accounting for personnel and did it work effectively. 
 
Did the Damage Control Officer have firm control of the situation. 
 
Was there a good flow of information between the Damage Control Officer / Electrical / 
Propulsion Managers regarding the state of essential services. 
 
Between them, did they provide sound support to the Marine Engineering Officer. 
 
Was there a good flow of information to the Command. 
 
 
Table 4:  Examples of Military Command and Control assessment criteria (Royal Navy, 2002) 
 
It can be seen that some of these assessment criteria are descriptions of very complex sets of overt 
behaviours and others infer some form of covert cognitive processing. Each of these criteria could 
be broken down into more simple and discrete overt behaviours. For example the criteria “Was the 
incident picture well kept” could be broken down into the overt behavioural markers of: 
 
 Verbal feedback about incident situation given by team members to team leader. 
 
 Team leader gives clear and concise command orders after receiving feedback. 
 
 Team leader updates incident status board. 
 
 Reference is made to incident status board by team members. 
 
 ‘Command Huddle’ technique used to elicit information from team members. 
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By observing these more simple and discrete overt behavioural markers, the complex cognitive 
processing assessment criteria of “Was the incident picture well kept” could be implied. 
  
The criteria within the military Command and Control assessment framework are used to give an 
overall assessment of the team’s performance based on a seven-point rating scale. This rating scale 
is shown in Table 5. below. This assessment is used within the individual officer’s appraisal 
reports as part of the officer’s overall assessment of their potential, so cannot be considered as a 
non-jeopardy assessment.  
  
Assessment 
 
Definition 
VERY GOOD Outstanding results achieved. Execution of the highest order. 
High standard throughout. Innovative solutions to problems. 
Equipment, fittings and systems well maintained and free from 
defects. 
GOOD Good results achieved in almost all respects. Execution requires 
only a few minor improvements. Few material / organisational 
/administrative deficiencies. Prepared effectively. 
VERY SATISFACTORY Execution, equipment, performance and organisation / 
administration at a strong standard, but a number of 
shortcomings, although minor, does not merit a Good 
assessment. 
SATISFACTORY Adequate results achieved with some shortcomings (one or two 
of which could be major (significant)) with scope for 
improvement. Execution safe and steady but could be improved. 
Some organisational / administrative deficiencies. Equipment 
generally providing effective performance. 
JUST SATISFACTORY Although not poor enough to merit a Below Standard 
assessment, execution, equipment, performance or organisational 
/ administrative need further improvement before a Satisfactory 
standard is achieved. Several significant weaknesses. 
BELOW STANDARD One or two critical weaknesses. A number of other significant 
weaknesses. Considerable wide improvement necessary. 
Execution inadequate. 
UNSATISFACTORY Several critical weaknesses. Unacceptable execution / material / 
organisation / administrative deficiencies. 
 
Table 5.  Military Command and Control assessment rating scale. (Royal Navy, 2002) 
 
It can be seen that the definitions within the overall assessment rating scale above are very broad. 
With the rating of the individual behavioural marker criteria having been assessed as either ‘met’ 
or ‘not met’, the process of then obtaining an overall assessment based on the definitions above 
was observed to be very difficult and very subjective. However, it appeared to achieve a valid 
assessment due to the process of moderation. 
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The use of complex assessment criteria is bound to lead to more subjective assessment outcomes, 
as evidenced during the observation of the military navy assessment exercise. However, the 
assessment of competence in crisis management by the military, even with the use of high-level 
complex behavioural markers, has been found to be fair and effective because of their use of large 
numbers of assessors and a process of moderation.  
 
  
3.2 CIVIL AVIATION 
 
Within the civil aviation industry, the training of crew resource management skills has been 
introduced as a way of improving safety performance. The civil aviation industry has recently 
been undertaking research into the best way to assess the non-technical skills of aircrew (JAR TEL 
Consortium, 2001). Non-technical skills can be defined as those skills, in addition to technical 
skills, required for competence in crisis management. There are four main categories of resource 
management skills, or non-technical skills, being used within behavioural marker systems within 
the civil aviation industry: 
 
 Co-operation 
 Leadership and Management 
 Situation Awareness 
 Decision Making (Flin & Martin, 1998) 
  
The European Union research project ‘Joint Aviation Requirements Translation and Elaboration of 
Legislation’ (JAR TEL Consortium, 2001) has evaluated the use of such a behavioural marker 
system for the assessment of resource management skills of commercial flight crews. Through the 
JAR TEL research project, a methodology for assessing the non-technical skills of aircrew, by 
observing individual overt behaviours, has been proposed. The JAR TEL project concluded that 
such an assessment framework: “is capable of proving itself a valid and reliable method for assessing 
non-technical skills.” 
 
However, the reservations of civil aviation pilots to the concept of the assessment of non-technical 
skills are also discussed in the JAR TEL report. One of the pilots main concerns was that they felt 
that the criteria on which any assessment is based are largely subjective, and thus cannot easily be 
monitored for fairness and accuracy (JAR TEL Consortium, 2001). Some examples of the 
behavioural markers used as criteria within the JAR TEL assessment framework are shown in 
Table 6 below. 
Chapter 3                                                                                       Review of Existing Assessment Practice 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________                                         
Behavioural Markers for the Assessment of Competence in Crisis Management                             89 
 
Behavioural Markers indicating good practice: 
 
Behavioural Markers indicating poor practice: 
Reflects on the suggestions of others.  
 
 
 
Ignores suggestions of others. 
Demonstrates will to achieve top 
performance. 
 
 
Does not care for performance effectiveness. 
Takes condition of other crewmembers into 
account. 
 
 
Does not take account of other 
crewmembers. 
Secondary operational tasks are prioritised 
to retain sufficient resources for primary 
flight duties. 
 
Secondary operational tasks interfere with 
primary flight duties. 
Allocates enough time to complete tasks. 
 
 
 
Ignores signs of stress and fatigue. 
 
Table 6.  Examples of Civil Aviation Non-Technical Skills assessment criteria (JAR TEL 
Consortium, 2001) 
 
It can be seen from these assessment criteria that the reservations held by some pilots may be 
justifiable, especially when viewed in the light of the interrater agreement data discussed 
previously in section 2.13. Behaviour such as “reflection” would be difficult to observe, unless this 
reflection resulted in some further related behaviour. In addition, assessments based upon metrics 
such as “enough” and “sufficient” could be seen as possibly leading to subjective outcomes. 
 
The cockpit environment is very different to that of the military’s war-gaming environment, but 
the non-technical skills of co-operation, leadership and management, situational awareness and 
decision-making, as metrics for assessing competence in crisis management, are common to both. 
As with the military assessment framework discussed in section 3.1, the JAR TEL criteria are 
assessed as having either been passed or failed. The assessments are carried out within high 
fidelity full mission aircraft simulators, using a single assessor. However, this time the assessment 
environment is a non-jeopardy environment. A number of scenarios can be used within the 
simulator in order to assess the performance of the candidates. These may relate to either normal 
or abnormal flight conditions.   
 
Chapter 3                                                                                       Review of Existing Assessment Practice 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________                                         
Behavioural Markers for the Assessment of Competence in Crisis Management                             90 
Pilots are also subject to assessment by the use of Line Operations Safety Audits (LOSA), which 
are non-jeopardy observations of crews conducting normal line flights. The basis for many of the 
behavioural markers rating scales in use for this type of assessment is the ‘University of Texas 
Behavioural markers Rating Scale’, which is detailed within the UK Civil Aviation Authority’s 
guidance document CAP 737 (CAA, 2003) and within the International Civil Aviation 
Organization’s guidance document 9803 AN/761 (ICAO, 2002). 
 
The focus of the LOSA assessment criteria is on the management of threats and errors. Examples 
of the behavioural markers used as criteria within the LOSA assessment framework are shown in 
Table 7. below. 
 
 
 
 
Behavioural Markers 
PLANS STATED 
 
 
 
Operational plans and decisions 
were communicated and 
acknowledged. 
Shared understanding about plans; 
Bottom lines were established. 
WORKLOAD 
MANAGEMENT 
Roles and responsibilities were 
defined for normal and non-
normal situations. 
 
Workload assignments were 
communicated and acknowledged. 
VIGILANCE Crewmembers remained alert of 
the environment and position of 
the aircraft. 
 
Crewmembers maintained 
situational awareness. 
AUTOMATION 
MANAGEMENT 
Automation was properly 
managed to balance situational 
and/or workload requirements. 
 
Automation set-up was briefed to 
other members; 
Effective recovery techniques from 
automation anomalies. 
 
INQUIRY Crewmembers asked questions to 
investigate and/or clarify current 
plans of action. 
 
Crewmembers not afraid to 
express a lack of knowledge; 
“Nothing taken for granted” 
attitude. 
 
 
Table 7.  Examples of Line Operations Safety Audits (LOSA) assessment criteria (CAA, 2003; 
ICAO, 2002) 
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Unlike the JAR TEL assessment framework that uses a two-point assessment scale, pass or fail, the 
LOSA criteria are assessed against a four-point rating scale. 
 
1 = poor 
 
2 = marginal 3 = good 4 = outstanding 
Observed 
performance had 
safety implications 
Observed 
performance was 
barely adequate 
Observed 
performance was 
effective 
Observed 
performance was 
truly noteworthy 
 
 
Table 8.  Line Operations Safety Audits (LOSA) assessment rating scale (ICAO, 2002; CAA, 2003) 
 
Non-technical skills assessments within civil aviation are currently not used to obtain an 
assessment of competence that can affect the issuance of a pilot’s flying licence. They are only 
used to obtain data about the issues related to the use of non-technical skills during flight 
operations, and to inform pilot training programmes, to try to alleviate any problems found. The 
assessment of non-technical skills within civil aviation is therefore considered to be a non-
jeopardy assessment. 
 
A major difference between the assessment of competence in crisis management within the 
military context, and within the civil aviation context, is that within the military context a team is 
assessed, whereas within the civil aviation context it is the assessment of an individual working 
within a team that is undertaken. 
 
 
3.3 OFFSHORE INDUSTRY 
 
The following observations were made by the author during the assessment of an Offshore 
Installation Manager.   
 
Within the offshore industry, the crisis manager of an offshore installation would be the offshore 
installation manager (OIM). The assessment of OIM’s is undertaken in a high fidelity full mission 
offshore installation control centre simulator, using two assessors. The OIM is assessed as the 
team leader. The team working for the OIM during the assessment exercise is supplied by the 
assessment centre. This team is essentially “dumb”, competently undertaking what they are asked 
to do and providing appropriate feedback to the team leader, but not using their initiative. 
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The OIM candidate is assessed over the course of three simulator exercises. After each exercise, 
the candidate receives feedback from the assessors on his or her performance.  The candidate also 
has the opportunity to clarify their actions, decisions and intentions to the assessors. This 
interview therefore forms a sort of debrief of each assessment exercise. 
 
Table 9. below gives some examples of the performance criteria used to assess OIM’s. 
 
 
OIM Performance Criteria 
 
Appropriate resources are utilised throughout emergency. 
 
Valid interpretations are made and valid decisions are taken throughout. 
 
Appropriate actions are taken as quickly as possible. 
 
Emergency response teams are coordinated and directed effectively. 
 
Valid decisions are taken on which activities should be delegated in the light of the 
circumstances of the moment. 
 
Actions and behaviours contribute to the confidence and effectiveness of the team at all 
times. 
 
The appropriate degree of detachment is maintained throughout. 
 
 
Table 9.  Examples of Offshore Industry assessment criteria (RGIT Montrose, 2002) 
  
It can be seen that these criteria relate to complex sets of behaviours and as such will be open to 
subjective interpretation. The use of adjectives such as appropriate, valid and effective within the 
criteria also means that there may be differences of opinion between assessors as to how 
appropriate, or how effective, a particular decision or course of action has been. In order to ensure 
that these differences do not adversely affect the assessment, two assessors are used to moderate 
the outcome.  
  
Within the offshore industry, it is accepted practice that OIM candidate performances under 
simulated conditions are viewed as opportunities to identify areas for development and 
improvement (RGIT Montrose, 2002). Unlike the military and some civil aviation assessment 
frameworks, where the individual assessment criteria can have only one of two ratings, competent 
or not yet competent, the offshore industry assessors use the following rating scale for assessing 
the candidate: 
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1. Fully meets the required standards in every respect. 
2. Sufficiently meets the required standards – but with areas identified for 
improvement (requiring some advisory comment by the assessors). 
3. Not yet demonstrating the required capabilities. (Within reason, the assessors 
will comment on those areas requiring substantial improvement). 
(RGIT Montrose, 2002) 
 
Although individual elements of the assessment framework are assessed against this rating scale, 
the final overall assessment may not just be the arithmetic average of all of the individual 
assessment criteria ratings. If the assessors consider that the candidate has a low rating in a 
“critical area”, the candidates overall rating may be given as lower than the arithmetic average. 
 
The assessment criteria are derived from the Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Organisation 
(OPITO) approved standard of performance for an OIM controlling emergencies (OPITO, 2005). A 
candidate has to pass this assessment before they can be employed as an offshore installation 
manager. Therefore, as with the military assessment system, this is not a non-jeopardy assessment 
environment. Some of the companies that operate offshore installations require existing OIM’s to 
undertake this assessment process at least once every three years, in order to prove their 
continuing competence. 
 
 
3.4 FIRE BRIGADE 
 
The following observations were made by the author during the assessment of a Fire Brigade 
Incident Commander.  
 
Incident Commanders within the Fire Brigade have to manage crisis situations on an almost daily 
basis. The Fire Brigade therefore has a rigorous assessment procedure in place to ensure that all of 
their Incident Commanders are competent in the management of crises. The Fire Brigade has 
comprehensive simulation facilities in which these assessments are undertaken. These consist of a 
high fidelity full mission incident command vehicle simulator and incident scene simulations, 
presenting visual scenes of the incident. Interaction with third parties who may be involved in the 
incident, such as the police, ambulance service and members of the public, is also provided. 
Through this range of simulations, the majority of the cues that would be in the real world 
incident environment can be presented to the candidate. 
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The Incident Command Assessment process is part of the overall assessment of the Fire Brigade 
Officers used to assess their potential for promotion, and as such is not a non-jeopardy 
assessment. The candidates are fully briefed about the assessment process before the simulation 
exercise is started. The information presented to the candidate during the simulation exercise 
follows a standardised script to ensure that all candidates experience the scenario in the same 
way. In order to ensure this standardised experience, the team working with the Incident 
Commander during the assessment exercise is supplied by the assessment centre. As in the 
Offshore Installation Manager assessment described in the previous section, the team supplied by 
the assessment centre is once again essentially “dumb”. The assessment centre ensures that this 
team competently undertakes what they are asked to do by the candidate, and that they provide 
appropriate feedback to the candidate, but that they do not use their initiative. 
 
Two assessors are used to assess the performance of each candidate. The assessors each have an 
assessment sheet, which has a separate page for each area of competence to be assessed. The 
assessors are trained to note clear examples of the candidate’s performance that relate to the 
demonstration of each particular competence. The assessors then also have to rate the candidate’s 
performance using a five-point rating scale that provides behavioural markers as indicators of 
both effective performance and less effective performance. Some examples of these behavioural 
markers are shown in Table 10. below. 
 
 
Incident Commander Performance Indicators 
 
More Effective Performance Indicators 
 
Less Effective Performance Indicators 
Recognises relationships between different 
pieces of information. 
 
Considers issues in isolation from each other 
and fails to recognise relationships between 
information. 
 
Develops a structured process by which 
decisions are made. 
 
Decision-making is haphazard and 
inconsistent. 
Is proactive in order to deal with dynamic 
situation. 
 
Is purely reactive to the dynamic situation. 
Seeks to develop working relationships and 
rapport with others. 
 
Is uninterested in building relationships with 
others. 
Prioritises objectives based on identified 
risks and resources required. 
 
Fails to prioritise objectives or priorities 
unclear or arbitrary; priorities do not reflect 
identified risks and resources required. 
 
 
Table 10.  Examples of Fire Brigade assessment criteria (London Fire Brigade, 2002) 
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The five-point Likert type rating scale used by the assessors to rate the individual performance of 
the Incident Commander candidate is reproduced in Table 11. below. 
 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
Strong 
Tendency To 
More 
Effective 
Tendency To 
More 
Effective 
No Strong 
Tendency 
Either Way 
Tendency To 
Less 
Effective 
Strong 
Tendency To 
Less 
Effective 
 
Table 11.  Fire Brigade Incident Command assessment rating scale (London Fire Brigade, 2002) 
 
At the end of the assessment exercise, the two assessors provide the candidate with an overall 
assessment summary, highlighting the key elements of the candidate’s performance. This 
feedback is used for the candidate’s continuing professional development. 
 
Some of the behavioural markers used in this assessment framework, such as ‘develops a structured 
process by which decisions are made’, relate to cognitive processes. The presence of these types of 
marker can only be inferred by any related overt behaviours, such as the sequence of command 
orders, the updating of a status board, or the verbalisation of intended actions as feedback to other 
team members. However, other behavioural markers, such as ‘seeks to develop working relationships 
and rapport with others’, do relate to more simple overt behaviours. 
 
 
3.5 ANAESTHESIOLOGY 
 
There have been a number of behavioural marker based assessment frameworks developed to 
assess the competence of anaesthetists (Gaba et al, 1998; Fletcher et al, 2004). These frameworks 
have been used to assess the competence of anaesthetists working within a surgical team. The 
framework developed by Gaba et al was used to assess clinical performance during simulated 
crisis situations, including cardiac arrest and malignant hyperthermia.  
 
These assessments frameworks were developed from the crew resource management assessment 
frameworks used in aviation and therefore have some similarities to these. They are currently 
only used in a non-jeopardy environment to gather data on performance issues related to the 
competence of anaesthetists in different clinical situations. 
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The assessment framework developed by Gaba et al utilised a patient simulator as the assessment 
environment. An anaesthesia team of two were assessed as part of a surgical team of four. The 
other members of the team were provided by the assessment centre, and acted as the surgeon and 
operating room nurse. Some examples of the behavioural markers used for the assessment of the 
anaesthesia team are shown in Table 12. below. 
 
 Crisis Management Behavioural Performance Markers 
 
Crisis Management Behaviour Behavioural Markers 
Inquiry/Advocacy/Assertion Inquiry is encouraged, and questions answered openly; 
Crewmembers seek information from others and speak up 
with appropriate persistence; 
Someone other than the main anaesthetist assumes 
command when necessary; 
Anaesthetist(s) insists on suspension of surgery with 
appropriate assertiveness. 
 
Communications Crewmembers notify each other of necessary information; 
Messages stated precisely and to specific individuals; 
Crewmembers acknowledge communications and verify 
ambiguous communications; 
Efforts are made to establish and maintain an open 
atmosphere; 
Tone of voice is appropriate to the situation. 
 
Feedback Errors in management are identified and corrected; 
Feedback addresses positive as well as negative 
performance; 
Is given and accepted objectively and non-defensively; 
Is given in appropriate manner and times. 
 
Group Climate Crew and team members remain calm; 
Inappropriate behaviours are ignored or countered 
properly; 
Atmosphere in the Operating Room is relaxed but escalates 
as appropriate; 
Group attention is focused on patient care; 
Distractions are actively modulated (e.g. music turned 
down or off when workload increases). 
 
Vigilance Demonstrates awareness of special characteristics of 
patient or situation; 
Monitors and cross-checks all sources of information; 
Considers abnormalities to be real until proven to be false.  
 
 
Table 12.  Examples of Anaesthesiology assessment criteria (Gaba et al, 1998) 
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These assessment criteria are rated using a five-point rating scale. There is also a rating to indicate 
that no behavioural markers relating to a certain crisis management behaviour category  were 
observed. However, if none of the behavioural markers for a particular crisis management 
behaviour category were observed, the assessment framework requires both the non observance 
rating and a rating from the five-point scale to be recorded. The assessment rating scale is shown 
in Table 13. below. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Not 
Observed 
 
(ALSO select a 
rating from 1-5) 
Poor 
Performance 
Minimally 
Acceptable 
Performance 
Standard 
Performance 
Good 
Performance 
Excellent 
Performance 
 
Table 13.  Anaesthesiology assessment rating scale (Gaba et al, 1998) 
 
Many of the criteria used in this assessment framework could be open to subjective interpretation. 
Adjectives are used within some of the behavioural markers, such as appropriate and necessary, that 
could lead to disagreement between assessors. In addition, the use of adverbs such as objectively, 
properly and actively can also lead to differences of opinion amongst assessors. 
 
However, other behavioural markers are quite simple and uncomplicated, which would make 
them easy to observe. These are markers such as  ‘inquiry is encouraged’ and ‘messages stated 
precisely’. The omission of unobservable cognitive processes as markers also helps to make this 
assessment framework easier to use. This view is supported by the interrater agreement values 
obtained by Gaba et al when using this assessment framework. The within group interrater 
agreement coefficients (rwg) for each of the crisis management behaviour categories assessed using 
the cardiac arrest scenario ranged between rwg = 0.65 to rwg = 0.8 
 
 
3.6 COMMERCIAL SHIPPING 
 
Unlike all of the other safety critical industries previously discussed in this chapter, the 
commercial shipping industry is unique in having a competence standard for ships officers that is 
applied throughout the world. All of the Flag State administrations of the world, through which 
vessels are registered and regulated, have agreed to assess the competence of their seafarers 
against the standards laid down in the Seafarer’s Training, Certification and Watchkeeping 
(STCW) Code, (International Maritime Organization, 1995). Within this Code, a mandatory 
standard has been included that specifies the minimum standard of competence required in “crisis 
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management and human behaviour” for those officers who have responsibilities for passengers. 
These competencies and their related assessment criteria are set out in table A-V/2 of the STCW 
Code. Examples of these assessment criteria are shown in Table 14. below. 
 
 
Competence  
 
 Criteria for Evaluating Competence 
Organize shipboard 
emergency procedures. 
The shipboard emergency procedures ensure a state of readiness 
to respond to emergency situations. 
 
Optimize the use of 
resources. 
Contingency plans optimise the use of available resources; 
 
Allocation of tasks and responsibilities reflects the known 
competence of individuals; 
 
Roles and responsibilities of teams and individuals are clearly 
defined. 
 
Control response to 
emergencies. 
Procedures and actions are in accordance with established 
principles and plans for crisis management onboard; 
 
Objectives and strategy are appropriate to the nature of the 
emergency, take account of contingencies and make optimum 
use of available resources; 
 
Actions of crewmembers contribute to maintaining order and 
control. 
 
Establish and maintain 
effective 
communications. 
Information from all available sources is obtained, evaluated and 
confirmed as quickly as possible and reviewed throughout the 
emergency; 
 
Information given to individuals, emergency response teams and 
passengers is accurate, relevant and timely; 
 
Information keeps passengers informed as to the nature of the 
emergency and the actions required of them. 
 
Control passengers and 
other personnel during 
emergency situations. 
 
Actions of crewmembers contribute to maintaining order and 
control. 
 
Table 14.  Merchant Navy assessment criteria from the Specification of minimum standard of 
competence in crisis management and human behaviour. (International Maritime Organization, 1995) 
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Although entitled ‘competence in crisis management’, the competencies within table A-V/2 of the 
STCW Code relate primarily to the management of emergencies. From the discussion within 
section 2.1 of this thesis it was proposed that one of the ways a crisis differs from an emergency is 
due to a lack of pre-defined responses available for the situation being experienced. The 
competencies within table A-V/2 cite the use of procedures and actions in accordance with 
established principles and plans as a criterion for evaluating competence, and therefore are clearly 
related to the management of an emergency, not a crisis. In addition, the criterion for assessing 
competence in organising shipboard emergency procedures purely relates to the ability to prepare 
emergency procedures, not the ability to enact those procedures. 
  
The assessment criteria given in Table A-V/2 of the STCW Code are also highly subjective and 
open to the interpretation of the assessor. The use of adjectives such as “accurate, relevant and 
timely” may lead to poor interrater reliability and agreement when assessing complex dynamic 
crisis scenarios. Similarly, the use of verbs such as “contribute” in assessment criteria invariably 
leads to differences in assessor interpretation. To ‘contribute’ to something is by definition only to 
play a part in the overall process that achieves an outcome. The significance of the part played by 
the candidate to the overall outcome of the competence being assessed, is left to the assessor to 
interpret.   
 
The competencies within Table A-V/2 of the STCW Code are used to assess individual 
performance within a team-working environment. Assessment is usually carried out by an 
individual assessor observing the candidate perform during a simulated emergency, either at a 
shore based assessment centre, or onboard a vessel. The simulations are usually tabletop type 
simulations related to the command and control activities onboard the vessel. The assessment 
process must: 
 
“provide evidence that the required standard of competence has been achieved in 
accordance with the methods and the criteria for evaluating competence”  (International 
Maritime Organization, 1995) 
 
The methods for demonstrating competence are also set out within table A-V/2 as: 
 
“Assessment of evidence obtained from approved training, exercises and practical 
demonstration” 
 
The approval of the training, exercises or demonstrations comes from the maritime administration 
of the country in which the assessment centre is based, or in which the vessel is registered. 
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3.7    SUMMARY OF RELEVANCE OF ASSESSMENT PRACTICE IN OTHER DOMAINS 
 
So, what can be learnt from an evaluation of the assessment practice in other safety critical 
industries or organisations, and how could this inform the development of a behavioural marker 
based assessment framework for merchant navy engineering officers?  
 
From the discussion in the previous sections of this chapter, it can be seen that safety critical 
organisations undertake the assessment of competence in crisis management in very different 
ways. Based upon observations within various safety critical organisations, Table 15 below 
provides a summary of their use of crisis management assessment frameworks.   
 
Although using complex, high-level, assessment criteria, the assessment framework used by the 
military appeared to produce valid assessments. However, this is achieved using a very large 
number of assessors and some very expensive resources.  The assessment environment used was 
virtually the real operational environment, to the extent that it was not entirely devoid of 
jeopardy.  This type of assessment system would not be possible in the commercial shipping 
industry where the use of multiple assessors in order to moderate any assessment would not be 
viewed as economically viable. However, the concept that assessment criteria are either ‘met’ or 
‘not met’ is an effective way of ensuring that assessors make a decision about the candidates’ 
competence. 
 
It may be feasible to apply the civil aviation assessment framework for non-technical skills within 
a merchant marine context, as the competences would appear to be transferable to other domains. 
However, due to the complex and in some cases cognitive nature of the assessment criteria, the 
assessment framework has not yet shown itself to be reliable when assessing competence in 
managing crisis scenarios. When using this assessment framework to assess pilots undertaking 
complicated ‘crisis’ scenarios, the within-group interrater agreement coefficient  (rwg) varied 
between zero and 0.2, or in other words, the agreement between assessors was not much greater 
than there would have been by chance. For this reason, the civil aviation non-technical skills 
assessment framework does not appear to be useful for the assessment of competence in crisis 
management within the commercial shipping domain. However, once again the concept that a 
candidate can only either pass or fail an assessment criteria, may be useful for the commercial 
shipping domain to ensure the clarity of assessments.   
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Context  Assessment 
Environment 
Assessor(s) Assessed Assessment 
Criteria 
Remarks 
Military High fidelity 
War Game 
within real 
environment. 
Multiple 
Assessors 
distributed 
throughout 
assessment 
environment. 
Team Specific task 
orientated 
completion 
criteria. 
Complexity of 
assessment 
environment 
leads to 
subjective 
interpretation. 
Fairness 
achieved 
through 
moderation. 
 
Civil 
Aviation 
High fidelity 
simulator. 
Single Individual 
working 
within a 
team. 
Overt 
behavioural 
markers with 
examples given 
of good and poor 
practice. 
Assessment 
framework 
difficult to use in 
complex 
scenarios leading 
to divergence of 
assessment. 
 
Offshore 
Oil/Gas 
High fidelity 
simulator and 
simulations 
onboard. 
 
Two Individual 
working 
within a 
team. 
Specific task 
orientated 
completion 
criteria and some 
overt behavioural 
markers. 
 
Two assessors 
used to moderate 
subjectivity of 
assessment. 
 
Fire 
Service 
High fidelity 
simulator. 
Two Individual 
working 
within a 
team. 
Specific task 
orientated 
completion 
criteria. 
Two assessors 
used to moderate 
subjectivity of 
assessment. 
 
Anaesthes-
iology 
High fidelity 
patient 
simulator 
Single Anaesthesia 
team of two 
working in a 
surgical 
team of four. 
Overt 
behavioural 
markers with 
examples given 
of good practice. 
Achieved 
acceptable 
interrater 
reliability. 
Merchant 
Marine 
Simulations 
onboard and 
tabletop. 
Single Individual 
working 
within a 
team. 
Prescriptive, but 
very open to 
subjective 
interpretation. 
 
Assessment 
framework too 
open to 
interpretation by 
assessing 
authority. 
 
 
Table 15. Comparison of the Assessment Frameworks for Assessing Competence in Crisis 
Management within different Safety Critical Organisations 
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The offshore industry uses some complex high-level assessment criteria for the assessment of their 
Offshore Installation Managers. By the use of two assessors to moderate assessment outcomes, the 
use of debriefing interviews and the use of multiple assessment scenarios for each candidate, a fair 
and valid assessment appears to be achieved. However, this could not be corroborated, as no 
evidence was available to evaluate the level of interrater reliability and agreement achieved by the 
offshore industries OIM assessment framework. The offshore industries assessment process is 
quite resource intensive, not only because it involves two assessors, multiple assessments and 
candidate debrief interviews, but because the other members of the OIM’s team are also supplied 
by the assessment centre to ensure the consistency and repeatability of OIM’s supporting team’s 
input into the assessment exercises. Once again, the large resource requirement for this type of 
assessment framework would make it unfeasible for use within the commercial shipping industry.  
 
Although some of the behavioural markers used by the Fire Brigade in their assessment 
framework relate to cognitive processes, other behavioural markers used relate to more simple 
overt behaviours. It is these simple, low-level, overt behavioural markers that may be relevant to 
the commercial shipping domain. This is because by using this type of behavioural marker as 
assessment criteria, it may be possible to undertake an assessment by using only one assessor, and 
this assessor might not need to be a domain expert. This is because low-level overt behavioural 
markers are more easily observable, and distinguishable, than complex high-level behaviours. 
Using this type of behavioural marker might also mean that a high level of interrater reliability 
and agreement was achievable. The development of any assessment framework that could be 
reliably used with a minimum of resources would be attractive to commercial shipping 
companies, as it would mean that the cost of any assessment could be kept relatively low, when 
compared to how assessments in crisis management are currently undertaken in other safety 
critical domains. 
 
The assessment framework used in anaesthesiology does have some criteria that could be open to 
subjective interpretation, but it also has some behavioural markers that are quite simple and 
uncomplicated, and therefore easy to observe. This assessment framework also omits any 
unobservable cognitive processes as behavioural markers, which also helps to make it easier to 
use. In use, this framework showed good interrater agreement coefficients (rwg) ranging from 0.65 
to 0.8. This is therefore good evidence to support the use of low-level, uncomplicated and easily 
observable behavioural markers as criteria for the assessment of competence in crisis 
management. 
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In summary, it can therefore be said that the assessment criteria within most assessment 
frameworks currently in use by safety critical industries contain a high proportion of behavioural 
markers that consist of complex sets of behaviours. The evidence from the interrater agreement 
coefficients would also suggest that these criteria are difficult to assess objectively, especially in 
real time during a crisis scenario, when there are a great many coincidental behaviours occurring 
in a short space of time.  
 
If a new assessment framework is to be developed for the assessment of competence in crisis 
management for merchant marine engineering officers, the evidence above would tend to suggest 
that the following attributes are necessary:  
 
 the assessment criteria should consist of low-level, uncomplicated behaviours; 
 
 the behavioural markers should be both overt and easily observable; 
 
 the criteria used need to be validated to show they are true indicators of competence 
in crisis management; 
 
 the criteria should be assessed against a two-point scale of either ‘passed’ or ‘failed’; 
 
The following chapter will detail the methodology used to develop a new assessment framework 
for assessing competence in crisis management for merchant marine engineering officers. 
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Chapter 4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY (PHASE ONE) 
 
4.1 BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
On starting work within the simulation section at Warsash Maritime Academy, the author of this 
thesis soon became aware that the simulator instructors would make their own personal 
assessments of the officers who were being trained within the simulator. Some instructors would 
make an assessment after only observing the officer in question for a relatively short period, 
sometimes as short as only thirty minutes. It was also observed that these initial assessments were 
quite often not modified, even after much longer periods of observation of up to four and a half 
days, because they were shown to be correct. 
 
A degree of validity was afforded to these assessments when the officers were presented with a 
crisis situation to manage. Invariably, the officers who had been originally assessed as being 
‘good’, were the most competent at managing the crisis situation. 
 
 The question was therefore raised as to the criteria that the simulator instructors were using in 
order to carryout their personal assessments of the officers being trained. When asked, the 
simulator instructors could not codify the criteria they were using, they would just say that it was 
“obvious” who was competent and who was not. It was this lack of ability to codify the criteria 
used to make these informal assessments that was one of the seeds for this research.  
 
One thing that was ‘obvious’ was that these formal assessments were being made solely based on 
observable and overt behavioural markers exhibited by the officers during the exercises within the 
simulator. There were no other interactions between the officers and the simulator instructors that 
influenced the assessments.  The instructors must have been observing very simple and 
uncomplicated behaviours, as assessments were made very quickly, without any apparent 
analysis or difficulty. In order to be able to assess competence in crisis management both simply 
and objectively, the assessment criteria used by these instructors needed to be codified. A reliable 
and valid assessment framework, based on these simple behavioural markers, would be a 
valuable tool for enhancing maritime safety. 
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From the observations detailed above, it is possible to propose the following hypothesis: 
 
It is possible to use simple overt behavioural markers to objectively assess 
competence in crisis management within the context of a simulated merchant 
vessel engine room control room. 
 
In order to prove, or disprove, this hypothesis, an experiment was designed that recreated the 
conditions under which the simulator instructors had observed the performance of the marine 
engineering officers, before making their informal assessments.  
 
During the literature review, evidence of the use of behavioural markers for the assessment of 
competence in managing crises within various safety critical organisations was recorded. 
Empirical evidence for the relevance, or irrelevance, of these markers to the commercial shipping 
domain was also required to be determined by experimentation. The crisis scenario experiment 
was designed to allow this empirical evidence to be collected and to provide evidence of any other 
behavioural markers that were relevant to the assessment of competence in crisis management. 
 
The experiment is detailed in the following sections. 
 
 
4.2 ETHNOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS 
 
In order to capture empirical evidence of the behaviours of the research experiment participants 
the following methodological attributes were required: 
 
Unobtrusiveness – so as not to adversely affect the natural behaviour of the participants; 
Repeatability – so that data from a number of experiments could be collected in the same way; 
Holistic – so that all relevant behaviours were recorded; 
Permanence – so that the data could be analysed as often as required; 
Contextual – so that the data reflect the setting in which the behaviours take place, as well as the  
behaviours themselves; 
Accuracy – so that the data are a precise record of both the audio and visual elements of the 
observed behaviour; 
Speed – so that none of the observable behaviour is missed; 
Objectivity – so that the data captured is an objective record of the behaviours observed. 
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There are a number of problems associated with the assessment of competence through 
observation. If these observations are undertaken in real time, with no permanent record being 
taken, there may always be contradictions between what the observer believed happened during 
the assessment period, and what actually happened. In some cases, this happens because of 
defective or selective memory functions of the observer. In other cases, the observers’ recollections 
and perceptions may be biased by their own experiences and beliefs. However, it may also 
happen because the activity being assessed may be very complex, with many behaviours being 
exhibited simultaneously, so making it impossible to adequately observe and interpret all of these 
behaviours in real time. There may also be many tacit behaviours exhibited, which although overt, 
are sometimes abstruse and difficult to observe, and need to be analysed in depth in order to 
interpret their significance.  
 
When observing tasks being performed in a complex technological environment, such as the 
engine room control room of a vessel, the social interaction of those being assessed is often 
affected by the individuals’ interactions with the technology that surrounds them. These 
interactions may cause subtle influences on the behaviours of those being observed, which are 
difficult to observe and interpret in real time (Luff et al., 1993).  
 
The use of questionnaires and interviews to analyse and assess performance has also been shown 
to be fraught with problems, not least because the questions used in these methodologies, and 
their scope, are often based on the preconceptions of the assessor, and as such cannot produce an 
objective assessment. In addition, those being assessed will display many tacit behaviours of 
which they are consciously unaware, and therefore unable to describe in response to a 
questionnaire or during an interview. Due to the complexity of tasks, especially the management 
of crises, many of the behaviours exhibited are performed automatically, without the need for 
conscious thought. The close coordination of the activities of the team members in the engine 
room control room relies on mutual monitoring, as much by the tacit behaviours of overseeing 
and overhearing, as by any more direct forms of communication. As these behaviours are not 
normally described, they are also often difficult to elicit by just using questionnaires or interviews 
(Jirotka, 1998).  
 
Ethnography is a qualitative research methodology that seeks to provide thorough descriptions of 
social interactions. Katz (1997) describes ethnography as  
 
“telling the story of how people, through collaborative and indirectly interdependent 
behaviour, create the ongoing character of particular social places and practices” 
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Ethnographic research methods focus on the behaviours of the members of a community or team, 
by studying them in natural, ongoing settings (DuFon, 2002). An ethnographic approach allows 
for behaviours to be investigated in the context in which they are produced, and to be interpreted 
and explained in relation to the environment of which they are a part (Watson-Gegeo, 1988).  
Ethnographic methods using video recordings try to alleviate the problems discussed above by 
capturing all of the behaviours exhibited in the naturalistic setting, from which a highly detailed 
description of how tasks are undertaken can be produced. In this way, not only can all of the 
explicit behaviours be analysed, but the implicit, tacit behaviours can be analysed as well (Jirotka, 
1998). A video recording of the whole of the engine control room environment in which the crisis 
scenario takes place can provide all of the methodological attributes described above. 
 
There are many different forms of ethnographic study, some of which involve the long term 
integration of the researcher into the community or team being observed, so as to try and limit the 
influence of the researcher on the natural behaviours of those being observed. Due to the limited 
time that the research participants were available to participate in the research experiments, and 
the fact that within the commercial shipping domain, teams are often only together for relatively 
short periods, it was decided that the ethnographic research methodologies where the researcher 
becomes embedded within the team, would be both impracticable and unnecessary. Discrete 
video recording of the teams undertaking the research experiments was seen to be a way of 
capturing the teams behaviours, without unduly influencing those behaviours. 
 
DuFon (2002) argues that if a researcher is to determine the structure or organisation of an event it 
is necessary to capture the whole event, or at least complete sequences of activity within an event. 
She argues that recording only parts of an event makes it difficult to interpret the exhibited 
behaviours, as their interpretation is influenced by what has come before. Recognising the 
boundaries of what constitutes a ‘complete event’ can be difficult. However, in the experimental 
protocol described below it can be seen that the research participants are taken from a period of 
normal and benign operation, into a period of crisis. The recording of the crisis continues until a 
natural concluding outcome is reached, whether good or bad. In this way, a complete event was 
recorded for each team of research participants. 
 
There is a general acceptance that the behaviours exhibited by groups under observation may be 
affected by their knowledge of being observed. It is also generally accepted that in order to 
counter this affect, ethnographic researchers need to become embedded within the community 
they are observing. In this way, the researcher can build trust with the participants and an 
understanding of the behaviours that are exhibited. It can also be hoped that by becoming 
embedded within the community, the researcher’s presence will exert less influence on the natural 
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behaviours of the participants. Within the case of the crisis scenario experiment the observer is, by 
the nature of their previous experience within the industry, already embedded into the 
community of the participants. The researcher has twenty years experience of the commercial 
vessel engine room environment as a marine engineer officer and was therefore able to readily 
become trusted and embedded within the engine room team and to understand the behaviours 
exhibited by the participants. Anecdotal evidence from the participants suggested that the 
presence of video cameras within the simulated engine room control room environment did not 
affect their natural behaviours. 
 
 
4.3 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
There are ethical concerns when undertaking research involving human participants. The United 
Kingdom’s Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) has a research ethics framework (ESRC, 
2006) that provides a number of principles of ethical research that are relevant to the research 
undertaken for this thesis. They state that: 
 
 “Research staff and subjects must be informed fully about the purpose, methods 
and intended possible uses of the research, what their participation in the 
research entails and what risks, if any, are involved; 
 The confidentiality of information supplied by research subjects and the 
anonymity of respondents must be respected; 
 Research participants must participate in a voluntary way, free from any 
coercion; 
  Harm to research participants must be avoided.” (ESRC, 2006) 
 
These principles are reflected in Southampton Solent University’s own Ethics Policy (Section 2S of 
the Academic Handbook) and have been complied with throughout the experimental research 
undertaken for this thesis. The following sections detail how these ethical principles have been 
complied with. 
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4.3.1 Informed Consent 
 
All of the volunteers that took part in this research were asked to read and sign a consent form, a 
copy of which is presented in Appendix 1. This form detailed the purpose of the research study, 
why they, in particular, had been asked to volunteer to take part in the research study, and the 
procedures that they would be asked to participate in as part of the research. It was judged by the 
researcher that this was sufficient information for the volunteers to make an informed decision as 
to whether or not they wished to participate in the research. The opportunity was given to all 
volunteers to ask questions of the researcher if they required further clarification of the 
information provided on the consent form. 
 
4.3.2 Confidentiality 
The consent form (Appendix 1) stated that volunteers would not be personally identified in any 
reports or publications that may result from the research study. It also stated that the use of the 
video recordings taken during the study would be strictly limited to the researcher named on the 
form. 
 
4.3.3 Right to Refuse to Participate or Withdraw 
 
It was clearly stated on the consent form (see Appendix 1) that the volunteer could refuse to 
participate or withdraw from the study at anytime. 
 
4.3.4 Risk Assessment 
 
The experiments undertaken to obtain data for this thesis can be defined as social research, and as 
such have the potential to involve psychological risk. It is therefore necessary for the level of risk 
to any participant to be determined, and if appropriate, for risk mitigation measures to be put in 
place.  
 
The level of risk to any participant within a simulated work environment that models closely the 
work environment onboard a commercial vessel is considered to be considerably less than the 
actual working environment onboard a commercial vessel. This is because, unlike the actual work 
environment, if errors in operation are made within the simulated work environment, the 
participant cannot be physically harmed. Because of this, it is likely that the level of psychological 
risk to participants within the simulated work environment is also less than it could be within the 
real work environment.  
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As all of the research study participants were experienced serving merchant navy engineering 
officers, undertaking continuing professional development training, they were obviously able to 
cope with the level of psychological risk in their real working environment. It was therefore 
concluded that they would also be able to cope with the reduced level of psychological risk within 
the simulated work environment, and that no additional risk mitigation measures were required.    
 
4.3.5 Complaints Procedure 
 
The consent form clearly stated the volunteer could report, anonymously if they chose, any 
complaints or comments regarding the manner in which the study was being conducted to the 
Quality Manager of Warsash Maritime Academy. The address of the Quality Manager was also 
given on the consent form. 
 
 
4.4 EXPERIMENT PARTICIPANTS 
 
In order to be able to assess competence in crisis management it would be necessary for any 
research participant to at least be competent in normal operations of engine room watchkeeping 
onboard a merchant vessel motorship. It was also thought to be beneficial that, if possible, within 
each group of research participants, there should be a senior officer who would take the role of 
team leader during the research exercise scenarios. This was to ensure that there was a level of 
management experience within each of the participating teams. 
 
The volunteers for the research study were drawn from the oil, chemical and gas tanker safety 
programmes run as professional development short courses at Warsash Maritime Academy. 
These courses run for five days and are attended by serving merchant navy officers of all ranks 
and experience. About half of the delegates for each course were serving marine engineering 
officers, all of whom had current valid certificates of competency issued by their national 
maritime administration or by the flag administration of the vessels they were serving on. At the 
start of each course, the researcher was permitted to talk to the course delegates about the 
research and to ask for volunteers to participate in the research experiment exercise. 
 
Three volunteers were requested from each course and informed that they would have to 
undertake two sessions within the engine room simulator. The first session of one and a half hours 
duration being a simulator familiarisation session, and the second session of one and a half hours 
duration, in which they would take part in the research exercise scenario. The first session was 
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carried out on the Tuesday evening of their course, from 1730 hrs until 1900 hrs. The second 
session was carried out on the Wednesday evening of their course, also from 1730 hrs until 1900 
hrs. The days and times of the sessions were kept the same for all teams of volunteers. 
 
Familiarisation with the simulator is necessary before the research exercise is undertaken in order 
that aspects of the ‘simulation’ do not hinder the participants’ performance when the research 
exercise is undertaken. This is generally accepted as usual practice within the simulator 
community. It was important that the research participants understood how to operate the 
simulated vessel and understood the layout of the engine room plant. The familiarisation session 
followed the same schedule for each group of research participants so that no team had any 
advantage or disadvantage compared to any other. The familiarisation schedule for every team of 
volunteers was as detailed in Table 16 below. 
 
Period Activity 
1730 hrs – 1750 hrs Simulator and engine room plant orientation led by researcher 
with simulator in halted condition.  
 
1750 hrs – 1810 hrs Simulator and engine room plant orientation led by researcher 
with simulator in running condition.  
 
Demonstration of paralleling of alternators in manual, semi-
automatic and automatic modes of operation. 
 
Demonstration of engine room control and bridge control 
functions for main engine. 
 
Demonstration of the use of the distributed control system. 
 
1810 hrs – 1900 hrs Self directed familiarisation of simulated engine room plant, with 
assistance from researcher if required. 
 
 
Table 16. Research Participant Simulated Engine Room Environment Familiarisation Schedule.   
 
It was made clear to the research participants that during the research exercise scenario, the 
researcher would take on the role of Extra Second Engineer, another member of the team who was 
available only via the use of the walkie-talkie radios supplied to each team member. There was 
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also a mechanic available who would work as directed by the Extra Second Engineer. These two 
extra team members are necessary within the simulated engine room environment to undertake 
tasks that are not available to the research participants through the simulation, but that they may 
require to be undertaken. These tasks are such things as opening up a piece of machinery for 
inspection or visually checking the position of a valve. The research participants were told that the 
Extra Second and the Mechanic would always undertake any task given to them both efficiently 
and effectively and that they would clearly feedback the outcome of any task they undertook to 
the team leader. However, the research participants were also advised that the Extra Second 
Engineer and the Mechanic would not use their own initiative to undertake tasks, they would 
only work as directed. 
 
In order to ensure that a range of behaviours and performance was observed during the research 
exercise scenarios it was decided to run twelve identical research exercises, with a different team 
of three serving marine engineering officers for each exercise. Thirty-six research participants 
were therefore required for the research study. The next section will provide details of the 
research exercise scenario. 
 
 
4.5 EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL (PHASE ONE) 
 
In order to allow for the observation of overt behavioural markers exhibited by research 
volunteers during a simulated crisis scenario, a repeatable crisis scenario had to be designed that 
was outside the normal sphere of experience of most marine engineering officers. Repeatability 
was important so that each team of volunteers could face the same crisis scenario. By ensuring the 
scenario was outside of the normal sphere of experience of the research experiment participants, 
the scenario would not be dealt with as an emergency situation, with action being taken to regain 
control in accordance with a set documented emergency procedure. The scenario was designed to 
be atypical, and therefore required those responsible for handling the crisis to think through the 
situation, and respond in creative and flexible ways. 
 
A crisis scenario was designed based upon the incident involving the motor tanker ‘Braer’ on 5 
January 1993 (MAIB, 1993). This vessel sailed from Mongstad, Norway on 3 January 1993, bound 
for Quebec. As soon as the vessel cleared Mongstad, she experienced severe southerly gales. On 
the following morning, a number of steel pipes that had been secured on the after deck of the 
vessel, broke free from of their lashings and started to roll about on the deck, between the port 
engine casing and the port ship’s side railings. The pipes eventually caused damage to the air vent 
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pipes of the diesel oil bunker storage tanks. This in turn allowed seawater that was washing over 
the deck to enter the air vent pipes and run down into the diesel oil storage tanks. This in turn led 
to severe contamination of the diesel oil fuel supply systems to the vessel’s boiler, main engine 
and diesel alternators. At 0440 hrs on 5 January 1993, due to the severe contamination of the diesel 
oil with seawater, the Braer’s main engine stopped, shortly followed by the failure of the vessel’s 
diesel alternator engines. 
 
At this point the vessel was ten miles off the southern tip of Sheltland, and was drifting north 
towards Sumburgh Head. Three and a half hours after stopping the vessel had drifted within half 
a mile of land and was thought to be in imminent danger of grounding. The decision was made at 
this point to abandon ship, and the complete crew was safely evacuated. Despite attempts by 
volunteers to set up a tow with an attending tug, the vessel eventually grounded on Garths Ness 
at 1119 hrs on 5 January 1993. The vessel was a total constructive loss, spilling 84,700 tonnes of 
crude oil into the sea. 
 
The aspect of this incident that was modelled was the seawater contamination of the diesel oil 
storage tanks. If introduced as a fault on the engine room simulator whilst a diesel alternator is 
running and supplying power to the vessel, the electrical power network voltage and frequency 
values start to fluctuate. This fluctuation increases over a period of fifteen minutes until a diesel 
alternator engine exhaust gas temperature deviation alarm sounds. If no action is taken to correct 
the situation, after a further five minutes the diesel alternator engine will stop, causing a loss of 
electrical power capacity on the electrical distribution network. Depending upon the decisions 
made by the Chief Engineer, and the actions taken by the engine room team, this could lead to the 
main engine stopping and the vessel being left drifting without power. 
 
An incident involving serious contamination of the fuel supply system with seawater is not a 
common occurrence, and therefore is not the type of incident that would be within the sphere of 
experience of most seafarers. It is also not the type of incident for which there is likely to be a 
documented emergency response procedure. In this respect, this type of incident can be 
categorised as a crisis situation. 
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The crisis scenario was developed to allow two recovery actions to be available that would ensure 
that the crisis could be effectively managed. These actions were: 
 
 The use of the residual steam pressure to immediately reinstate the electrical power 
supply to the vessel by use of the steam driven turbo alternator, and to in turn fire the 
boiler to maintain the necessary steam pressure. This would then allow the main 
engine to be restarted; 
 
 To use the emergency alternator to run all of the required main engine auxiliary 
machinery supplied from the emergency switchboard, and to close the switchboard 
interconnecting tiebreaker in order to run the main engine auxiliary scavenge air 
blower from the main switchboard. This would then in turn allow the main engine to 
be restarted. 
 
4.5.1 Initial Plant Condition 
 
The plant condition at the start of the simulated crisis scenario was as follows: 
 
 Main Engine running at 110 rpm on heavy fuel oil and in Bridge Control, Full Away on 
Passage; 
 
 All main engine No.2 pumps running with all main engine No.1 pumps set to automatic 
standby; 
 
 Boiler online firing on heavy fuel oil. Combustion control in automatic. Steam pressure 16 
bar; 
 
 No.1 Diesel Alternator running in parallel with the Turbo Alternator. Total electrical load 
650kW; 
 
 Emergency Alternator and emergency lighting set to automatic standby condition; 
 
 Interconnecting Tiebreaker between Main and Emergency Switchboards closed; 
 
 Interconnecting Tiebreaker Main Consumer Overload Trip set to 100kW. 
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The research participants were made aware of these conditions in a briefing before the start of the 
exercise. 
 
4.5.2 Initial Situation 
 
The vessel situation at the start of the simulated crisis scenario was as follows: 
 
 The vessel is a single hulled oil tanker of 90,000 tonnes deadweight built in Korea in 1986; 
 
 The vessel is carrying a cargo of 84,700 tonnes of light crude oil; 
 
 The vessel has been in heavy weather for the past 24 hours; 
 
 The Master has advised the Chief Engineer that they will soon be entering a traffic 
separation system and going to Standby condition.  
 
The research participants were made aware of the situation outlined above in a briefing before the 
start of the exercise. 
 
4.5.3 Personnel Roles 
 
The roles of the personnel involved in the simulated crisis scenario were as follows: 
 
 One research volunteer was designated as Chief Engineer; 
 
 One research volunteer was designated as Second Engineer; 
 
 One research volunteer was designated as Third Engineer; 
 
 Simulator Instructor was designated as Extra Second Engineer (only available to the 
engine room team via radio communication);  
 
 A mechanic was available, but working through the Extra Second Engineer. 
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The most senior of the volunteers taking part in each research exercise was chosen to be the Chief 
Engineer. All of the research participants were asked if they were happy to take on their 
designated role before the start of the exercise. 
 
 
4.5.4 Crisis Scenario Interventions 
 
As discussed previously in section 2.12 of this thesis it can be argued that stress is a precursor to a 
crisis, and that stressors are the building blocks of a crisis situation. In order to ensure that a crisis 
situation was presented to the research participants a number of interventions were made 
throughout the exercise scenario that constituted stressors to the team leader. These included: 
 
 Multiple information sources – Master, Extra Second Engineer and other team members; 
 
 Rapidly changing or evolving scenario – problems with electrical power generation 
systems and vessel in close navigable situation; 
 
 Requirement for team coordination – problems with electrical power generation systems; 
 
 Performance pressure – need to restore electrical power as soon as possible; 
 
  Time pressure - vessel drifting into towards shoals; 
 
 High workload or information overload – diagnosis of problems experienced with 
electrical power generation systems; 
 
 Threat – vessel without power in a close navigable situation and with the possibility of 
running aground. 
 
By controlling the timing of the application of these stressors, it was possible to control the 
cumulative level of stressors presented to the team leader during a simulator exercise. It was 
therefore possible to ensure that each team leader was subjected to the same stressors at the same 
times during each experiment. 
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The interventions made during the simulated crisis scenario were as follows: 
 
Start +5 minutes  
 
Master informs Chief Engineer that vessel is now entering the traffic separation system, but traffic 
density is expected to be light, so he does not anticipate the need to reduce the main engine 
revolutions to manoeuvring speed. Master rings Standby condition. 
 
Start +10 minutes 
 
Master informs Chief Engineer that traffic density is increasing so will go into Engine Room 
Control and Chief Engineer can start to reduce main engine revs to maximum manoeuvring 
speed, 85 rpm. 
Start +15 minutes 
 
Master informs Chief Engineer that due to the close approach of a cross channel ferry he will have 
to slow the vessel down to half ahead. Master informs Chief Engineer that the vessel is now in 
very close navigable waters. The Master asks the Chief Engineer if all is okay down below. 
 
Start +20 minutes 
 
The fault of ‘water contamination of the diesel oil service and settling tanks’ is introduced. 
 
Start +40 minutes 
 
If vessel is without power, Master informs Chief Engineer that vessel is drifting towards shoals 
and may run aground. 
 
 
4.5.5 Recording of New Observed Behavioural Markers 
 
The twelve research exercises were run and a video recording of each exercise was taken using a 
fixed camera position and fixed microphone positions. The camera field of view and sound 
recording levels of each exercise were maintained the same. Each recording was analysed to 
determine if any behavioural markers relevant to the management of crises were observable that 
had not been found during the literature review.  
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4.5.6 Rating of Observed Behavioural Markers 
 
For a behavioural marker to be an effective assessment metric it needs to be relevant to the 
competence being assessed, easily evaluated as a demonstration of good or poor behaviour, easily 
observed, and should occur reasonably frequently. The behavioural markers observed during the 
twelve experiments were therefore rated using metrics of ease of observation, ease of evaluation, 
frequency of occurrence and relevance to competence in crisis management, to determine the 
most efficacious sub-set of markers to be used within any experimental assessment framework. A 
five point Likert scale was used to rate each behavioural marker as follows: 
 
 
A)  Ease of Observation Easy           1     2     3     4     5     Difficult 
 
B)  Ease of Evaluation     Easy           1     2     3     4     5     Difficult 
 
C)  Frequency of Occurrence Often          1     2     3     4     5     Rarely 
 
D)  Relevance to Competence in Crisis Management  Relevant    1     2     3     4     5     Irrelevant 
 
The relevance of a particular behavioural marker to competence in crisis management was 
evaluated by the observed affect that behaviour had on the management of the crisis. 
 
An overall index value was assigned to each behavioural marker. This was determined by 
multiplying together the four Likert scale ratings given to each behavioural marker. The rating for 
frequency of occurrence was weighted at two times the other ratings. This is because if a 
behavioural marker does not occur very often, it will not be a useful metric. This is because 
however relevant it is, and however easy to evaluate and observe, if it rarely occurs, it will rarely 
contribute to the assessment of competence.  
 
Behavioural Marker Index = A x B x 2C x D 
 
This behavioural marker index was therefore an indication of the suitability of a particular 
behavioural marker for inclusion within an assessment framework for assessing competence in 
crisis management. The lower the index value the more suitable a behavioural marker was 
considered for inclusion in the assessment framework. 
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All of the behavioural markers observed within the twelve experiments run were rated using the 
Behavioural Marker Index formula. 
 
 
4.5.7 Determination of Experimental Assessment Framework 
 
In order to be usable by an assessor for an assessment of competence in crisis management in real 
time, any assessment framework has to be made up of a limited number of behavioural markers. 
If there are too many behavioural markers within the assessment framework, it will become 
difficult for the assessor to use. For this reason it was decided to limit the experimental assessment 
framework to include only those behavioural markers that had an index rating of eight or less. 
 
Once these behavioural markers had been determined, examples of good and poor behaviour 
associated with these markers were codified by observation of the research exercise recordings. 
These example behaviours would be included within the guidance for assessors using the 
experimental assessment framework.   
 
 
4.5.8 Expert Evaluation of Experimental Assessment Framework 
 
An experiment was undertaken where two expert crisis management assessors were asked to rate 
the behavioural markers within the experimental assessment framework for ease of observation, 
ease of evaluation, frequency of occurrence and relevance to competence in crisis management. In 
order to undertake this experiment, the expert assessors were given a copy of one of the recorded 
crisis scenario experiments run. The results of this experiment were compared with the ratings 
given by the researcher for all of the recorded experiments. This was done to show the degree of 
agreement between the expert crisis management assessors and the researcher on the effectiveness 
of the behavioural markers included within the previously determined experimental assessment 
framework.  
 
If there was agreement between the expert assessors and the researcher on the most effective 
behavioural markers to use for the assessment of crisis management, the experimental assessment 
framework could be taken through to phase two of the research methodology unaltered. 
However, if there was any major disagreement, the experimental assessment framework may 
have to be amended to reflect the differences. 
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The expert crisis management assessors who took part in this experiment were two of the lead 
assessors from the London Fire Brigade Incident Commander Assessment Centre. 
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Chapter 5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS (PHASE ONE) 
 
 
5.1 BEHAVIOURAL MARKERS ARISING OUT OF EXPERIMENTS 
 
Following the running of the twelve crisis scenario experiments; all of the video recordings were 
studied to determine if any overt behavioural markers, relevant to competence in crisis 
management, could be observed that had not been highlighted during the literature review. Ten 
new behavioural markers were found that had the potential to be useful in the assessment of 
competence in crisis management. These are detailed in Table 17 below. 
 
Overt Behavioural Marker 
 
Comments 
Sharing of workload 
 
How well the crisis manager shares the tasks to 
be undertaken between the team members.  
 
Number of tasks directly undertaken by the 
crisis manager, possibly leading to a loss of 
situational overview. 
 
Unfinished sentences 
 
Crisis manager not completing sentences when 
communicating to other team members. 
 
Patterns of movement 
 
Uses measured movements within a defined 
area where crisis manager is able to maintain 
overview of the situation. 
 
Crisis Manager asking their team questions in 
order to elicit information so that they can 
improve their situational awareness 
 
 
 
Team leader using different types of decision 
making strategies  
 
 
 Analytical 
 Intuitive (Recognition Primed Decision-
making) 
 Critical Thinking 
Thinking aloud in order to gain reassurance 
from other members of the team 
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Not returning to task in hand after a distraction 
 
 
Team Leader ‘grasping’ at suggestions made by 
other team members 
 
Crisis manager does not reflect on the 
suggestions of others before acting on those 
suggestions. 
 
Measured movements in response to stimuli 
 
Crisis manager makes measured, reasonable, 
considered and controlled movements in 
response to stimuli. 
 
Making a series of truncated movements 
 
Crisis manager moves between task locations in 
a truncated or hesitant manner.  
 
Moves between two task locations without, in 
the short term, reaching either. 
 
Presents an on the spot rocking motion. 
 
 
Table 17.  Behavioural markers arising out of experiments. 
 
 
5.2 EVALUATION OF BEHAVIOURAL MARKERS 
 
With the behavioural markers identified from the literature review, and the additional 
behavioural markers identified during the crisis scenario experiments, a total of seventy-seven 
behavioural markers were evaluated for ease of observation, ease of evaluation, frequency of 
occurrence and relevance to competence in crisis management. A behavioural marker index was 
also calculated for each behaviour observed using the method detailed in section 4.5.6.  
 
The evaluation was carried out through a detailed study of the video data collected during the 
experiments. The results of this evaluation are presented in Table 18 below. 
 
Chapter 5                                                                                                  Results and Analysis (Phase One) 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________                                         
Behavioural Markers for the Assessment of Competence in Crisis Management                             123 
 
Overt Behavioural 
Marker 
Associated  
Crisis Management 
Skill 
Ease of 
Observation 
 
 
 
A 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Ease of 
Evaluation 
 
 
 
B 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Frequency 
of 
Occurrence 
 
 
C 
 
1 = often 
5 = rarely 
Relevance to 
competence in 
crisis 
management 
 
D 
 
1 = relevant 
5 = irrelevant 
Behavioural 
Marker Index 
 
 
A x B x 2C x D 
Ratio of degree of 
feedback control to 
degree of predictive 
control. 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
5 
 
2 
 
3 
 
1 
 
60 
Integration of team 
member attributes and 
values to maximum 
advantage. 
 
Leadership 
 
Workload 
Management 
 
 
5 
 
5 
 
2 
 
1 
 
100 
The number of alternative 
hypotheses and actions 
communicated to team 
members. 
 
Sharing Mental 
Models 
 
Option Generation 
 
Team Building 
 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
4 
The level of ‘satisficing’ 
exhibited 
Option Generation 
 
Decision–making 
 
 
3 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
18 
Communicating in a way 
that reveals ones mental 
models 
Sharing Mental 
Models 
 
Team Building 
 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
8 
Relevance and timeliness 
of unsolicited information 
passed between team 
members as measures of 
the degree of congruence 
of their mental models 
 
Sharing Mental 
Models 
 
Teamwork  
 
Team Building 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
12 
The level of anticipation 
of the needs of other team 
members and of future 
action and task 
requirements 
 
Situational  
Awareness 
 
Teamwork 
 
4 
 
4 
 
2 
 
1 
 
64 
The amount of relevant 
information passed in 
anticipation of need, as a 
ratio of the amount of 
relevant information 
available 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
Teamwork 
 
5 
 
5 
 
3 
 
1 
 
150 
The periodicity of 
situation assessment 
updates to the other team 
members 
Sharing mental 
Models 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
Management 
 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
16 
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Overt Behavioural 
Marker 
Associated  
Crisis Management 
Skill 
Ease of 
Observation 
 
 
 
A 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Ease of 
Evaluation 
 
 
 
B 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Frequency 
of 
Occurrence 
 
 
C 
 
1 = often 
5 = rarely 
Relevance to 
competence in 
crisis 
management 
 
D 
 
1 = relevant 
5 = irrelevant 
Behavioural 
Marker Index 
 
 
 
A x B x 2C x D 
Ignoring feedback delays Situational 
Awareness 
 
 
3 
 
4 
 
3 
 
2 
 
144 
Focus too much on the 
reduction of uncertainty 
by requesting information 
 
Decision-making  
2 
 
5 
 
3 
 
3 
 
180 
Inaccuracy in timing the 
right moment of 
intervention 
 
Decision-making 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
16 
Tendency to focus on one 
system at a time, thereby 
ignoring the dynamics of 
the complete system 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
8 
Lack of knowledge 
concerning the relation 
between symptoms and 
causes 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
4 
 
5 
 
2 
 
1 
 
80 
The number of 
dimensions upon which a 
decision is based 
 
Decision-making  
4 
 
4 
 
1 
 
2 
 
64 
The length of term of 
considerations upon 
which a decision is based 
 
Decision-making  
5 
 
5 
 
1 
 
4 
 
200 
Amount of sampling 
behaviour exhibited 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
8 
Time between the onset of 
a disturbance and the first 
time a related action was 
carried out or an 
information request was 
made; defined as the 
disturbance detection 
time 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
 
 
3 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
18 
The time span between 
the first information 
request or action related 
to a disturbance and the 
correction of that 
disturbance 
 
Decision-making 
 
 
3 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
18 
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Overt Behavioural 
Marker 
Associated  
Crisis Management 
Skill 
Ease of 
Observation 
 
 
 
A 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Ease of 
Evaluation 
 
 
 
B 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Frequency 
of 
Occurrence 
 
 
C 
 
1 = often 
5 = rarely 
Relevance to 
competence in 
crisis 
management 
 
D 
 
1 = relevant 
5 = irrelevant 
Behavioural 
Marker Index 
 
 
 
A x B x2 C x D 
The number of 
information requests 
made about a disturbance  
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
Decision-making 
 
2 
 
3 
 
2 
 
2 
 
48 
The number of times a 
supervisor inspected 
systems through their 
graphical control 
interface, as indicated by 
the number of mouse 
clicks on the control 
screen giving a 
measurement of 
monitoring behaviour 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
4 
 
32 
The division of time and 
effort over different 
essential sub-goals 
 
Workload 
Management 
 
Co-ordination 
 
5 
 
4 
 
1 
 
1 
 
40 
The ability to switch 
between the processing of 
information about 
different sub-goals, as 
opposed to the need to 
completely finish one 
sub-goal before 
considering another 
 
Workload 
Management 
 
5 
 
5 
 
1 
 
1 
 
50 
Explicitly asking their 
team how much time they 
have before they must 
commit to a decision 
 
Co-operation 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
Decision-making 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
5 
 
1 
 
10 
Team leader focuses on 
individual tasks rather 
than the teams’ 
 
Leadership 
 
Workload 
Management 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
8 
The level of useful 
communication amongst 
the team 
 
Co-operation 
 
Teamwork 
 
Sharing Mental 
Models 
 
 
3 
 
4 
 
1 
 
1 
 
24 
The degree to which a 
crisis manager monitors 
the information exchange 
between members of their 
crisis management team 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
 
 
5 
 
5 
 
1 
 
5 
 
250 
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Overt Behavioural 
Marker 
Associated  
Crisis Management 
Skill 
Ease of 
Observation 
 
 
 
A 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Ease of 
Evaluation 
 
 
 
B 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Frequency 
of 
Occurrence 
 
 
C 
 
1 = often 
5 = rarely 
Relevance to 
competence in 
crisis 
management 
 
D 
 
1 = relevant 
5 = irrelevant 
Behavioural 
Marker Index 
 
 
 
A x B x 2C x D 
Seeking information from 
all available sources 
 
Situational 
Awareness. 
 
Decision-making 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
24 
Passing information to 
the appropriate persons 
before being asked 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
Co-operation 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
1 
 
54 
Providing big picture 
updates 
 
Sharing mental 
models 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
3 
 
1 
 
6 
Using proper 
phraseology 
 
Communication  
1 
 
3 
 
1 
 
4 
 
24 
Providing complete 
internal and external 
reports 
 
Sharing mental 
model 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
1 
 
48 
Avoiding excess chatter 
 
Communication  
1 
 
2 
 
5 
 
3 
 
60 
Ensuring 
communications are 
audible and ungarbled 
 
Communication  
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
8 
Correcting team errors 
 
Leadership 
 
Co-operation 
 
 
1 
 
3 
 
5 
 
3 
 
90 
Providing and requesting 
backup or assistance 
when needed 
 
Co-operation 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
1 
 
2 
 
5 
 
1 
 
20 
Providing guidance or 
suggestions to team 
members 
 
Co-operation 
 
Teamwork 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
16 
Stating clear team and 
individual priorities 
 
Leadership 
 
Communication 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
3 
 
1 
 
6 
Delegation of tasks based 
upon known 
crewmember strengths 
 
Workload 
Management 
 
2 
 
4 
 
4 
 
2 
 
128 
High degree of 
crewmember integration 
within the team 
 
Teamwork 
 
Co-operation 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
4 
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Overt Behavioural 
Marker 
Associated  
Crisis Management 
Skill 
Ease of 
Observation 
 
 
 
A 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Ease of 
Evaluation 
 
 
 
B 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Frequency 
of 
Occurrence 
 
 
C 
 
1 = often 
5 = rarely 
Relevance to 
competence in 
crisis 
management 
 
D 
 
1 = relevant 
5 = irrelevant 
Behavioural 
Marker Index 
 
 
 
A x B x 2C x D 
Information backup 
provided during periods 
of ambiguity 
 
Communication 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
3 
 
2 
 
72 
Regular soliciting of 
information between 
crewmembers 
 
Communication 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
4 
Integration of real-world 
operations experience, 
rather than a reliance on 
procedures 
 
Decision-making 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
3 
 
3 
 
2 
 
2 
 
72 
Extensive “what-if” 
analyses undertaken 
 
 Risk Assessment 
 
Decision-making  
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
3 
 
2 
 
12 
Task prioritisation carried 
out 
 
Decision-making  
3 
 
1 
 
3 
 
1 
 
18 
Adaptation of plan to 
take into account 
evolving events 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
3 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
36 
Distracting information 
coded and assigned level 
of urgency for attention 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
Decision-making 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
4 
Maintain a focused 
attitude to task objectives 
 
Leadership 
 
 
 
2 
 
2 
 
3 
 
2 
 
48 
Contingency plans 
developed on an ongoing 
basis 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
1 
 
54 
Overt awareness of time 
as a finite resource by 
questioning time 
management status 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
2 
 
2 
 
4 
 
1 
 
32 
Demonstrates awareness 
of ‘big picture’ context 
 
Situational  
Awareness 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
4 
Closely co-ordinates 
actions with others 
 
Co-operation  
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
2 
 
32 
Gives consideration to the 
needs of others 
 
Co-operation 
 
Teamwork 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
2 
 
3 
 
72 
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Overt Behavioural 
Marker 
Associated  
Crisis Management 
Skill 
Ease of 
Observation 
 
 
 
A 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Ease of 
Evaluation 
 
 
 
B 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Frequency 
of 
Occurrence 
 
 
C 
 
1 = often 
5 = rarely 
Relevance to 
competence in 
crisis 
management 
 
D 
 
1 = relevant 
5 = irrelevant 
Behavioural 
Marker Index 
 
 
 
A x B x 2C x D 
Utilise team briefings for 
specific threats 
 
Sharing mental 
model 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
8 
Provide a large range of 
response options to 
threats 
 
Decision -making  
2 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
1 
 
48 
Crewmembers 
performance thoroughly 
questioned and 
crosschecked 
 
Teamwork  
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
2 
 
108 
Prompts for timely 
response to correct any 
crewmember-induced 
errors 
 
Teamwork 
 
Co-operation 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
2 
 
108 
Prompts for timely 
response to any change in 
situation 
 
Teamwork 
 
Co-operation 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
2 
 
108 
Keeps crewmembers 
focused on the 
accomplishment of the 
task 
 
Leadership  
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
8 
Communication kept 
succinct 
 
Communication  
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
8 
Effectively increases work 
rate to cope with 
escalation of crisis 
 
Workload 
Management 
 
1 
 
2 
 
4 
 
1 
 
16 
Sharing of workload 
 
 
Workload 
Management 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
4 
Unfinished sentences 
 
Communication  
1 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
3 
 
6 
Patterns of movement 
 
Leadership  
1 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
3 
 
6 
Crisis Manager asking 
their team questions in 
order to elicit information 
so that they can improve 
their situational 
awareness 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
1 
 
1 
 
3 
 
1 
 
6 
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Overt Behavioural 
Marker 
Associated  
Crisis Management 
Skill 
Ease of 
Observation 
 
 
 
A 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Ease of 
Evaluation 
 
 
 
B 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Frequency 
of 
Occurrence 
 
 
C 
 
1 = often 
5 = rarely 
Relevance to 
competence in 
crisis 
management 
 
D 
 
1 = relevant 
5 = irrelevant 
Behavioural 
Marker Index 
 
 
 
A x B x 2C x D 
Team leader using 
different types of 
decision-making 
strategies  
 
Decision-making  
3 
 
4 
 
2 
 
3 
 
144 
Thinking aloud in order 
to gain reassurance from 
other members of the 
team 
 
Co-operation 
 
Teamwork 
 
1 
 
2 
 
5 
 
4 
 
80 
Not returning to task in 
hand after a distraction 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
3 
 
36 
Team leader ‘grasping’ at 
suggestions made by 
other team members 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
Decision-making 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
8 
Measured movements in 
response to stimuli 
 
Leadership  
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
8 
Making a series of 
truncated movements 
 
Leadership  
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
8 
Thanking another team 
member for pointing out 
a mistake 
 
Co-operation 
 
Teamwork 
 
1 
 
1 
 
5 
 
4 
 
40 
Helping other team 
members having 
difficulty 
 
Co-operation 
 
Teamwork 
 
1 
 
1 
 
3 
 
4 
 
24 
Making motivating 
statements 
 
Leadership  
1 
 
1 
 
4 
 
3 
 
24 
Praising other team 
members 
 
Leadership 
 
Teamwork 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
4 
 
3 
 
24 
Suggesting ways to find 
an error 
 
Co-operation 
 
Teamwork 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
108 
 
Table 18.  Evaluation of Behavioural Markers. 
 
By using the Behavioural Marker Index, it is possible to start to differentiate between those 
markers that might be effective criteria assessing competence in crisis management, and those that 
would not. By applying the cut-off value for the index described in section 4.5.7, a sub-set of 
markers was produced. This sub-set is made up of those markers that have the greatest potential 
to be effective assessment criteria. The number of markers within this sub-set is twenty-two and 
this is a more manageable number of criteria for an assessment framework that is to be used for a 
real time assessment. This assertion is supported by the fact that the number of assessment criteria 
used within the assessment frameworks of other safety critical domains reviewed in Chapter 3 
were as shown in Table 19 below. 
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Safety Critical Domain 
 
Number of Assessment Criteria 
Military 
 
28 
Civil Aviation 
 
43 
Offshore Industry 
 
24 
Fire Brigade 
 
19 
Anaesthesiology 
 
21 
Commercial Shipping 
 
27 
Average Number of Assessment Criteria 
 
27 
 
 
      Table 19.  Number of assessment criteria in different assessment frameworks. 
 
 
Those behavioural markers with an index of eight or lower that were to be used in the 
experimental assessment framework are shown below in Table 20. 
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Overt Behavioural 
Marker 
Associated  
Crisis Management 
Skill 
Ease of 
Observation 
 
 
 
A 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Ease of 
Evaluation 
 
 
 
B 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Frequency 
of 
Occurrence 
 
 
C 
 
1 = often 
5 = rarely 
Relevance to 
competence in 
crisis 
management 
 
D 
 
1 = relevant 
5 = irrelevant 
Behavioural 
Marker Index 
 
 
 
A x B x 2C x D 
High degree of 
crewmember integration 
within the team 
 
Teamwork 
 
Co-operation 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
4 
Regular soliciting of 
information between 
crewmembers 
 
Communication 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
4 
Distracting information 
coded and assigned level 
of urgency for attention 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
Decision-making 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
4 
Demonstrates awareness 
of ‘big picture’ context 
 
Situational  
Awareness 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
4 
Sharing of workload. 
 
 
Workload 
Management 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
4 
The number of alternative 
hypotheses and actions 
communicated to team 
members. 
 
Sharing Mental 
Models 
 
Option Generation 
 
Team Building 
 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
4 
Unfinished sentences 
 
Communication  
1 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
3 
 
6 
Patterns of movement 
 
Leadership  
1 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
3 
 
6 
Crisis Manager asking 
their team questions in 
order to elicit information 
so that they can improve 
their situational 
awareness 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
1 
 
1 
 
3 
 
1 
 
6 
Providing big picture 
updates 
 
Sharing mental 
models 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
3 
 
1 
 
6 
Stating clear team and 
individual priorities 
 
Leadership 
 
Communication 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
3 
 
1 
 
6 
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Overt Behavioural 
Marker 
Associated  
Crisis Management 
Skill 
Ease of 
Observation 
 
 
 
A 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Ease of 
Evaluation 
 
 
 
B 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Frequency 
of 
Occurrence 
 
 
C 
 
1 = often 
5 = rarely 
Relevance to 
competence in 
crisis 
management 
 
D 
 
1 = relevant 
5 = irrelevant 
Behavioural 
Marker Index 
 
 
 
A x B x 2C x D 
Utilise team briefings for 
specific threats 
 
Sharing mental 
model 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
8 
Keeps crewmembers 
focused on the 
accomplishment of the 
task 
 
Leadership  
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
8 
Ensuring 
communications are 
audible and ungarbled 
 
Communication  
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
8 
Communication kept 
succinct 
 
Communication  
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
8 
Tendency to focus on one 
system at a time, thereby 
ignoring the dynamics of 
the complete system 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
8 
Communicating in a way 
that reveals ones mental 
models 
Sharing Mental 
Models 
 
Team Building 
 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
8 
Team leader ‘grasping’ at 
suggestions made by 
other team members 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
Decision-making 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
8 
Measured movements in 
response to stimuli 
 
Leadership  
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
8 
Making a series of 
truncated movements 
 
Leadership  
1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
8 
Amount of sampling 
behaviour exhibited 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
8 
Team leader focuses on 
individual tasks rather 
than the teams’ 
 
Leadership 
 
Workload 
Management 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
2 
 
1 
 
8 
 
Table 20.  Behavioural markers with the lowest indices. 
 
 
5.3   CHARACTERISATION OF BEHAVIOURAL MARKERS 
 
Before sending this experimental assessment framework to the expert crisis management 
assessors for a further evaluation, it was necessary to characterise these behavioural markers by 
giving examples of good and poor behaviours. This was done in order to clarify the assessment 
rating scale for the “ease of evaluation” criteria. The characterisations for the behavioural markers 
in the experimental assessment framework are detailed in Table 21 below.  
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 Ref: Overt 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Good Behaviours Poor Behaviours 
 
 
 
1. High degree of 
crewmember 
integration 
within the team 
 
Involves other crewmembers in 
planning, diagnostic and decision 
making processes. 
 
Accepts feedback and advice from 
crewmembers. 
Isolates a crewmember or 
crewmembers.  
 
Only utilises crewmember or 
crewmembers by giving them a 
command order. 
 
Ignores feedback or advice from 
crewmembers. 
 
Specific case may be cultural 
isolation. 
 
2. Regular soliciting 
of information 
between 
crewmembers 
 
Regularly asks other crewmembers 
for information. 
Does not ask other crewmembers 
for information. 
3. Distracting 
information 
coded and 
assigned level of 
urgency for 
attention 
 
Gives a low priority to information 
that is of a secondary nature with 
respect to the primary task. 
Gives a high priority to 
information that is of a secondary 
nature with respect to the primary 
task. 
4. Demonstrates 
awareness of ‘big 
picture’ context 
 
Verbalises task priorities in 
anticipation of future events. 
 
i.e. “We need to do xxxxx now or 
in yy minutes zzzzz will happen.” 
 
No anticipation of future events 
evident. 
 
Acts surprised as events happen. 
5. Sharing of 
workload  
 
 
Delegates individual tasks in order 
to maintain situation overview. 
Gets too involved in individual 
tasks to the extent that situation 
overview is lost. 
6. The number of 
alternative 
hypotheses and 
actions 
communicated to 
team members. 
 
Proposes alternative hypotheses 
and actions to team members. 
Does not propose any alternative 
hypotheses or actions to team 
members. 
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Ref: Overt 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Good Behaviours Poor Behaviours 
 
 
 
7. Unfinished 
sentences 
 
Communicates to team with 
complete and coherent sentences. 
Uses unfinished sentences in 
communications with team. 
8. Patterns of 
movement 
 
Uses measured movements within 
a defined area where team leader 
is able to maintain overview of 
situation. 
 
Uses very fast movements. 
 
No defined area of movement, so 
overview of instrumentation is not 
possible. 
 
Focuses too much on one item of 
instrumentation. 
 
Leaves control room for extended 
periods. 
 
9. Crisis Manager 
asking their team 
questions in 
order to elicit 
information so 
that they can 
improve their 
situational 
awareness 
 
Asks team members questions 
about the situation in order to 
improve situational awareness. 
Does not ask team members 
questions about the situation. 
10. Providing big 
picture updates 
 
Provides team members with 
updates on the overview of the 
situation. 
 
Does not provide team members 
with any updates on the overview 
of the situation. 
11. Stating clear team 
and individual 
priorities 
 
States clear team and individual 
team member task priorities. 
Does not state team or individual 
team member task priorities. 
12. Utilise team 
briefings for 
specific threats 
 
Briefs team about specific threats. Does not brief team about specific 
threats. 
13. Keeps 
crewmembers 
focused on the 
accomplishment 
of the task 
 
Provides encouragement and 
motivates team to keep them 
focussed on the accomplishment of 
the task. 
 
Tasks completed in good time. 
 
Fails to monitor task progression. 
 
Team does not complete tasks in 
good time. 
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Ref: Overt 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Good Behaviour Poor Behaviour 
 
 
 
14. Ensuring 
communications 
are audible and 
not garbled 
 
Communications clear and easy to 
understand. 
Communications inaudible and 
garbled. 
 
Communications not understood 
by team members. 
 
15. Communication 
kept succinct 
 
 
Communications kept succinct. Communications too long and 
over complicated. 
16. Tendency to 
focus on one 
system at a time, 
thereby ignoring 
the dynamics of 
the complete 
system 
 
Maintains overview of all systems, 
thereby maintaining awareness of 
system interactions. 
Focuses on one system to the 
exclusion of all others. 
 
Is surprised by system 
interactions. 
17. Communicating 
in a way that 
reveals ones 
mental models 
 
Communicates thoughts on the 
situation and how it is developing 
to team members. 
Does not communicate thoughts to 
team members. 
18. Team leader 
‘grasping’ at 
suggestions 
made by other 
team members 
 
Reflects on suggestions from team 
members before accepting or 
rejecting them. 
Acts immediately on suggestions 
from team members without any 
prior reflection.  
19. Measured 
movements in 
response to 
stimuli 
 
Makes measured and controlled 
movements in response to stimuli. 
Makes rapid and uncontrolled 
movements in response to stimuli. 
20. Making a series 
of truncated 
movements 
 
Moves without hesitation. 
 
Moves smoothly between tasks. 
 
Movement truncated. 
 
Movements hesitant. 
 
Moves between two task locations 
without, in the short term, 
reaching either. 
 
Presents an on the spot rocking 
motion. 
 
21. Amount of 
sampling 
behaviour 
exhibited 
 
Undertakes a lot of sampling of 
information in order to maintain a 
high level of situational awareness. 
Does not undertake much 
sampling of information. 
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Ref: Overt 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Good Behaviour Poor Behaviour 
 
 
 
22. Team leader 
focuses on own 
individual tasks 
rather than the 
teams’ 
 
Maintains focus on overall team 
task objective. 
Focuses too much on own 
individual tasks that are not 
directly related to the overall team 
task objective. 
 
i.e. team leader spends a lot of 
time trying to put another 
alternator onto the main 
switchboard. 
 
 
Table 21.  Characterisation of Behavioural Markers 
 
 
 
5.4 EVALUATION BY EXPERT CRISIS MANAGEMENT ASSESSORS 
 
The experimental behavioural marker assessment framework, including the characterisation of 
these behavioural markers, detailed in Table 21, was given to two expert crisis management 
assessors for evaluation. These assessors evaluated the behavioural markers in the assessment 
framework using one of the crisis scenario experiment recordings. It was appreciated that by only 
giving the expert assessors one of the twelve recording with which to evaluate the behavioural 
markers, their assessment would be limited in relation to the frequency of occurrence of any 
particular marker. However, it was also appreciated that those behavioural markers that were 
frequently observed when viewing just one crisis scenario recording, would probably be 
frequently observable across all of the recordings. As each crisis scenario recording was over one 
hour in length, it was deemed too great an imposition on the expert assessors to ask them to 
evaluate more than one complete recording for this part of the research study. The ratings they 
gave for ease of observation, ease of evaluation, frequency of occurrence and relevance to 
competence in crisis management are shown in Table 22 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5                                                                                                  Results and Analysis (Phase One) 
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________                                         
Behavioural Markers for the Assessment of Competence in Crisis Management                             137 
 
Overt Behavioural 
Marker 
Ease of 
Observation 
 
 
 
A 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Ease of 
Evaluation 
 
 
 
B 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Frequency 
of 
Occurrence 
 
 
C 
 
1 = often 
5 = rarely 
Relevance to 
competence in 
crisis 
management 
 
D 
 
1 = relevant 
5 = irrelevant 
1. High degree of 
crewmember 
integration within the 
team 
 
1 1 5 1 
2. Regular soliciting of 
information between 
crewmembers 
 
1 1 4 1 
3.Distracting 
information coded and 
assigned level of 
urgency for attention 
 
3 3 5 3 
4. Demonstrates 
awareness of ‘big 
picture’ context 
 
1 1 5 1 
5. Sharing of 
workload. 
 
1 1 4 2 
6. The number of 
alternative hypotheses 
and actions 
communicated to team 
members. 
 
1 1 4 1 
7. Unfinished 
sentences 
 
1 3 5 3 
8. Patterns of 
movement 
 
1 1 1 2 
9. Crisis Manager 
asking their team 
questions in order to 
elicit information so 
that they can improve 
their situational 
awareness 
 
1 1 2 1 
10. Providing big 
picture updates 
 
1 1 3 1 
11. Stating clear team 
and individual 
priorities 
 
1 1 5 1 
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Overt Behavioural 
Marker 
Ease of 
Observation 
 
 
 
A 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Ease of 
Evaluation 
 
 
 
B 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Frequency 
of 
Occurrence 
 
 
C 
 
1 = often 
5 = rarely 
Relevance to 
competence in 
crisis 
management 
 
D 
 
1 = relevant 
5 = irrelevant 
12. Utilise team 
briefings for specific 
threats 
 
1 1 4 1 
13. Keeps 
crewmembers focused 
on the 
accomplishment of the 
task 
 
1 1 5 3 
14. Ensuring 
communications are 
audible and not 
garbled 
 
1 1 3 2 
15. Communication 
kept succinct 
 
3 3 1 3 
16. Tendency to focus 
on one system at a 
time, thereby ignoring 
the dynamics of the 
complete system 
 
1 3 2 2 
17. Communicating in 
a way that reveals 
ones mental models 
1 1 3 2 
18. Team leader 
‘grasping’ at 
suggestions made by 
other team members 
 
1 1 5 1 
19. Measured 
movements in 
response to stimuli 
 
1 3 2 1 
20. Making a series of 
truncated movements 
 
1 2 1 2 
21. Amount of 
sampling behaviour 
exhibited 
 
4 4 3 2 
22. Team leader 
focuses on own 
individual tasks rather 
than the teams’ 
 
1 1 1 1 
 
Table 22.  Evaluation by expert crisis management assessors. 
 
The ratings given by the expert assessors were then used to calculate the behavioural marker 
indices for each behavioural marker. These indices are shown, in ranked order, with the lowest 
first, in Table 23 below. 
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Overt Behavioural 
Marker 
Ease of 
Observation 
 
 
 
A 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Ease of 
Evaluation 
 
 
 
B 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Frequency 
of 
Occurrence 
 
 
C 
 
1 = often 
5 = rarely 
Relevance to 
competence in 
crisis 
management 
 
D 
 
1 = relevant 
5 = irrelevant 
Behavioural 
Marker Index 
 
 
 
A x B x 2C x D 
22. Team leader 
focuses on own 
individual tasks 
rather than the 
teams’ 
 
1 1 1 1 2 
8. Patterns of 
movement 
 
1 1 1 2 4 
9. Crisis Manager 
asking their team 
questions in order to 
elicit information so 
that they can 
improve their 
situational 
awareness 
 
1 1 2 1 4 
10. Providing big 
picture updates 
 
1 1 3 1 6 
2. Regular soliciting 
of information 
between 
crewmembers 
 
1 1 4 1 8 
6. The number of 
alternative 
hypotheses and 
actions 
communicated to 
team members. 
 
1 1 4 1 8 
12. Utilise team 
briefings for specific 
threats 
 
1 1 4 1 8 
20. Making a series 
of truncated 
movements 
 
1 2 1 2 8 
1. High degree of 
crewmember 
integration within 
the team 
 
1 1 5 1 10 
4. Demonstrates 
awareness of ‘big 
picture’ context 
 
1 1 5 1 10 
11. Stating clear 
team and individual 
priorities 
 
1 1 5 1 10 
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Overt Behavioural 
Marker 
Ease of 
Observation 
 
 
 
A 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Ease of 
Evaluation 
 
 
 
B 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Frequency 
of 
Occurrence 
 
 
C 
 
1 = often 
5 = rarely 
Relevance to 
competence in 
crisis 
management 
 
D 
 
1 = relevant 
5 = irrelevant 
Behavioural 
Marker Index 
 
 
 
A x B x 2C x D 
18. Team leader 
‘grasping’ at 
suggestions made 
by other team 
members 
 
1 1 5 1 10 
14. Ensuring 
communications are 
audible and not 
garbled 
 
1 1 3 2 12 
17. Communicating 
in a way that reveals 
ones mental models 
 
1 1 3 2 12 
19. Measured 
movements in 
response to stimuli 
 
1 3 2 1 12 
5. Sharing of 
workload  
 
1 1 4 2 16 
16. Tendency to 
focus on one system 
at a time, thereby 
ignoring the 
dynamics of the 
complete system 
 
1 3 2 2 24 
13. Keeps 
crewmembers 
focused on the 
accomplishment of 
the task 
 
1 1 5 3 30 
15. Communication 
kept succinct 
 
3 3 1 3 54 
7. Unfinished 
sentences 
 
1 3 5 3 90 
21. Amount of 
sampling behaviour 
exhibited 
 
4 4 3 2 192 
3. Distracting 
information coded 
and assigned level 
of urgency for 
attention 
 
3 3 5 3 270 
 
Table 23.  Behavioural marker indices from expert assessor evaluation.  
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In order to make a comparison between the behavioural marker indices as rated by the researcher, 
and the indices as rated by the expert crisis management assessors, all indices are shown in Table 
24 below. This table also shows the difference between the researcher’s indices and the expert 
assessors’ indices, as well as the average index for each behavioural marker. 
 
 
Overt Behavioural Marker Behavioural 
Marker 
Index 
 
Rated by 
Researcher 
 
 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Index 
 
Rated by 
Expert 
Assessors 
Difference 
Between 
Indices 
Average 
Index 
1. High degree of crewmember 
integration within the team 
 
 
4 
 
10 
 
6 
 
7 
2. Regular soliciting of information 
between crewmembers 
 
 
4 
 
8 
 
4 
 
6 
3. Distracting information coded 
and assigned level of urgency for 
attention 
 
 
4 
 
270 
 
266 
 
137 
4. Demonstrates awareness of ‘big 
picture’ context 
 
 
4 
 
10 
 
6 
 
7 
5. Sharing of workload  
 
4 16 12 10 
6. The number of alternative 
hypotheses and actions 
communicated to team members. 
 
 
4 
 
8 
 
4 
 
6 
7. Unfinished sentences 
 
6 90 84 48 
8. Patterns of movement 
 
6 
 
4 2 5 
9. Crisis Manager asking their team 
questions in order to elicit 
information so that they can 
improve their situational 
awareness 
 
 
6 
 
4 
 
2 
 
5 
10. Providing big picture updates 
 
6 
 
6 0 6 
11. Stating clear team and 
individual priorities 
 
 
6 
 
10 
 
4 
 
8 
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Overt Behavioural Marker Behavioural 
Marker 
Index 
 
Rated by 
Researcher 
 
 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Index 
 
Rated by 
Expert 
Assessors 
Difference 
Between 
Indices 
Average 
Index 
12. Utilise team briefings for 
specific threats 
 
 
8 
 
8 
 
0 
 
8 
13. Keeps crewmembers focused 
on the accomplishment of the task 
 
 
8 
 
30 
 
22 
 
19 
14. Ensuring communications are 
audible and ungarbled 
 
 
8 
 
12 
 
4 
 
10 
15. Communication kept succinct 
 
8 
 
54 46 
 
31 
16. Tendency to focus on one 
system at a time, thereby ignoring 
the dynamics of the complete 
system 
 
 
8 
 
24 
 
16 
 
16 
17. Communicating in a way that 
reveals ones mental models 
 
 
8 
 
 
12 
 
4 
 
10 
18. Team leader ‘grasping’ at 
suggestions made by other team 
members 
 
 
8 
 
10 
 
2 
 
9 
19. Measured movements in 
response to stimuli 
 
 
8 
 
12 
 
4 
 
10 
20. Making a series of truncated 
movements 
 
 
8 
 
8 
 
0 
 
8 
21. Amount of sampling behaviour 
exhibited 
 
 
8 
 
192 
 
184 
 
100 
22. Team leader focuses on 
individual tasks rather than the 
teams’ 
 
 
8 
 
2 
 
6 
 
5 
 
Table 24.  Comparison of behavioural marker indices. 
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It can be seen from the table above that the researcher’s indices and the expert assessors’ indices of 
fifteen of the behavioural markers are in very close agreement, being within six index points of 
each other. This indicates that these behavioural markers are likely to be effective assessment 
criteria for assessing competence in crisis management. This agreement shows the reliability of 
these behavioural markers as assessment criteria, but not their validity. For this reason, these 
fifteen behavioural markers (1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 22) were passed through 
to the validation phase of the research. 
 
Due to the larger differences in the indices of the remaining seven behavioural markers (3, 5, 7, 13, 
15, 16 and 21), further analysis was required before a decision could be made as to whether to pass 
these markers through to the validation phase of the research, or not. In order to facilitate this 
further analysis, Table 25 below sets out all of the evaluation ratings and indices as assessed by 
the researcher, with, in brackets, all of the evaluation ratings and indices as assessed by the expert 
assessors. 
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Overt Behavioural 
Marker 
Associated  
Crisis Management 
Skill 
Ease of 
Observation 
 
 
 
A 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Ease of 
Evaluation 
 
 
 
B 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Frequency 
of 
Occurrence 
 
 
C 
 
1 = often 
5 = rarely 
Relevance to 
competence in 
crisis 
management 
 
D 
 
1 = relevant 
5 = irrelevant 
Behavioural 
Marker Index 
 
 
 
A x B x 2C x D 
1. High degree of 
crewmember integration 
within the team 
 
Teamwork 
 
Co-operation 
 
1 (1) 
 
1 (1) 
 
1 (5) 
 
2 (1) 
 
4 (10) 
2. Regular soliciting of 
information between 
crewmembers 
 
Communication 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
 
1 (1) 
 
1 (1) 
 
2 (4) 
 
1 (1) 
 
4 (8) 
3. Distracting information 
coded and assigned level 
of urgency for attention 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
Decision-making 
 
1 (3) 
 
1 (3) 
 
2 (5) 
 
1 (3) 
 
4 (270) 
4. Demonstrates 
awareness of ‘big picture’ 
context 
 
Situational  
Awareness 
 
1 (1) 
 
1 (1) 
 
2 (5) 
 
1 (1) 
 
4 (10) 
5. Sharing of workload. 
  
 
Workload 
Management 
 
1 (1) 
 
2 (1) 
 
1 (4) 
 
1 (2) 
 
4 (16) 
6. The number of 
alternative hypotheses 
and actions 
communicated to team 
members. 
 
Sharing Mental 
Models 
 
Option Generation 
 
Team Building 
 
 
2 (1) 
 
1 (1) 
 
1 (4) 
 
1 (1) 
 
4 (8) 
7. Unfinished sentences 
 
Communication  
1 (1) 
 
 
1 (3) 
 
1 (5) 
 
3 (3) 
 
6 (90) 
8. Patterns of movement 
 
Leadership  
1 (1) 
 
 
1 (1) 
 
1 (1) 
 
3 (2) 
 
6 (4) 
9. Crisis Manager asking 
their team questions in 
order to elicit information 
so that they can improve 
their situational 
awareness 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
1 (1) 
 
1 (1) 
 
3 (2) 
 
1 (1) 
 
6 (4) 
10. Providing big picture 
updates 
 
Sharing mental 
models 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
 
1 (1) 
 
1 (1) 
 
3 (3) 
 
1 (1) 
 
6 (6) 
11. Stating clear team and 
individual priorities 
 
Leadership 
 
Communication 
 
 
1 (1) 
 
1 (1) 
 
3 (5) 
 
1 (1) 
 
6 (10) 
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Overt Behavioural 
Marker 
Associated  
Crisis Management 
Skill 
Ease of 
Observation 
 
 
 
A 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Ease of 
Evaluation 
 
 
 
B 
 
1 = Easy 
5 = Difficult 
Frequency 
of 
Occurrence 
 
 
C 
 
1 = often 
5 = rarely 
Relevance to 
competence in 
crisis 
management 
 
D 
 
1 = relevant 
5 = irrelevant 
Behavioural 
Marker Index 
 
 
 
A x B x 2C x D 
12. Utilise team briefings 
for specific threats 
 
Sharing mental 
model 
 
1 (1) 
 
2 (1) 
 
2 (4) 
 
1 (1) 
 
8 (8) 
13. Keeps crewmembers 
focused on the 
accomplishment of the 
task 
 
Leadership  
1 (1) 
 
2 (1) 
 
2 (5) 
 
1 (3) 
 
8 (30) 
14. Ensuring 
communications are 
audible and ungarbled 
 
Communication  
1 (1) 
 
2 (1) 
 
2 (3) 
 
1 (2) 
 
8 (12) 
15. Communication kept 
succinct 
 
Communication  
1 (3) 
 
1 (3)  
 
2 (1) 
 
2 (3) 
 
8 (54) 
16. Tendency to focus on 
one system at a time, 
thereby ignoring the 
dynamics of the complete 
system 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
1 (1) 
 
2 (3) 
 
2 (2) 
 
1 (2) 
 
8 (24) 
17. Communicating in a 
way that reveals ones 
mental models 
Sharing Mental 
Models 
 
Team Building 
 
 
2 (1) 
 
2 (1) 
 
1 (3) 
 
1 (2) 
 
8 (12) 
18. Team leader 
‘grasping’ at suggestions 
made by other team 
members 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
Decision-making 
 
 
1 (1) 
 
1 (1) 
 
2 (5) 
 
2 (1) 
 
8 (10) 
19. Measured movements 
in response to stimuli 
 
Leadership  
1 (1) 
 
1 (3) 
 
2 (2) 
 
2 (1) 
 
8 (12) 
20. Making a series of 
truncated movements 
 
Leadership  
1 (1) 
 
1 (2) 
 
2 (1) 
 
2 (2) 
 
8 (8) 
21. Amount of sampling 
behaviour exhibited 
 
Situational 
Awareness 
 
 
 
2 (4) 
 
2 (4) 
 
1 (3) 
 
1 (2) 
 
8 (192) 
22. Team leader focuses 
on individual tasks rather 
than the teams’ 
 
Leadership 
 
Workload 
Management 
 
 
1 (1) 
 
2 (1) 
 
2 (1) 
 
1 (1) 
 
8 (2) 
 
Table 25.  Comparison of all evaluation ratings and indices. 
 
 
The following section will further evaluate those behavioural markers where the behavioural 
marker index rated by the researcher differed from that rated by the expert assessors by more 
than 6 index points. 
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Behavioural Marker No. 3  -  Distracting information coded and assigned level of urgency for attention 
 
The ratings for this behavioural marker show significant differences, of more than one index 
point, for all four assessment criteria. This therefore shows that this marker is unreliable, and for 
this reason it was rejected from the experimental assessment framework. 
 
 
Behavioural Marker No.5  -  Sharing of Workload 
 
For this behavioural marker, the index for ease of observation was rated as 1 by both the 
researcher and the expert assessors. The indices for ease of evaluation and relevance to 
competence in crisis management were only rated differently by one index point. It is the rating 
given by the expert assessors for ‘frequency of occurrence’ that introduces the main difference 
between their index and the researcher’s index. As the expert assessors only received one crisis 
scenario recording to evaluate, for the reasons discussed earlier in this section, their low frequency 
of occurrence rating for this behavioural marker may not be giving a true reflection of the markers 
overall frequency of occurrence across all of the experimental recordings. If the term for 
‘frequency of occurrence’ were omitted from the behavioural marker index formula, the revised 
index for this marker, as evaluated by the expert assessors, would be 2. It was therefore decided 
that this behavioural marker should be included within the experimental assessment framework. 
 
 
Behavioural Marker No.7  -  Unfinished Sentences 
 
As with behavioural marker No.5, the rating for which there was the greatest disagreement 
between the researcher and the expert assessors was for the ‘frequency of occurrence’. Again, if 
this term were omitted from the behavioural marker index formula, the revised index for this 
marker, as evaluated by the expert assessors, would be 9. This marker was therefore also included 
within the experimental assessment framework. 
 
 
Behavioural Marker No.13  -  Keeps crew members focused on accomplishment of task 
 
As with behavioural markers No.5 and 7, it is the rating for ‘frequency of occurrence’ that 
differentiates between the researcher’s index and the expert assessors index for this marker. If this 
term were omitted from the behavioural marker index formula, the revised index for this marker, 
as evaluated by the expert assessors, would be 3. This marker was therefore also included within 
the experimental assessment framework. 
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Behavioural Marker No.15  -  Communications kept succinct 
 
For this behavioural marker the researcher’s ratings and the expert assessors’ ratings significantly 
disagree, by more than one index point, for both the ease of observation and the ease of evaluation 
criteria. Even if the term for the ‘frequency of occurrence’ were omitted, the revised index for this 
marker, as evaluated by the expert assessors, would still be 27. Therefore, this behavioural marker 
was rejected from the experimental assessment framework. 
 
Behavioural Marker No.16  -  Tendency to focus on one system at a time, thereby ignoring the dynamics of 
the complete system 
 
For this behavioural marker all of the ratings given by the researcher and the expert assessors 
were within one index point. By omitting the term for ‘frequency of occurrence’, the revised index 
for this marker, as evaluated by the expert assessors, would be 6. Therefore, this behavioural 
marker was retained within the experimental assessment framework. 
 
 
Behavioural Marker No.21  -  Amount of sampling behaviour exhibited 
 
For this behavioural marker, for all but the ‘relevance to competence in crisis management’ 
criteria, the researcher’s ratings and the expert assessors ratings differ by more than one index 
point. Therefore, this behavioural marker was rejected from the experimental assessment 
framework. 
 
Following the above evaluation it was decided that behavioural markers 3, 15 and 21 would be 
left out of the experimental assessment framework to be validated in phase two of the research. 
The final set of nineteen behavioural markers that make up the experimental assessment 
framework to be tested for validity and interrater agreement are shown below in Table 26.  
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 Ref: Overt 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Good Behaviours Poor Behaviours 
 
 
 
1. High degree of 
crewmember 
integration 
within the team 
 
Involves other crewmembers in 
planning, diagnostic and decision 
making processes. 
 
Accepts feedback and advice from 
crewmembers. 
Isolates a crewmember or 
crewmembers.  
 
Only utilises crewmember or 
crewmembers by giving them a 
command order. 
 
Ignores feedback or advice from 
crewmembers. 
 
Specific case may be cultural 
isolation. 
 
2. Regular soliciting 
of information 
between 
crewmembers 
 
Regularly asks other crewmembers 
for information. 
Does not ask other crewmembers 
for information. 
3. Demonstrates 
awareness of ‘big 
picture’ context 
 
Verbalises task priorities in 
anticipation of future events. 
 
i.e. “We need to do xxxxx now or 
in yy minutes zzzzz will happen.” 
 
No anticipation of future events 
evident. 
 
Acts surprised as events happen. 
4. Sharing of 
workload  
 
 
Delegates individual tasks in order 
to maintain situation overview. 
Gets too involved in individual 
tasks to the extent that situation 
overview is lost. 
5. The number of 
alternative 
hypotheses and 
actions 
communicated to 
team members. 
 
Proposes alternative hypotheses 
and actions to team members. 
Does not propose any alternative 
hypotheses or actions to team 
members. 
6. Unfinished 
sentences 
 
Communicates to team with 
complete and coherent sentences. 
Uses unfinished sentences in 
communications with team. 
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Ref: Overt 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Good Behaviours Poor Behaviours 
 
 
 
7. Patterns of 
movement 
 
Uses measured movements within 
a defined area where team leader 
is able to maintain overview of 
situation. 
 
Uses very fast movements. 
 
No defined area of movement, so 
overview of instrumentation is not 
possible. 
 
Focuses too much on one item of 
instrumentation. 
 
Leaves control room for extended 
periods. 
 
8. Crisis Manager 
asking their team 
questions in 
order to elicit 
information so 
that they can 
improve their 
situational 
awareness 
 
Asks team members questions 
about the situation in order to 
improve situational awareness. 
Does not ask team members 
questions about the situation. 
9. Providing big 
picture updates 
 
Provides team members with 
updates on the overview of the 
situation. 
 
Does not provide team members 
with any updates on the overview 
of the situation. 
10. Stating clear team 
and individual 
priorities 
 
States clear team and individual 
team member task priorities. 
Does not state team or individual 
team member task priorities. 
11. Utilise team 
briefings for 
specific threats 
 
Briefs team about specific threats. Does not brief team about specific 
threats. 
12. Keeps 
crewmembers 
focused on the 
accomplishment 
of the task 
 
Provides encouragement and 
motivates team to keep them 
focussed on the accomplishment of 
the task. 
 
Tasks completed in good time. 
 
Fails to monitor task progression. 
 
Team does not complete tasks in 
good time. 
13. Ensuring 
communications 
are audible and 
not garbled 
 
Communications clear and easy to 
understand. 
Communications inaudible and 
garbled. 
 
Communications not understood 
by team members. 
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Ref: Overt 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Good Behaviours Poor Behaviours 
 
 
 
14. Tendency to 
focus on one 
system at a time, 
thereby ignoring 
the dynamics of 
the complete 
system 
 
Maintains overview of all systems, 
thereby maintaining awareness of 
system interactions. 
Focuses on one system to the 
exclusion of all others. 
 
Is surprised by system 
interactions. 
15. Communicating 
in a way that 
reveals ones 
mental models 
 
Communicates thoughts on the 
situation and how it is developing 
to team members. 
Does not communicate thoughts to 
team members. 
16. Team leader 
‘grasping’ at 
suggestions 
made by other 
team members 
 
Reflects on suggestions from team 
members before accepting or 
rejecting them. 
Acts immediately on suggestions 
from team members without any 
prior reflection.  
17. Measured 
movements in 
response to 
stimuli 
 
Makes measured and controlled 
movements in response to stimuli. 
Makes rapid and uncontrolled 
movements in response to stimuli. 
18. Making a series 
of truncated 
movements 
 
Moves without hesitation. 
 
Moves smoothly between tasks. 
 
Movement truncated. 
 
Movements hesitant. 
 
Moves between two task locations 
without, in the short term, 
reaching either. 
 
Presents an on the spot rocking 
motion. 
 
19. Team leader 
focuses on own 
individual tasks 
rather than the 
teams’ 
 
Maintains focus on overall team 
task objective. 
Focuses too much on own 
individual tasks that are not 
directly related to the overall team 
task objective. 
 
i.e. team leader spends a lot of 
time trying to put another 
alternator onto the main 
switchboard. 
 
 
Table 26.  Final Experimental Assessment Framework 
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Each of the behavioural markers within this experimental assessment framework has been shown, 
through the analysis of twelve crisis scenarios, to have the best balance of the characteristics for 
ease of observation and evaluation, frequency of occurrence, and relevance to the assessment of 
competence in crisis management, of all of the behavioural markers evaluated. Of these nineteen 
behavioural markers, seven are original markers, solely determined during the ethnographic 
analysis of the crisis scenario experiment video recordings undertaken within this research. The 
remainder of the markers were determined from the literature review, and then evaluated for 
their effectiveness in assessing competence in crisis management, within the context of a merchant 
vessel engine room control room environment, through the ethnographic analysis. The following 
chapter will describe the next phase of the research methodology in which the experimental 
assessment framework, determined by phase one of the research, will be tested for validity and 
interrater agreement. 
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Chapter 6. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY (PHASE TWO) 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Phase one of this research resulted in the production of an experimental assessment framework 
for assessing competence in crisis management for merchant navy engineer officers. Face validity 
of this assessment framework was sought during phase one of this research by having two expert 
crisis management assessors use and review the experimental assessment framework in a limited 
trial. During this trial, the experts were asked to rate the ease of observation, ease of evaluation, 
frequency of occurrence and relevance to competence in crisis management, of the behavioural 
markers in the assessment framework. Once the trial had been completed, a comparison was then 
made between the observations of the expert crisis management assessors and the researcher, 
from which the experimental assessment framework was derived.  The results of the research 
carried out in phase one gave face validity to the assessment framework. However, in order to 
prove the validity and reliability of the assessment framework, further research was required.  
 
 
6.2 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
  
The objective of the experimental work and analysis undertaken during phase two of the research 
was to evaluate the following hypotheses:  
 
1. That the sub-set of behavioural markers that formed the experimental assessment 
framework determined in phase one of the research can be used as valid markers for the 
objective assessment of competence in crisis management within the context of a ships 
engine room control room. 
 
2. That the experimental assessment framework that has been developed can be used with a 
high degree of interrater agreement. 
 
3. That if a behavioural marker based assessment framework has sufficiently simple and 
objective assessment criteria, it can be used by non-domain experts to assess competence 
in crisis management. 
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4. That if a behavioural marker based assessment framework has sufficiently simple and 
objective assessment criteria, it can be used successfully, without the need to give specific 
training to assessors in its use. 
 
The next section will detail the experimental protocol devised in order to undertake the evaluation 
of these hypotheses. 
 
 
6.3 EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL (PHASE TWO) 
 
Using the video data collected during the experiments carried out in phase one of this research, a 
video was produced that presented the full range of behaviours used in the assessment 
framework. This video was comprised of twelve five-minute event sets, one from each of the 
original experiments. Each event set was temporally anchored, starting from the moment in the 
crisis scenario when the vessel lost power. This temporal anchoring was important to ensure that, 
when viewed, each assessor was assessing the behaviours exhibited by the candidates during the 
same period of the scenario event set. In this way, the number of variables affecting the response 
of the candidates would be similar in each case. By trying to ensure that the number of variables 
affecting the performance of the candidate was similar in each case, the assessments should better 
reflect the individual competence in crisis management of the candidates. The same video was 
shown to three groups of assessors, with six assessors in two of the groups and seven assessors in 
the other group. 
 
Currently, the assessment of competence in crisis management is not required for all officers in 
the merchant navy. Therefore, there is not a pool of maritime crisis management assessors that 
could be drawn upon to assist within the validation process of the experimental assessment 
framework. It was therefore deemed important to have two groups of domain expert assessors 
involved in the validation process, one group of marine engineer officer operations domain 
experts and one group of crisis management assessment experts. 
 
Group 1 
 
Group 1 consisted of six qualified engineer officers, who had sailed as Chief Engineer Officer, but 
who were not skilled assessors. The members of this group were therefore marine engineer officer 
operations domain experts, but not crisis management domain experts. The members of this 
group were asked, by using only their ‘gut’ feelings, to rank the Chief Engineers of each of the 
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twelve teams shown in the video event sets from best to worst crisis manager. The mean ranking 
of this group was determined.  
 
Group 2 
 
Group 2 consisted of six non-domain expert assessors. By this, it is meant that these assessors 
were skilled at assessing, but that they were not experts in assessing competence in marine 
engineer officer operations, or crisis management. These assessors were asked to use the 
assessment framework developed in phase one of this research to assess the overt behavioural 
markers exhibited by the Chief Engineers of each of the twelve teams shown in the video event 
sets using a four point rating scale. The rating scale was comprised of the following categories: 
 
 Good 
 Towards Good 
 Towards Poor 
 Poor 
 
The rating scale also included a “not observed” category, to record if a particular behavioural 
marker from the previously determined assessment framework could not be observed during the 
event set. The within group interrater agreement of this group of assessors was determined 
statistically. The mean of the absolute ratings given for each Chief Engineer for each behavioural 
marker by the assessors in this group was also calculated in order to determine the rank order of 
the Chief Engineers as measured using the experimental assessment framework.  
 
This group of assessors received no training in how to use the assessment framework. The only 
documentation they were given, apart from the behavioural tendency response sheets, was a set 
of examples of good and poor behaviours relating to each of the behavioural markers they were to 
assess. These behaviours specifically related to competence in crisis management within a 
merchant navy vessel engine control room environment. This set of example behaviours is shown 
in Appendix 2.  
 
Group 3 
 
Group 3 consisted of seven experts in assessing competence in crisis management. These assessors 
were asked, by using only their ‘gut’ feelings, to rank the Chief Engineers of each team from best 
to worst crisis manager. The mean ranking of this group was determined.  
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If the experimental assessment framework is valid, there should be a high degree of correlation 
between the assessments of groups 1, 2 and 3. Also, the within group interrater agreement of 
group 2 should be high.  
 
Before sending the example behaviour marker sheet of the final assessment framework that is 
shown in Table 26, to the group 2 assessors, a review of how the behavioural markers were 
presented was carried out. As written in Table 26, some of the example behavioural markers were 
written as being positive behaviours, some were written as being negative behaviours and some 
were written as neutral behaviours. It was decided that this might be confusing when asking 
assessors to rate these behaviours using a rating scale. In order to make the assessment framework 
as clear as possible to the assessors, all of the behavioural markers were re-written so that all gave 
an indication of a positive behaviour. For example, the neutrally worded behavioural marker 
“Patterns of movement” became “Uses measured patterns of movement”, and the negatively 
worded behavioural marker “Team leader ‘grasping’ at suggestions made by other team 
members” became “Team leader reflects on the suggestions made by other team members”. The 
example behavioural marker sheet that was used during the phase 2 experiments is shown in 
Appendix 2. 
 
 
6.4 METRICS 
 
6.4.1 Interrater Reliability and Interrater Agreement 
 
Following the completion of two multitrait/multirater assessment studies, Lawler (1967) 
concluded that different raters often fail to converge in their assessments because they are 
observing different things. This implies that the criteria that were being used for these 
assessments were too open to subjective interpretation, and did not focus the attention of the 
assessors on the overt behaviours required for successful completion of the task. This may be true 
of many assessment frameworks where behavioural markers are left too broadly categorised to 
produce truly objective assessments. Even where the behaviour is well defined, different raters 
may rely on different perceptions of that behaviour, from different times during the observation 
period, when they make their final assessment. 
 
LeBreton et al (2003) propose another hypothesis to explain the apparent inconsistency between 
raters, which they term the Restriction of Variance Hypothesis. This hypothesis posits that the 
apparent uniqueness of ratings is largely artificial, brought about by the restriction of variance in 
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the observed performance of the candidates. This restricted variance may arise from interventions 
such as recruitment and selection practices, training and organisational culture, as well as rating 
biases, such as leniency or central tendency. This restriction of variance in the candidates can lead 
to a distribution of performance ratings that are negatively skewed, with assessments being 
mostly good, mostly average, or mostly poor. LeBreton et al (2003) argue that assessing rating 
similarity using correlation-based analyses, such as intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC’s) or 
Pearson correlations, requires that sufficient between-target variance exists to produce meaningful 
inferential statistics. They argue that: 
 
“without substantial between-target variance, any correlation based index of rating 
similarity will likely be low.” (LeBreton et al, 2003) 
 
Therefore, it would appear to be unwise to try to determine the level of interrater reliability and 
interrater agreement solely based on a statistical analysis using a correlation-based index. This is 
because low correlations could occur either due to substantial rating discrepancies, or due to a 
lack of between-target variance. In order to ensure that any restriction of variance in the 
candidates does not result in a misleading statistical analysis, it would be better to undertake such 
an analysis using a statistical index that is not affected by a lack of between-target variance. 
LeBreton et al (2003) propose that the rwg index (James, Demaree & Wolf, 1984) is such a statistic. 
 
In order to be clear about what is being measured, a distinction should be made between 
interrater reliability and interrater agreement. LeBreton and Senter (2007) define interrater 
reliability (IRR) as:  
 
“the relative CONSISTENCY of ratings provided by multiple judges of multiple targets.”  
 
The IRR index is used to show if, when rank-ordering targets, judges order with a relative 
consistency to each other. IRR is not concerned with the absolute equivalence of rating scores 
given by judges, but with the equivalence of relative rankings. 
 
The interrater agreement (IRA) index is defined by LeBreton and Senter (2007) as: 
 
“the ABSOLUTE CONCENSUS in scores furnished by multiple judges for one or more 
targets.” 
 
This means that the interrater agreement index is useful to determine if an assessment framework 
can produce scores that are interchangeable or equivalent in terms of their absolute values. The 
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higher the level of interrater agreement between multiple judges, the higher can be said to be the 
discriminatory attributes of the behavioural markers that compose the assessment framework 
used by the judges. 
 
The IRA index can be used when multiple judges rate a single target on a single variable using an 
interval scale of measurement, such as a Likert scale. The rwg index defines agreement between the 
scoring of judges in terms of the proportional reduction in error variance: 
                                
   rwg = 1 -  
          
 
where:  
Sx2 is the observed variance on the variable x taken over k different judges or raters; 
and 
σE2 is the variance expected when there is a complete lack of agreement amongst the judges. 
(LeBreton and Senter, 2007) 
 
Brown and Hauenstein (2005) argued that interrater agreement indices are dependent upon both 
the number of points on the rating scale being used and the number of raters. However, in their 
study of interrater disagreement and dispersion, Roberson et al (2007) found that there was a high 
degree of convergence amongst interrater agreement indices. They showed that the average of 
correlations between the most widely used interrater agreement indices, including rwg, was 0.95, 
with a range of 0.93 to 0.98. With this high degree of interrater agreement indices convergence, it 
is considered acceptable to use the rwg index within this research study. 
 
When using the rwg index, if all raters perfectly agree on the rating given to a particular assessment 
criterion, the observed variance between the raters would be equal to zero, i.e.  Sx2=0 
 
 Therefore as:  rwg   = 1 -  Sx2/ σE2 
 If  Sx2 = 0 rwg   = 1 - 0/ σE2 
   rwg   = 1  
 
Conversely, if all raters lack any level of agreement on the rating given to a particular assessment 
criterion, with their responses being effectively random in nature, the observed variance would 
equate to that based on the theoretical null error distribution with Sx2 being equal to σE2.  
 Sx2   
σE2 
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In this case: 
  
If  Sx2 = σE2  rwg   = 1 - σE2 / σE2    
   rwg   = 0 
 
However, it may be the case that any lack of agreement by the raters may not be random in 
nature, but may be affected by some sort of response bias, such as leniency, central tendency, or 
severity. When estimating rwg indices, James et al (1984) recommended that multiple null error 
distributions should be used to account for any possible affects of rater bias. 
 
If the raters were to exhibit no systematic bias, then the null distribution, or response equating to 
no agreement, would be uniform or rectangular. However, if a central tendency bias was 
suspected, the null distribution would be expected to be triangular in form, with a greater 
tendency for raters to use central rating values, than those at the extremes of the rating scale. 
Central tendency might be expected from those raters who are cautious, or who are not 
comfortable or accomplished with the use of assessment criteria. Although the raters forming  
Group 2 of this study had not been trained in the use of the study’s specific crisis management 
competence assessment framework, they were already expert competence assessors in other 
domains, and as such would not be expected to exhibit any central tendency bias. 
 
The raters in Group 2 of this study knew that they were participating in a research programme 
and that the outcome of their assessments was completely confidential, and could not in any way 
affect the research participants being assessed. Because of this there was no reason to suspect that 
the raters would exhibit any leniency bias. Also, as none of the raters in Group 2 either personally 
knew, or had ever met, the research participants being assessed, there was no reason to suspect 
that the raters would exhibit any severity bias either. 
 
In the light of the discussion in the preceding paragraphs, it is considered acceptable within this 
study to use a uniform null distribution when determining the within-group interrater agreement 
for assessor Group 2. 
 
Differential response bias may be another influence on rater response. This bias relates to the 
situation where raters apply different subjective interpretations to identical points on a rating 
scale. In order to reduce the risk of this type of bias occurring, a simple four point rating scale was 
chosen, with clear alternative responses available to the raters, see Figure 5 below: 
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Good Towards Good Towards Poor Poor 
4 3 2 1 
 
Figure 5. Assessment Rating Scale 
 
The option of giving a rating of zero was also available to the raters if they could not observe the 
behavioural marker being assessed. 
 
Mood, Graybill and Boes (1974) give an equation for the theoretical variance of a uniform null 
error distribution as: 
 
   σEU2  =  
 
where A is the number of response options. 
 
Therefore, for a four point rater scale: 
 
   σEU2  =  
 
   σEU2  =   1.25 
 
Therefore, in order to calculate the within group interrater agreement rwg index for assessor Group 
2, the following equation was used: 
 
                               
   rwg  = 1  -  
          
 
 
 
A2 – 1 
   12 
42 – 1 
   12 
 Sx2   
 1.25 
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6.4.2 Rank Order 
 
The outcome of the assessments carried out by the different groups of assessors were, in the case 
of assessor groups 1 and 3, a rank order of the Chief Engineers assessed from best crisis manager 
to worst crisis manager. The outcome of the assessments carried out by assessor group 2 were also 
provided in terms of a rank order, by calculating the mean of all of the rating scores given by each 
assessor for each individual behavioural marker for each Chief Engineer. With a set of three rank 
order scores, it is possible to use a rank correlation coefficient to calculate the size of the 
correlation between pairs of score sets. This is a way of determining how well the different groups 
of assessors agree with each other over the assessment of the Chief Engineers competence in crisis 
management. 
 
When determining the level of concordance in a series of paired variates there are a number of 
statistical methods that can be used, such as the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient 
or the Spearman rank correlation coefficient. Common practice has been to use the Pearson 
correlation coefficient, but there are arguments in favour of using the Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient to determine the level of concordance between the three groups of assessors when 
assessing the Chief Engineers competence in crisis management.  
 
The first argument is that the Spearman rank correlation coefficient is a distribution free, or non-
parametric statistic, which is more suited to correlating non-normally distributed data (McDonald 
& Green, 1960). The data obtained from the assessment of the Chief Engineers is not expected to 
have a normal distribution if the level of objectivity and discrimination of the assessment criteria 
is sufficiently high. 
 
The second argument is that in a number of studies it has been shown that when comparing an 
analysis of the same set of data there is a high level of agreement between the results obtained 
using the Pearson correlation coefficient and those obtained using the Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient (McDonald & Green, 1960; O’Brien & Griffiths, 1965).  
 
For the reasons discussed above it was decided to use the Spearman rank correlation coefficient in 
order to determine the level of assessment concordance between the different groups of assessors 
in this experiment. 
 
As each group of assessors is made up of either six or seven assessors, there is always a chance of 
some level of variability in their assessments, whatever assessment framework they are using. By 
using a statistical method such as a rank correlation coefficient, a test to determine the statistical 
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significance of the results can be carried out to show whether or not the correlation has a 
recognised level of significance.  
 
As the rank order is based upon a ranking of 12 Chief Engineers, the generally accepted critical 
values of the Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficient (rs) are shown below: 
 
Number of Subjects (N) 
Level of Significance 
p < 0.05 
Level of Significance 
p < 0.01 
 
12 
 
0.503 
 
0.678 
                                     Lee (2008)  
 
If a Spearman rank order correlation coefficient is determined that is statistically significant 
between assessor groups 2 and 3, this will show that the experimental assessment framework can 
be used by non-domain experts, without the need for specific training in its use, to assess 
competence in crisis management of marine engineering officers in an engine room control room 
environment. 
 
If a Spearman rank order correlation coefficient is determined that is statistically significant 
between assessor groups 1 and 3, this will validate the use of the expert crisis management 
assessors as a means of providing a benchmark for the level of competence in crisis management 
for each of the Chief Engineers assessed. 
 
 
6.4.3 Observability  
 
The effectiveness of any assessment framework based on behavioural markers is in part 
dependent upon the observability of the behavioural markers used. It does not matter how valid a 
particular behavioural marker is at measuring a level of competence in crisis management, if that 
behavioural marker cannot be observed when an assessment is being undertaken. 
 
The design of any assessment scenario is very important when using a behavioural marker based 
assessment framework. The scenario must be designed to allow the greatest opportunity for all of 
the behavioural markers within the assessment framework to be observed at some level on the 
rating scale. If a behavioural marker is consistently not observed, then its worth within the 
assessment framework would have to be questioned. A behavioural marker may not be observed 
for a number of reasons:- 
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i)     The behavioural marker is physically difficult to observe. 
 
In order to address this issue the behavioural markers within the experimental assessment 
framework were all determined and validated by direct observation of the experiment 
scenario used in phase one of this research. 
 
ii)    The assessment scenario does not lend itself to eliciting that behaviour. 
 
Once again this issue was addressed by ensuring that during the development of the 
experimental assessment framework, all of the proposed behavioural markers were 
observed when using the experiment scenario. 
 
iii)    The candidate being assessed does not exhibit that behaviour. 
 
If more assessors do not observe a particular behavioural marker than is expected by 
chance, then it is probable that the candidate has not exhibited that behaviour. This is a 
perfectly valid result and can be interpreted as part of the candidates overall assessment. 
 
iv)    The assessor does not recognise the behavioural marker even though it is being exhibited by  
        the candidate. 
 
All of the behavioural markers used within the experimental assessment framework were 
carefully chosen for their ease of observability. This should make it easy for any assessor 
to recognise each behaviour if it is being exhibited by the candidate. 
 
v)     The behavioural marker has been poorly worded within the assessment framework, making  
         it difficult to interpret whether it has been observed or not. 
 
The assessment framework was evaluated by expert crisis management assessors during 
its development. Part of this evaluation was to ensure that the behavioural markers were 
described clearly and concisely in order to make them easy to interpret objectively and 
without ambiguity. 
  
As discussed in section 6.4.1 the assessment rating scale gave the assessors an option for recording 
the fact they were unable to observe any particular behavioural marker. It was therefore possible 
to record the percentage of behavioural markers observed by the Group 2 assessors for each 
experiment scenario. 
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The results and analysis of the within-group interrater agreement, the Spearman rank order 
correlation coefficient and the assessment framework behavioural marker observability, for 
assessor Group 2, will now be discussed in Chapter 7.  
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Chapter 7. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS (PHASE TWO) 
 
Three sets of results will be discussed within this chapter: 
 
1) The within-group interrater agreement for the assessments made by the assessors in 
assessor Group 2 when using the experimental behavioural marker based assessment 
framework. 
2) The rank order of competence in crisis management for the twelve Chief Engineers, as 
assessed by the three different assessor groups. 
3) The observability of the behavioural markers used within the experimental assessment 
framework. 
 
The data recorded by the three assessor groups when viewing the twelve experiment scenarios are 
shown in Appendix 3.  
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 7.1 INTERRATER AGREEMENT 
 
The results of the within-group interrater agreement for uniform null distribution  rwg_un  obtained 
using the assessment scores from the Group 2 assessors when assessing the twelve Chief 
Engineers are shown in Table 27 below. Mean within-group interrater agreement indices are 
shown for each Chief Engineer and for each Behavioural Marker. 
 
 
 
BM 
Within-Group Interrater Agreement for uniform null distribution   rwg_un 
 
 
Mean 
rwg_un C/E 
1 
C/E 
2 
C/E 
3 
C/E 
4 
C/E 
5 
C/E 
6 
C/E 
7 
C/E 
8 
C/E 
9 
C/E 
10 
C/E 
11 
C/E 
12 
 
1 
       
0.12 
       
0.47 
       
0.68 
       
0.23 
       
0.55 
       
0.68 
       
0.55 
       
0.76 
       
0.55 
       
0.12 
       
0.79 
       
0.47 
 
0.50 
 
2 
       
0.55 
       
0.47 
       
0.68 
       
0.55 
       
0.47 
       
0.87 
       
0.68 
       
0.79 
       
0.76 
       
-0.17 
       
0.87 
       
0.47 
 
0.58 
 
3 
       
0.23 
       
0.87 
       
0.44 
       
0.12 
       
0.12 
       
0.44 
       
0.44 
       
0.76 
       
0.04 
       
0.44 
       
0.87 
   
-0.60 
 
0.35 
 
4 
       
0.36 
       
0.47 
       
0.12 
       
0.44 
       
0.47 
       
0.47 
       
0.55 
       
0.76 
       
0.87 
       
0.44 
       
0.76 
       
0.44 
 
0.51 
 
5 
       
0.84 
       
0.87 
       
0.04 
       
0.23 
       
0.15 
       
0.76 
       
0.80 
       
0.84 
       
0.15 
       
0.04 
       
0.79 
       
0.04 
 
0.46 
 
6 
       
0.79 
       
0.47 
       
0.87 
       
0.87 
       
0.47 
       
0.87 
       
0.79 
       
0.79 
       
0.12 
       
0.44 
       
0.87 
       
0.68 
 
0.67 
 
7 
       
0.47 
       
0.47 
       
0.47 
       
0.15 
       
0.76 
       
0.79 
       
0.23 
       
0.47 
       
0.12 
       
0.55 
       
0.79 
       
0.15 
 
0.45 
 
8 
       
0.12 
       
0.79 
       
0.55 
       
0.60 
       
0.47 
       
0.44 
       
0.84 
       
0.76 
       
0.84 
       
0.44 
       
0.76 
       
0.20 
 
0.57 
 
9 
       
0.47 
      
1.00 
       
0.23 
      
-0.28 
      
-0.17 
       
0.68 
       
0.80 
       
0.36 
      
-0.04 
       
0.60 
       
0.79 
       
0.20 
 
0.39 
 
10 
       
0.44 
       
0.76 
       
0.44 
       
0.79 
       
0.76 
       
0.55 
       
0.84 
       
0.60 
       
0.36 
       
0.44 
       
0.76 
       
0.23 
 
0.58 
 
11 
       
0.44 
       
0.73 
       
0.20 
       
0.44 
       
0.27 
       
0.27 
       
0.80 
       
0.60 
       
0.36 
      
1.00 
       
0.84 
       
0.44 
 
0.53 
 
12 
       
0.47 
       
0.60 
       
0.47 
       
0.87 
       
0.79 
       
0.23 
       
0.55 
       
0.79 
       
0.15 
       
0.23 
       
0.76 
       
0.04 
 
0.49 
 
13 
       
0.79 
       
0.79 
       
0.79 
       
0.79 
       
0.76 
       
0.68 
       
0.76 
       
0.76 
       
0.47 
       
0.79 
       
0.79 
       
0.68 
 
0.73 
 
14 
       
0.44 
       
0.79 
       
0.36 
       
0.44 
       
0.55 
       
0.47 
       
0.55 
       
0.79 
       
0.36 
       
0.79 
       
0.79 
       
0.15 
 
0.54 
 
15 
       
0.23 
       
0.79 
      
-0.17 
       
0.55 
       
0.47 
       
0.87 
       
0.47 
       
0.79 
       
0.15 
      
-0.09 
       
0.87 
      
-0.52 
 
0.36 
 
16 
       
0.87 
       
0.20 
       
0.47 
       
0.87 
       
0.44 
       
0.84 
       
0.76 
       
0.84 
       
0.47 
       
0.36 
       
0.79 
       
0.47 
 
0.61 
 
17 
       
0.87 
       
0.79 
       
0.79 
       
0.23 
       
0.79 
       
0.55 
       
0.68 
       
0.79 
       
0.12 
       
0.47 
       
0.76 
       
0.12 
 
0.58 
 
18 
       
0.55 
       
0.79 
       
0.44 
       
0.68 
       
0.23 
       
0.47 
       
0.55 
       
0.79 
       
0.47 
       
0.55 
       
0.76 
       
0.23 
 
0.54 
 
19 
       
0.76 
       
0.55 
       
0.68 
       
0.47 
       
0.55 
       
0.79 
       
0.76 
       
0.76 
      
-0.17 
       
0.36 
       
0.44 
       
0.23 
 
0.51 
Mean 
rwg_un 
 
0.52 
 
0.67 
 
0.45 
 
0.48 
 
0.47 
 
0.62 
 
0.65 
 
0.73 
 
0.32 
 
0.41 
 
0.78 
 
0.21 
 
 
Table 27.  Within-Group Interrater Agreement for uniform null distribution   rwg_un 
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Graph 1.  Mean Within-Group Interrater Agreement for Chief Engineers 
 
 
Graph 1 shows the degree of interrater agreement between the assessors for each of the twelve 
Chief Engineers who were assessed during the crisis management scenario. 
 
The standard for interpreting Interrater Agreement index estimates used in this study is that 
proposed by LeBreton and Senter (2007): 
 
 
Level of Interrater Agreement 
 
Substantive Interpretation 
 
0.00 to 0.30 
 
Lack of agreement 
 
0.31 to 0.50 
 
Weak agreement 
 
0.51 to 0.70 
 
Moderate agreement 
 
0.71 to 0.90 
 
Strong agreement 
 
0.91 to 1.00 
 
Very strong agreement 
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For assessor Group 2 the strongest level of within-group interrater agreement was for Chief 
Engineers 11, 8, 2 and 7. There was strong agreement between the assessors in their assessment of 
Chief Engineers 11 and 8. There was moderate agreement between the assessors in their 
assessment of Chief Engineers 1, 2, 6 and 7. There was only weak agreement between the 
assessors in their assessment of Chief Engineers 3, 4, 5, 9 and 10. There was a lack of agreement 
between the assessors in their assessment of Chief Engineer 12. 
 
Williams et al (1997) argue that an acceptable level of interrater agreement when using a 
behavioural marker based assessment system would be between 0.7 to 0.8. However, this level of 
agreement was only expected after extensive rater training that would lead to raters being able to 
calibrate their assessments through comparisons with other assessors. It was one of the objectives 
of the research undertaken for this thesis to discover whether it was possible to develop a 
behavioural marker based assessment framework that could provide an acceptable level of 
interrater agreement without the need for extensive rater training and calibration. The data in 
Table 27 indicates that, at least in part, this objective has been achieved. The strong interrater 
agreement in the assessment of Chief Engineers 11 and 8 shows that for certain candidates the 
experimental assessment framework can achieve an acceptable level of interrater agreement. 
However, there are also other candidates for which the assessment framework delivers only weak 
interrater agreement. In the next section on Rank Order, reasons for these differences in interrater 
agreement will be explained. 
 
These results suggest that this experimental behavioural marker based assessment framework is 
good at discriminating between the competent and the not yet competent crisis managers. 
 
Graph 2 below shows the Within Group Interrater Agreement Index rwg_un for each of the 
behavioural markers used within the assessment framework.  These results show that there was 
moderate to strong within group interrater agreement for 12 out of the 19 behavioural markers 
used within the assessment framework. For those behavioural markers that indicated only weak 
agreement further research would need to be undertaken to determine if the assessment 
framework would be improved by their exclusion, or if some refinement of these behavioural 
markers might be made to improve these levels of interrater agreement. One way of refining these 
behavioural markers would be to debrief the assessors to determine whether changes to the good 
and poor behaviour criteria would have made the markers easier to assess.  
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It should be noted that the interrater agreement results from these experiments have been 
achieved with no rater training or rater calibration, and yet still compare very favourably with 
results from research into the use of other behavioural marker based assessment frameworks, for 
which extensive rater training and calibration was undertaken, such as JAR TEL Consortium, 2001 
and Fletcher et al, 2003. 
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Graph 2.  Mean Within-Group Interrater Agreement for Behavioural Markers 
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7.2 RANK ORDER 
 
Assessor groups 1 and 3 were tasked to produce a rank order from their assessments. The rank 
order for assessor group 2 can be determined by calculating the mean of all of the rating scores 
given by each assessor for each behavioural marker for each Chief Engineer. These mean total 
ratings are shown in Table 28 below.  
 
Chief Engineer Mean Total Rating Rank Order 
1 2.59 7 
2 1.79 12 
3 2.44 8 
4 2.60 6 
5 2.87 3 
6 2.69 4 
7 1.97 11 
8 3.37 2 
9 2.63 5 
10 2.08 10 
11 3.62 1 
12 2.26 9 
 
   Table 28.  Rank Order of Chief Engineers as assessed by Group 2. 
 
 
The mean rank order for assessor groups 1 and 3 can be determined by calculating the mean of 
each of the rank order scores given to each Chief Engineer by each of the assessors in the group. 
These rank orders are shown in Tables 29 and 30 below. 
 
 
Chief Engineer Mean Ranking Rank Order 
1 5.50 4 
2 7.50 8 
3 8.00 9 
4 4.50 3 
5 6.33 6 
6 5.67 5 
7 9.00 10 
8 3.33 2 
9 7.17 7 
10 9.83 12 
11 2.00 1 
12 9.17 11 
 
   Table 29.  Rank Order of Chief Engineers as assessed by Group 1. 
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Chief Engineer Mean Ranking Rank Order 
1 4.86 4 
2 9.14 10 
3 5.43 5 
4 4.57 3 
5 8.71 9 
6 7.86 8 
7 9.71 11 
8 2.86 2 
9 6.86 6 
10 10.00 12 
11 1.14 1 
12 7.71 7 
 
   Table 30.  Rank Order of Chief Engineers as assessed by Group 3. 
 
 
It is now possible to compare the rank order of the Chief Engineers as determined by each of the 
three groups of assessors. The three rank orders are shown in Table 31 below. 
 
Rank Order Group 1 
(Chief Engineer) 
Group 2 
(Chief Engineer) 
Group 3 
(Chief Engineer) 
1 11 11 11 
2 8 8 8 
3 4 5 4 
4 1 6 1 
5 6 9 3 
6 5 4 9 
7 9 1 12 
8 2 3 6 
9 3 12 5 
10 7 10 2 
11 12 7 7 
12 10 2 10 
 
Table 31.  Comparison of the Mean Rank Order of Chief Engineers by each group of assessors. 
 
 
It is possible to use the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient to determine the agreement 
between two rankings. The rank correlation coefficient is within the interval of –1 to 1 where: 
 
 If there is perfect agreement between the two rankings such that the rank orders are the 
same, the coefficient has the value of 1; 
 
 If there is perfect disagreement between the rankings, such that one rank order is the 
exact reverse of the other, the coefficient has a value of –1; 
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 For all other levels of agreement, the closer the coefficient is to 1 the greater the level of 
agreement; 
 
 There is one special case where the value of the coefficient is zero. In this case, the rank 
orders can be said to be completely independent of one another. 
 
Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient is given by the formula: 
 
                                 
 ρ = 1 -  
 
 
 
            where di   = the difference between each rank of corresponding values 
 
                 and n = the number of pair values 
 
 
Taking the mean rank order values for non-domain expert assessor, group 2, and the mean rank 
order value the expert crisis management assessors, group 3, the Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient between these sets of data can be determined.  
 
Chief Engineer Rank Order 
as assessed by 
Group 2 
Rank Order 
As assessed by 
Group 3 
Difference 
in rank order 
between groups 
di 
Difference 
squared 
 
di2 
1 7 4 3 9 
2 12 10 2 4 
3 8 5 3 9 
4 6 3 3 9 
5 3 9 6 36 
6 4 8 4 16 
7 11 11 0 0 
8 2 2 0 0 
9 5 6 1 1 
10 10 12 2 4 
11 1 1 0 0 
12 9 7 2 4 
 
Σ di2 
 
 
92 
 
 
 
         ∴ ρ =  1 -  
 
    
      =  0.6783  
6 Σ di
2 
n(n2-1) 
6 x 92 
12(122 – 1) 
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Null Hypothesis 1: 
There is no relationship between the ranking of the candidates by assessor groups 2 and 3. 
 
   ρ = 0.6783 > critical value 0.503 (α = 0.05, n=12) 
 
So Null Hypothesis 1 is rejected and it is concluded that the relationship between the ranking of 
the candidates by assessor groups 2 and 3 is statistically significant (p ≤ 0.01) 
 
This figure of 0.6783 (p ≤  0.01 ) for the Spearman rank correlation coefficient shows that there is a 
good level of agreement between the mean rank order of the group of expert crisis management 
assessors and the mean rank order of the group of non-domain expert assessors who used the 
experimental assessment framework, and that the level of this agreement was significant  
(p ≤  0.01).  
 
As the Spearman rank correlation coefficient is statistically significant between assessor groups 2 
and 3, this shows that the experimental assessment framework can be used by non-domain 
experts, without the need for specific training in its use, to assess competence in crisis 
management of marine engineering officers in an engine room control room environment. 
 
Now, taking the mean rank order values of the marine engineer officer operations domain 
experts, group 1, and the mean rank order value of the expert crisis management assessors, group 
3, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient between these sets of data can be determined.  
 
Chief Engineer Rank Order 
as assessed by 
Group 1 
Rank Order 
As assessed by 
Group 3 
Difference 
in rank order 
between groups 
di 
Difference 
squared 
 
di2 
1 4 4 0 0 
2 8 10 2 4 
3 9 5 4 16 
4 3 3 0 0 
5 6 9 3 9 
6 5 8 3 9 
7 10 11 1 1 
8 2 2 0 0 
9 7 6 1 1 
10 12 12 0 0 
11 1 1 0 0 
12 11 7 4 16 
 
Σ di2 
 
 
56 
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         ∴ ρ =  1 -  
 
    
      =  0.8042 
 
  
Null Hypothesis 2: 
There is no relationship between the ranking of the candidates by assessor groups 1 and 3. 
 
   ρ = 0.8042 > critical value 0.503 (α = 0.05, n=12) 
 
So Null Hypothesis 2 is rejected and it is concluded that the relationship between the ranking of 
the candidates by assessor groups 1 and 3 is statistically significant (p < 0.005) 
 
This figure of 0.8042 for the Spearman rank correlation coefficient shows that there is a very good 
level of agreement between the mean rank order of the group of expert crisis management 
assessors and the mean rank order of the group of marine engineer officer operations domain 
experts, and that the level of this agreement was significant (p < 0.005).  
 
As the Spearman rank correlation coefficient is statistically significant between assessor groups 1 
and 3, this validates the use of the expert crisis management assessors as a means of providing a 
benchmark for the level of competence in crisis management for each of the Chief Engineers 
assessed. 
 
From the comparison of the mean rank order of Chief Engineers by each group of assessors (Table 
31), it can be seen that all three groups of assessors agree that the Chief Engineers with the highest 
level of competence in crisis management were Chief Engineers 11 and 8. It can also be noted that 
the highest indices for the mean within-group interrater agreement amongst the assessors of 
assessor Group 2 were also for Chief Engineers 11 and 8, being 0.78 and 0.73 respectively.  
 
There were also high indices for the mean within-group interrater agreement amongst the 
assessors of assessor Group 2 for Chief Engineers 2 and 7, being 0.67 and 0.65 respectively. There 
is also close rank order agreement between the expert crisis management assessor Group 1 and 
the non-domain expert assessor Group 2 for Chief Engineers 2 and 7.  
 
6 x 56 
12(122 – 1) 
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For those Chief Engineers for whom the non-domain expert assessors recorded lower levels of 
mean within-group interrater agreement there was also some slight discrepancy in the rank 
ordering of these Chief Engineers between the Group 1 and Group 2 assessors. It is reasonable to 
suggest that these middle rank order Chief Engineers were neither fully competent crisis 
managers, nor totally incompetent crisis managers. For this reason, different elements of their 
performance as crisis managers were assessed slightly differently by the different assessors.  
 
However, these results do clearly show that by using the experimental behavioural marker based 
assessment framework, even without specific training in its use, or specific calibration of their 
assessments, the non-domain expert assessors were able to determine, with a good level of 
agreement, the most competent crisis managers and the least competent crisis managers. 
 
 
7.3 OBSERVABILITY 
 
The rating scale used by the Group 2 assessors included an option to record that any particular 
behavioural marker had not been observed during the experiment scenario. It was therefore 
possible to calculate the percentage of observed responses for each behavioural marker in each of 
the twelve experiment scenarios. The mean percentage of the total observed responses for each 
scenario was calculated, as was the mean percentage of total observed responses for each 
behavioural marker. The results are shown in Table 32 below. 
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BM 
Percentage of Observed Responses for each Scenario (Sc) 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
Sc 
1 
Sc 
2 
Sc 
3 
Sc 
4 
Sc 
5 
Sc 
6 
Sc 
7 
Sc 
8 
Sc 
9 
Sc 
10 
Sc 
11 
Sc 
12 
 
1 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
2 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
3 
 
100% 
 
100% 
       
83% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
       
83% 
       
83% 
 
100% 
       
83% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
   
83% 
 
93% 
 
4 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
5 
       
83% 
 
100% 
       
83% 
 
100% 
       
83% 
       
83% 
       
67% 
       
83% 
 
100% 
       
83% 
 
100% 
       
83% 
 
87% 
 
6 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
7 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
8 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
83% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
83% 
 
83% 
 
83% 
 
83% 
 
83% 
 
83% 
 
90% 
 
9 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
       
67% 
 
100% 
 
83% 
 
83% 
 
100% 
 
83% 
 
93% 
 
10 
 
83% 
 
83% 
 
83% 
 
100% 
 
83% 
 
100% 
 
83% 
 
83% 
 
83% 
 
83% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
89% 
 
11 
 
83% 
       
67% 
 
83% 
 
83% 
       
67% 
       
67% 
       
67% 
 
83% 
 
83% 
 
83% 
 
83% 
 
83% 
 
77% 
 
12 
 
100% 
 
83% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
98% 
 
13 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
14 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
15 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
16 
 
100% 
 
83% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
83% 
 
83% 
 
83% 
 
83% 
 
100% 
 
83% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
91% 
 
17 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
18 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
19 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
Mean 
 
97% 
 
96% 
 
96% 
 
98% 
 
96% 
 
96% 
 
91% 
 
96% 
 
96% 
 
95% 
 
98% 
 
96% 
 
96% 
 
Table 32.  Percentages of Behavioural Markers being Observed. 
 
 
The overall mean for the percentage of the total observed responses for the 12 scenarios run was 
95.92% with a standard deviation of only 1.78. This shows that there was a very high degree of 
observability of the behavioural markers used in the assessment framework, across all scenarios. It 
also shows that the design of the experimental scenario was very good at eliciting the behavioural 
markers used in the assessment framework, from each candidate being assessed, in a way that 
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was easily observable by the assessors. These results therefore validate the crisis management 
scenario design in terms of the scenario’s ability to elicit the behavioural markers being assessed. 
 
Of the individual behavioural markers being assessed, only three, behavioural marker numbers   
5, 10 and 11, were observed in less than 90% of assessments. Of these three behavioural markers, 
only number 11 was observed in less than 87% of assessments. The overall mean percentage of 
total observed responses for all 19 behavioural markers was 95.68% with a standard deviation of 
6.45. 
 
Eleven out of the nineteen behavioural markers were observed during every one of the 72 
assessments undertaken. 
 
These data indicate that there was a very high level of observability of the behavioural markers 
used within the crisis management assessment framework. These results therefore validate the 
behavioural markers used within the crisis management assessment framework in terms of the 
exhibition of these behaviours during the management of crises.  
 
 
7.4 SUMMARY 
 
It is recognised that there is a problem that is common to all behavioural marker based 
assessments of competence and that is the problem of aggregation over time. Gaba et al (1998) 
discuss this at length, pointing out that even over short periods of time, levels of performance may 
fluctuate between good and poor, and that these fluctuations can occur quite rapidly. Where a 
group of raters are going to award aggregate scores on a rating scale for a particular behavioural 
marker that relates to the observed overt behaviour exhibited during a period of performance, 
there is always the possibility that each rater may aggregate differently because they have each 
focused on different moments of performance. Gaba et al (1998) suggest strategies for addressing 
the problem of aggregation over time, such as “developing specific conventions for aggregating scores 
over time”. One problem with such strategies is that they require the assessors to receive specific 
training in order for them to be effective. It was one of the objectives of this research to determine 
if a behavioural marker based assessment framework could be developed with behavioural 
markers that were so objective and simple to observe, that specific assessor training would not be 
required. The results on observability discussed in this chapter would tend to suggest that this 
objective has been achieved. 
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The objective of this experimental behavioural marker based assessment framework was to 
determine competence in crisis management. It is clear from the results that there is good 
discrimination between those candidates who were competent, the top two, 11 and 8, and those 
who were not yet competent, the bottom three, 10, 7 and 2. Therefore it can be said that the 
sensitivity of the measurement system is high for these candidates. If the experimental framework 
were to be used to assess competence in crisis management, a mean rating value could be set as 
the cut off point between competent and not yet competent.  From the data collected in these 
experiments a mean total rating cut off point could be set at 3.2, measured against the four point 
rating scale of the experimental assessment framework, with those scoring above this being 
deemed to be competent in crisis management. 
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Chapter 8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
It was the intention of phase one of this research to prove or disprove the hypothesis that simple 
overt behavioural markers could be used to objectively assess competence in crisis management 
within the context of a simulated merchant vessel engine room control room. In order to do this, 
an experiment was designed, using a high fidelity engine control room simulator, which recreated 
the conditions of a crisis situation at sea, during which the performance of a team of marine 
engineering officers could be observed.  
 
During the literature review, evidence of the use of behavioural markers for the assessment of 
competence in managing crises within various safety critical organisations was recorded. 
Empirical evidence for the relevance, or irrelevance, of these markers to the commercial shipping 
domain was determined by experimentation. The crisis scenario experiments were designed to 
allow this empirical evidence to be collected, and to provide evidence of any other overt 
behavioural markers that were relevant to the assessment of competence in crisis management.  
 
From the empirical evidence collected, a sub-set of simple overt behavioural markers was 
determined to form an experimental assessment framework. Each of the behavioural markers 
within this experimental assessment framework were shown, through the analysis of twelve crisis 
scenarios, to have the best balance of the characteristics for ease of observation and evaluation, 
frequency of occurrence, and relevance to the assessment of competence in crisis management, of 
all of the behavioural markers evaluated. Of the nineteen behavioural markers that made up the 
experimental assessment framework, seven were original markers, solely determined during the 
ethnographic analysis of the crisis scenario experiment video recordings undertaken within this 
research. The remainder of the markers were determined from the literature review, and then 
evaluated for their effectiveness in assessing competence in crisis management through the 
ethnographic analysis.  
 
The analysis of the results of this research, detailed in Chapter 5, have shown that it is possible to 
use simple overt behavioural markers to objectively assess competence in crisis management 
within the context of a simulated merchant vessel engine room control room. By showing, 
through experimentation, a close agreement between the evaluation of the behavioural markers 
within the experimental assessment framework given by the researcher, and the evaluation given 
by the expert crisis management assessors, phase one of this research showed that these 
behavioural markers were likely to be effective assessment criteria for assessing competence in 
crisis management.  
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Although this close agreement between researcher and expert evaluators showed that these 
behavioural markers were possibly reliable assessment criteria, it did not prove their validity in 
assessing competence in crisis management. In addition, because the expert assessors’ evaluation 
was only compared to the researcher’s evaluation, the interrater agreement of these behavioural 
markers was not proven. It was in phase two of this research that the experimental assessment 
framework was tested for validity and interrater agreement. 
 
During a research project into the use of simulators to train and assess merchant navy officers in 
the handling of escalating emergencies (Habberley et al, 2001), the statement was made that:  
 
“Crisis management standards of competence are ill defined and consequently so are their 
‘behavioural markers’ by which the standard may be assessed”  
 
This research has addressed this gap in our knowledge by proposing, testing and validating a set 
of behavioural markers that can be used to assess competence in crisis management of merchant 
navy engineer officers.  
 
A crisis situation is a highly demanding decision-making environment. It is therefore important, 
within any safety critical organisation, to be able to assess the competence of those tasked with 
managing a crisis should it arise. This research has demonstrated that, in the domain of merchant 
navy engineer officers, this type of assessment is possible using a simulated working environment 
and a behavioural marker based assessment framework. 
 
The original element of this research is that it has shown that it is possible to develop and validate 
a behavioural marker based assessment framework, for use in assessing competence in crisis 
management of merchant navy engineer officers, which uses simple, objective behavioural 
markers. It has also shown that this type of assessment framework can be used successfully by 
non-domain expert assessors without the need for specific assessor training and calibration. 
 
Other behavioural marker based assessment frameworks reviewed within this thesis, such as 
those from the military and civil aviation domains, have been shown to use assessment criteria 
that can be viewed as overly complex and therefore subjective in nature. These assessment 
frameworks were shown to require the training and calibration of assessors in order for them to 
achieve valid assessments. Even after this assessor training and calibration, although providing 
valid assessments when assessing non crisis scenarios, some of these assessment frameworks were 
found to give ambiguous assessments when used to assess competence in managing crisis 
scenarios.   
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This research has provided an understanding of how behavioural markers can be used to 
objectively assess competence in crisis management of merchant navy engineer officers. The 
research has also provided an understanding of the methods by which these behavioural markers 
can be elicited and assessed. The research has shown that through the use of a realistic crisis 
scenario within a high fidelity simulated ship’s engine control room environment it was possible 
to elicit the objective behavioural markers of a crisis management assessment framework. The 
observability results show that the crisis scenario was designed to ensure that there were 
opportunities for all of the behaviours within the assessment framework to be exhibited. This 
research has defined a set of behavioural markers that constitute a standard of performance for 
use in the assessment of competence in crisis management. 
 
Within the research it was argued that a competence can only be validly assessed within the 
context in which it is practiced or used. This argument led to the development of a simulated 
crisis scenario with a high level of contextual fidelity in which the behavioural markers of the 
standard performance could be elicited. 
 
The construct validity of the crisis management assessment framework was proven by showing a 
correlation in the assessment of competence undertaken by the group of non-domain expert 
assessors and that undertaken by the group of expert crisis management assessors. 
 
The most difficult aspect of developing the assessment framework was determining the 
behavioural markers to use. These markers not only had to be highly relevant to the competence 
of managing crises, but also had to very clearly define the enactment of an overt behaviour that 
could be easily observed. The causal relationship and validity of each behavioural marker with 
respect to the performance outcome of the crisis manager was determined by the use of the 
literature review and the validation experiments undertaken during phase one of the research. A 
number of the markers were synthesised from elements of previous research into the management 
of crises. Both these synthesised markers, and the remaining markers that were determined 
through the ethnographic analysis of the video data, were validated by experiment through their 
evaluation by expert crisis management assessors. 
 
Through the review of the literature it was shown that verbal protocols and cognitive analysis are 
difficult techniques to use directly in the assessment of competence in crisis management. In fact it 
was shown that these techniques could, if used in a too holistic or reductionist manner, adversely 
affect the outcome of an assessment. However, some overt behaviours related to these techniques, 
such as proposing alternative hypotheses and actions, and communicating in a way that reveals 
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ones mental model of a situation, were shown to be useful metrics for the assessment of 
competence in crisis management. The review of the literature also showed that the interactions 
between the crisis manager and the crisis management team play an important part in the 
management of a crisis. 
 
The differences between ‘high level’ behavioural markers, consisting of  a complex set of 
behaviours, and ‘low level’ behavioural markers, consisting of very basic simple behaviours, were 
discussed. This research provides evidence that the use of ‘high level’ behavioural markers, as 
assessment criteria for assessing competence in crisis management, can lead to poor interrater 
agreement, and therefore inaccurate assessments. Conversely, the research has shown that by 
using ‘low level’ behavioural markers for the same purpose, interrater agreement of an acceptable 
level can be achieved, and therefore accurate assessments. 
 
This research has shown that in order to be able to assess competence in crisis management, an 
assessment environment needs to be provided that can ensure the presence of those domain 
specific cues the crisis manager requires to make good decisions. If the assessment environment 
lacks realism, it can affect the way the candidate conceptualises information from the 
environment, leading to a change in their level of situational awareness, thereby affecting their 
ability to manage the crisis. It can be concluded from this that the integrity of the realism in any 
simulation used to assess competence in crisis management is of the greatest importance. 
 
This research has shown support for the argument that because there need not be consistent 
relationships between processes and outcomes, and because some process violations are 
beneficial, the use as assessment criteria comprised of complete models of expert behaviour 
exhibited when undertaking a process would not seem to be justified. Instead, the behavioural 
markers that support and facilitate successful processes, beneficial process violations and 
successful outcomes would seem to be the most relevant assessment criteria. 
 
The evaluation of the assessment frameworks currently in use by a range of safety critical 
industries and organisations showed that they include a high proportion of behavioural markers 
that consist of complex sets of behaviours. The evaluation showed that this type of behavioural 
marker was difficult to assess objectively, especially in real time during a crisis scenario, when 
there are a great many coincidental behaviours occurring in a short space of time. This evidence 
therefore suggests that, in order to be effective, any assessment framework developed to assess 
competence in crisis management should use assessment criteria that consist of simple, 
uncomplicated, behavioural markers that are overt and easily observable. 
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In relation to the hypotheses proposed throughout this research, the following can now be 
concluded: 
 
Hypothesis 1 
 
It is possible to use simple overt behavioural markers to objectively assess competence in crisis 
management within the context of a simulated merchant vessel engine control room. 
 
and 
 
Hypothesis 2 
 
That the sub-set of behavioural markers that formed the experimental assessment framework 
determined in phase one of the research can be used as valid markers for the objective assessment of 
competence in crisis management within the context of a ships engine room control room. 
 
This research showed that there was a high level of non domain expert assessor within group 
interrater agreement when assessing the Chief Engineers who are most competent in crisis 
management. This level of competence in crisis management was validated by both domain 
expert and expert crisis management assessor groups. It can therefore be concluded from these 
results that the simple overt behavioural markers that formed the experimental assessment 
framework can be used as valid markers for the objective assessment of competence in crisis 
management within the context of a ships engine room control room. 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 
 
That the experimental assessment framework that has been developed can be used with a high 
degree of interrater agreement. 
 
The results of this research show that, when using the experimental assessment framework, the 
two Chief Engineers for whom the non-domain expert assessors had strong within group 
interrater agreement were the two who were the most competent at crisis management. Both the 
expert crisis management assessors and the domain expert assessors agreed with this assessment. 
It can therefore be concluded that for those Chief Engineers who are competent in crisis 
management the experimental assessment framework can be used with a high degree of interrater 
agreement.  
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Hypothesis 4 
 
That if a behavioural marker based assessment framework has sufficiently simple and objective 
assessment criteria, it can be used by non-domain experts to assess competence in crisis 
management. 
 
The within-group interrater agreement for the non-domain expert assessors was strongest for the 
most competent Chief Engineers. This result shows that the simple and objective behavioural 
markers used within the experimental assessment framework have allowed the assessors to 
clearly discriminate between those Chief Engineers who are competent in crisis management and 
those Chief Engineers who are not yet competent in crisis management. 
 
 
Hypothesis 5 
 
That if a behavioural marker based assessment framework has sufficiently simple and objective 
assessment criteria, it can be used successfully, without the need to give specific training to 
assessors in its use. 
 
This research has shown that there is a statistically significant Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient of 0.6783 (p ≤ 0.01) for the level of agreement between the mean rank order of 
competence in crisis management as assessed by the group of expert crisis management assessors, 
and the mean rank order of the group of non-domain expert assessors who used the experimental 
assessment framework. This correlation shows that the experimental assessment framework can 
be used by non-domain experts, without the need for specific training in its use, to assess 
competence in crisis management of marine engineering officers in an engine room control room 
environment. 
 
This research has also shown that although the non-domain expert assessors received no rater 
training or rater calibration in the use of the experimental assessment framework, their interrater 
agreement results compare very favourably with results from research into the use of other 
behavioural marker based assessment frameworks, for which extensive rater training and 
calibration was undertaken. 
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This research was undertaken in order to provide the international maritime community with an 
understanding of how a behavioural marker system could be applied for the assessment of 
competence in crisis management of merchant marine engineer officers. 
 
The aims of this research were: 
 
 to understand how behavioural markers can be used to objectively assess competence in 
crisis management of merchant navy engineer officers. 
 
 to understand the methods by which these behavioural markers can be elicited and 
assessed. 
 
The results of this research have shown that by using uncomplicated, simple, overt behavioural 
markers as assessment criteria it is possible to objectively assess competence in crisis management 
of merchant marine engineer officers.  
 
There was a very high degree of observability of the behavioural markers used within the 
experimental assessment framework when the assessors observed the candidates’ performance 
within the simulated crisis scenario. This high degree of observability has shown that the use of a 
crisis scenario enacted within a full mission engine room simulator is a valid method for eliciting 
these behavioural markers. 
 
It was noted in the introduction to this research that, because of the very competitive commercial 
environment in which the merchant navy operates, any framework for the assessment of 
competence in crisis management of merchant navy engineer officers would have limited 
resources available for its implementation. This research has shown that it is possible to have a 
crisis management competence assessment framework that can be used by a single non domain 
expert assessor, without any specific rater training or calibration, to produce a valid assessment of 
a candidate’s competence in crisis management.  
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In the domain of the merchant navy this research has a number of original aspects: 
 
1.    The determination of uncomplicated, simple, overt behavioural markers for an 
experimental crisis management assessment framework, through an ethnographic 
analysis of crisis manager performance within a crisis scenario enacted within a full 
mission merchant vessel engine room simulator. 
 
 
2.   The validation of a crisis management assessment framework that can be used by non 
domain expert assessors, without any prior training or calibration, to make valid 
assessments of competence in crisis management of merchant navy engineer officers.  
 
 
3. The development of an assessment tool that can be used within the international maritime 
industry for the assessment of competence in crisis management of marine engineer 
officers. 
 
 
4. This research has moved forward the knowledge of the use of behavioural markers for the 
 assessment of competence. 
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Chapter 9. REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
There are elements of this research that could be expanded in order to try to further improve and 
develop the crisis management competence assessment framework. The phase 2 experiments 
could be performed again with a new set of assessors for Group 2. These assessors would still be 
non-domain expert assessors, the same as those originally used in assessor Group 2. The 
assessment framework for this new set of experiments should only use those behavioural markers 
that had an original within group interrater agreement index of 0.5 or greater. These new 
experiments could be used to show if this sub-set of behavioural markers returned a higher within 
group interrater agreement for Chief Engineer assessments, but also retained a high Rank 
Spearman Correlation Coefficient between the new assessor Group 2 rank order and the original 
expert crisis management assessor Group 3 rank order. If this were the case, it would show that 
this sub-set of thirteen behavioural markers was able to produce a valid assessment of competence 
in crisis management with a higher overall level of interrater agreement, but with an assessment 
framework that was easier to use, by having six less behavioural markers to assess. 
 
It might also be of interest to undertake further experiments to determine the minimum number 
of behavioural markers that could be used within the assessment framework that would still give 
a valid assessment of competence in crisis management. 
 
The phase 2 experiments could also be performed again, but instead of using the four point rating 
scale, a two point rating scale of ‘competent’ and ‘not yet competent’, could be used instead. If by 
using a two point rating scale the within group interrater agreement and the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient could be improved, this would further validate the experimental 
assessment framework. 
 
In this research only one crisis scenario was used. It is possible that some candidates responded 
well, or poorly, to this particular scenario because of their prior experiences. In order to further 
validate the experimental assessment framework it would be beneficial to assess candidates 
performance in a number of different crisis scenarios, so as to remove the possibility that a level of 
prior experience of a particular crisis scenario did not unduly influence the assessment results.  
 
The use of video recordings of candidates’ performance, rather than real time live assessment, 
allowed the assessors time to observe and assess the behavioural markers, even during complex 
situations, when many behaviours were being exhibited in quick succession. 
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In order to improve confidence in the validity of the behavioural marker based experimental 
assessment framework, the crisis scenario experiments could be run again to increase the sample 
size of Chief Engineers being assessed. The results of the research have shown that the research 
methodology is robust, but a larger sample size would help to improve confidence in the validity 
of the experimental assessment framework.  
 
There is always the question of whether an assessment of a candidate’s performance carried out 
within a full mission engine room simulator will truly reflect that candidate’s performance 
onboard a real vessel at sea. Many safety critical industries and organisations, such as civil 
aviation, medicine, offshore and the fire brigade, use high fidelity full mission simulators to assess 
the competence of their personnel. It is generally accepted within these industries and 
organisations that a high fidelity full mission simulator can provide all of the cues from the 
environment that are necessary for candidates to exhibit behaviours in the same way as they 
would in their real working environment. It would therefore be expected that a high fidelity full 
mission merchant vessel engine room simulator could also provide the cues necessary for 
candidates to perform in a way that reflected their normal performance onboard a real vessel at 
sea. Anecdotal evidence received by the researcher from hundreds of seafarers who have used the 
full mission engine room simulator supports this expectation. 
 
This research showed how in many other safety critical industries and organisations training and 
assessment is undertaken to try to ensure that those personnel who may be called upon to manage 
crisis situations are competent to do so. It is hoped that this research will be used by others to try 
to ensure that the international maritime industry also has personnel in place who, if the need 
arises, are competent to manage crises. In order to try to achieve this aim it is intended that the 
International Maritime Organization be advised of this research. 
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WARSASH MARITIME ACADEMY, SOUTHAMPTON SOLENT UNIVERSITY 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
TITLE OF STUDY: Behavioural Markers for the Assessment of Competence in Crisis Management 
 
RESEARCHER:  D.I.Gatfield  Tel: 01489 556282  Email: david.gatfield@solent.ac.uk 
 
 
PURPOSE 
 
You are being asked to participate in a research study.  The purpose of this study is to determine 
how behavioural markers can be used to objectively assess competence in crisis management. 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
You are being asked to participate because you are an experienced merchant navy engineering 
officer who could be called upon to manage a crisis onboard a vessel. 
PROCEDURES 
 
If you choose to participate, you will undertake two exercises within the Engine Room Simulator 
here at Warsash Maritime Academy. Each exercise will last approximately one hour. The first 
exercise will be used to familiarise you with the simulated engine room environment. During the 
second exercise, you will be placed in a simulated crisis situation. A video recording will be made 
of this exercise. 
RISKS 
 
There are no known risks associated with the participation in this research study. 
BENEFITS 
 
The benefit to you from participating in this study is that you will be able to test your ability to 
manage a crisis situation onboard a vessel. The benefits to the wider maritime community will be 
an understanding of how a behavioural marker system can be applied for the assessment of 
competence in crisis management. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
You will not be personally identified in any reports or publications that may result from this 
study. Use of the video recordings taken during this study will be strictly limited to the 
investigator named above. 
COSTS/COMPENSATION 
There will be no cost to you, nor will you be compensated for participating in this study.  
 
 
Participant’s Initials________              Page 1 of 2
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RIGHT TO REFUSE OR WITHDRAW 
 
You may refuse to participate or withdraw from the study at anytime.  
 
QUESTIONS 
 
If you have any questions, please ask.  If you have additional questions later, contact: 
David Gatfield at Warsash Maritime Academy Tel: 01489 556282   
Email: david.gatfield@solent.ac.uk  
 
You may report (anonymously, if you so choose) any complaints or comments regarding the 
manner in which this study is being conducted to: The Quality Manager, Warsash Maritime 
Academy, Southampton Solent University, Newtown Road, Warsash, Southampton, SO31 9ZL. 
 
CLOSING STATEMENT 
 
MY SIGNATURE BELOW INDICATES THAT I HAVE DECIDED TO VOLUNTEER AS A 
RESEARCH PARTICIPANT AND THAT I HAVE READ, I UNDERSTAND, AND I HAVE 
RECEIVED A COPY OF THIS CONSENT FORM. 
 
 
 
 
SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT DATE 
 
 
 
 
SIGNATURE OF RESEARCHER DATE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             Page 2 of 2 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 Final Assessment Framework used by Group 2 Assessors 
                                                                                                                                                         Appendices 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Behavioural Markers for the Assessment of Competence in Crisis Management                               207 
Examples of Good and Poor Behaviours related to Competence in Crisis 
Management within a Merchant Navy Vessel Engine Room Control Room 
Environment. 
 
 
 Ref: Overt 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Good Behaviours Poor Behaviours 
 
 
 
1. High degree of 
crewmember 
integration 
within the team 
 
Involves other crewmembers in 
planning, diagnostic and decision 
making processes. 
 
Accepts feedback and advice from 
crewmembers. 
Isolates a crewmember or 
crewmembers.  
 
Only utilises crewmember or 
crewmembers by giving them a 
command order. 
 
Ignores feedback or advice from 
crewmembers. 
 
Specific case may be cultural 
isolation. 
 
2. Regular soliciting 
of information 
between 
crewmembers 
 
Regularly asks other crewmembers 
for information. 
Does not ask other crewmembers 
for information. 
3. Demonstrates 
awareness of ‘big 
picture’ context 
 
Verbalises task priorities in 
anticipation of future events. 
 
i.e. “We need to do xxxxx now or 
in yy minutes zzzzz will happen.” 
 
No anticipation of future events 
evident. 
 
Acts surprised as events happen. 
4. Sharing of 
workload  
 
 
Delegates individual tasks in order 
to maintain situation overview. 
Gets too involved in individual 
tasks to the extent that situation 
overview is lost. 
5. The number of 
alternative 
hypotheses and 
actions 
communicated to 
team members 
 
Proposes alternative hypotheses 
and actions to team members. 
Does not propose any alternative 
hypotheses or actions to team 
members. 
6. Uses complete 
and coherent 
sentences 
 
Communicates to team with 
complete and coherent sentences. 
Uses unfinished sentences in 
communications with team. 
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Ref: Overt 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Good Behaviours Poor Behaviours 
 
 
 
7. Uses measured 
patterns of 
movement 
 
Uses measured movements within 
a defined area where team leader 
is able to maintain overview of 
situation. 
 
Uses very fast movements. 
 
No defined area of movement, so 
overview of instrumentation is not 
possible. 
 
Focuses too much on one item of 
instrumentation. 
 
Leaves control room for extended 
periods. 
 
8. Crisis Manager 
asking their team 
questions in 
order to elicit 
information so 
that they can 
improve their 
situational 
awareness 
 
Asks team members questions 
about the situation in order to 
improve situational awareness. 
Does not ask team members 
questions about the situation. 
9. Providing big 
picture updates 
 
Provides team members with 
updates on the overview of the 
situation. 
 
Does not provide team members 
with any updates on the overview 
of the situation. 
10. Stating clear team 
and individual 
priorities 
 
States clear team and individual 
team member task priorities. 
Does not state team or individual 
team member task priorities. 
11. Utilises team 
briefings for 
specific threats 
 
Briefs team about specific threats. Does not brief team about specific 
threats. 
12. Keeps 
crewmembers 
focused on the 
accomplishment 
of the task 
 
Provides encouragement and 
motivates team to keep them 
focussed on the accomplishment of 
the task. 
 
Tasks completed in good time. 
 
Fails to monitor task progression. 
 
Team does not complete tasks in 
good time. 
13. Ensuring 
communications 
are audible and 
not garbled 
 
Communications clear and easy to 
understand. 
Communications inaudible and 
garbled. 
 
Communications not understood 
by team members. 
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Ref: Overt 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Good Behaviours Poor Behaviours 
 
 
 
14. Focuses on the 
dynamics of the 
complete system 
 
Maintains overview of all systems, 
thereby maintaining awareness of 
system interactions. 
Focuses on one system to the 
exclusion of all others. 
 
Is surprised by system 
interactions. 
15. Communicating 
in a way that 
reveals ones 
mental models 
 
Communicates thoughts on the 
situation and how it is developing 
to team members. 
Does not communicate thoughts to 
team members. 
16. Team leader 
reflects on the 
suggestions 
made by other 
team members 
 
Reflects on suggestions from team 
members before accepting or 
rejecting them. 
Acts immediately on suggestions 
from team members without any 
prior reflection.  
 
‘Grasps’ at suggestions of others. 
17. Measured 
movements in 
response to 
stimuli 
 
Makes measured and controlled 
movements in response to stimuli. 
Makes rapid and uncontrolled 
movements in response to stimuli. 
18. Moves smoothly 
and without 
hesitation 
 
Moves without hesitation. 
 
Moves smoothly between tasks. 
 
Movement truncated. 
 
Movements hesitant. 
 
Moves between two task locations 
without, in the short term, 
reaching either. 
 
Presents an on the spot rocking 
motion. 
 
19. Team leader 
focuses on teams’ 
tasks rather than 
on own 
individual tasks 
 
Maintains focus on overall team 
task objective. 
Focuses too much on own 
individual tasks that are not 
directly related to the overall team 
task objective. 
 
i.e. team leader spends a lot of 
time trying to put another 
alternator onto the main 
switchboard. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
 Phase 2 Assessment Data 
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BEHAVIOURAL MARKERS FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF COMPETENCE IN CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT OF MERCHANT NAVY ENGINEERING OFFICERS. 
 
Group 1 – Assessor Data 
 
  
Rank Order of 
Competence in 
Crisis Management 
  
 
Chief Engineer in Video Scenario Number 
  
Assessor 
1 
Assessor 
2 
Assessor 
3 
Assessor 
4 
Assessor 
5 
Assessor 
6 
 
BEST        1 
 
 
11 
 
11 
 
8 
 
11 
 
11 
 
8 
 
2 
 
8 
 
4 
 
11 
 
1 
 
8 
 
2 
 
3 
 
9 
 
8 
 
6 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
4 
 
1 
 
5 
 
7 
 
6 
 
1 
 
5 
 
1 
 
5 
 
10 
 
5 
 
3 
 
6 
 
6 
 
5 
 
9 
 
12 
 
2 
 
7 
 
11 
 
7 
 
6 
 
6 
 
2 
 
3 
 
9 
 
12 
 
 
 
8 
 
3 
 
3 
 
1 
 
6 
 
5 
 
9 
 
9 
 
2 
 
10 
 
9 
 
12 
 
2 
 
3 
 
10 
 
10 
 
12 
 
7 
 
9 
 
1 
 
5 
 
11 
 
12 
 
7 
 
3 
 
8 
 
10 
 
7 
 
WORST  12 
 
7 
 
2 
 
4 
 
10 
 
12 
 
10 
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BEHAVIOURAL MARKERS FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF COMPETENCE IN CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT OF MERCHANT NAVY ENGINEERING OFFICERS. 
 
Assessment Scores from Group 2 Assessors for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.1 
 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Reference 
Behavioural Tendency Score for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.1 
 
Assessor 
1 
Assessor 
2 
Assessor 
3 
Assessor 
4 
Assessor 
5 
Assessor 
6 
1 4 
 
2 
 
1 3 2 3 
2 3 
 
2 
 
2 4 3 3 
3 3 
 
2 
 
1 3 1 3 
4 2 
 
3 
 
1 3 2 1 
5 2 
 
0 
 
2 3 2 2 
6 4 
 
3 
 
3 4 3 3 
7 2 
 
3 
 
3 4 2 2 
8 3 
 
1 
 
3 4 2 2 
9 3 
 
1 
 
1 2 1 2 
10 3 
 
1 
 
2 3 0 2 
11 2 
 
1 
 
1 3 0 2 
12 3 
 
3 
 
1 3 3 3 
13 4 
 
4 
 
3 4 3 4 
14 2 
 
2 
 
3 4 2 2 
15 4 
 
2 
 
3 4 2 2 
16 3 
 
3 
 
2 3 3 3 
17 3 
 
3 
 
3 3 2 3 
18 4 
 
3 
 
3 4 2 3 
19 3 
 
2 
 
2 3 3 2 
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BEHAVIOURAL MARKERS FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF COMPETENCE IN CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT OF MERCHANT NAVY ENGINEERING OFFICERS. 
 
Assessment Scores from Group 2 Assessors for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.2 
 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Reference 
Behavioural Tendency Score for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.2 
 
Assessor 
1 
Assessor 
2 
Assessor 
3 
Assessor 
4 
Assessor 
5 
Assessor 
6 
1 1 
 
1 1 2 3 2 
2 2 
 
2 1 1 3 1 
3 1 
 
2 1 1 1 1 
4 2 
 
3 1 1 2 1 
5 1 
 
1 1 1 2 1 
6 3 
 
1 3 2 3 2 
7 2 
 
3 2 1 1 1 
8 2 
 
1 2 1 2 2 
9 1 
 
1 1 1 1 1 
10 1 
 
1 2 2 0 2 
11 1 
 
0 1 2 0 2 
12 2 
 
3 2 1 0 2 
13 3 
 
2 2 3 3 3 
14 2 
 
2 1 2 1 2 
15 1 
 
2 2 2 2 1 
16 2 
 
1 1 3 0 3 
17 2 
 
3 2 3 2 2 
18 3 
 
3 2 3 2 3 
19 1 
 
2 1 2 3 2 
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BEHAVIOURAL MARKERS FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF COMPETENCE IN CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT OF MERCHANT NAVY ENGINEERING OFFICERS. 
 
Assessment Scores from Group 2 Assessors for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.3 
 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Reference 
Behavioural Tendency Score for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.3 
 
Assessor 
1 
Assessor 
2 
Assessor 
3 
Assessor 
4 
Assessor 
5 
Assessor 
6 
1 2 
 
3 3 4 3 3 
2 2 
 
3 3 4 3 3 
3 1 
 
2 1 3 0 2 
4 1 
 
3 2 4 3 2 
5 1 
 
3 1 3 0 3 
6 3 
 
3 3 4 3 3 
7 2 
 
2 3 4 3 2 
8 2 
 
2 2 3 1 3 
9 1 
 
3 1 3 1 2 
10 1 
 
2 1 3 0 2 
11 2 
 
1 1 3 0 3 
12 1 
 
3 2 3 2 3 
13 3 
 
3 3 4 3 4 
14 2 
 
2 1 3 1 3 
15 1 
 
3 2 4 1 3 
16 2 
 
3 2 4 2 3 
17 2 
 
2 3 3 3 3 
18 2 
 
2 3 4 2 2 
19 1 
 
2 2 3 2 2 
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BEHAVIOURAL MARKERS FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF COMPETENCE IN CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT OF MERCHANT NAVY ENGINEERING OFFICERS. 
 
Assessment Scores from Group 2 Assessors for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.4 
 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Reference 
Behavioural Tendency Score for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.4 
 
Assessor 
1 
Assessor 
2 
Assessor 
3 
Assessor 
4 
Assessor 
5 
Assessor 
6 
1 4 
 
3 3 3 3 1 
2 4 
 
3 3 3 4 2 
3 4 
 
3 2 1 3 2 
4 3 
 
3 3 2 3 1 
5 3 
 
3 1 1 3 2 
6 4 
 
3 3 3 3 3 
7 4 
 
2 3 1 2 2 
8 3 
 
4 2 3 0 3 
9 4 
 
3 1 2 1 1 
10 3 
 
3 2 2 2 2 
11 3 
 
2 3 2 0 1 
12 3 
 
3 3 3 3 2 
13 4 
 
4 3 3 3 3 
14 4 
 
3 2 2 2 2 
15 4 
 
3 3 3 2 2 
16 3 
 
3 3 2 3 3 
17 4 
 
2 2 1 2 2 
18 3 
 
2 2 1 2 2 
19 4 
 
3 3 2 2 2 
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BEHAVIOURAL MARKERS FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF COMPETENCE IN CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT OF MERCHANT NAVY ENGINEERING OFFICERS. 
 
Assessment Scores from Group 2 Assessors for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.5 
 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Reference 
Behavioural Tendency Score for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.5 
 
Assessor 
1 
Assessor 
2 
Assessor 
3 
Assessor 
4 
Assessor 
5 
Assessor 
6 
1 4 
 
4 3 2 3 3 
2 4 
 
4 3 2 4 3 
3 3 
 
3 2 2 1 4 
4 3 
 
3 3 1 3 3 
5 3 
 
3 1 1 3 3 
6 4 
 
4 3 2 3 4 
7 4 
 
4 3 3 3 4 
8 3 
 
4 2 2 2 3 
9 2 
 
3 1 1 3 4 
10 2 
 
3 2 2 0 3 
11 0 
 
3 1 2 0 3 
12 2 
 
3 3 2 3 3 
13 4 
 
4 3 3 3 4 
14 3 
 
3 2 2 3 4 
15 3 
 
4 2 2 2 3 
16 3 
 
4 3 2 0 4 
17 4 
 
3 3 3 3 4 
18 4 
 
3 3 3 1 3 
19 3 
 
3 2 2 4 3 
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Assessment Scores from Group 2 Assessors for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.6 
 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Reference 
Behavioural Tendency Score for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.6 
 
Assessor 
1 
Assessor 
2 
Assessor 
3 
Assessor 
4 
Assessor 
5 
Assessor 
6 
1 3 
 
3 4 3 2 3 
2 3 
 
3 4 3 3 3 
3 2 
 
3 4 2 0 3 
4 3 
 
2 4 3 2 2 
5 2 
 
3 3 3 0 2 
6 4 
 
3 3 3 3 3 
7 2 
 
2 3 2 3 2 
8 3 
 
3 3 2 1 3 
9 2 
 
2 3 2 1 2 
10 2 
 
2 3 2 1 3 
11 1 
 
0 3 2 0 3 
12 3 
 
3 4 3 1 3 
13 4 
 
3 3 3 2 3 
14 3 
 
2 3 2 1 3 
15 3 
 
3 3 3 2 3 
16 3 
 
3 3 3 0 4 
17 4 
 
3 3 3 2 2 
18 3 
 
3 3 3 1 3 
19 3 
 
2 3 3 2 3 
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BEHAVIOURAL MARKERS FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF COMPETENCE IN CRISIS 
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Assessment Scores from Group 2 Assessors for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.7 
 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Reference 
Behavioural Tendency Score for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.7 
 
Assessor 
1 
Assessor 
2 
Assessor 
3 
Assessor 
4 
Assessor 
5 
Assessor 
6 
1 1 
 
2 1 3 2 2 
2 2 
 
2 2 3 1 2 
3 1 
 
3 3 2 0 2 
4 1 
 
3 3 2 2 2 
5 1 
 
2 0 2 0 2 
6 2 
 
3 3 3 3 2 
7 1 
 
2 3 3 1 1 
8 2 
 
1 2 2 0 2 
9 1 
 
2 0 2 0 2 
10 1 
 
2 2 2 0 2 
11 0 
 
1 2 2 0 2 
12 1 
 
2 3 2 1 2 
13 2 
 
3 3 3 2 2 
14 1 
 
2 3 2 1 2 
15 2 
 
3 3 3 1 2 
16 1 
 
1 2 2 0 1 
17 2 
 
1 3 2 2 2 
18 2 
 
2 3 3 1 2 
19 1 
 
1 1 2 2 2 
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Assessment Scores from Group 2 Assessors for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.8 
 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Reference 
Behavioural Tendency Score for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.8 
 
Assessor 
1 
Assessor 
2 
Assessor 
3 
Assessor 
4 
Assessor 
5 
Assessor 
6 
1 4 
 
4 3 4 3 3 
2 4 
 
4 3 4 3 4 
3 4 
 
3 3 4 3 4 
4 4 
 
3 3 4 3 4 
5 4 
 
3 3 3 0 3 
6 4 
 
4 3 4 3 4 
7 4 
 
3 3 4 2 4 
8 4 
 
4 3 4 0 3 
9 4 
 
3 2 3 2 4 
10 3 
 
3 2 4 0 3 
11 3 
 
3 2 3 0 4 
12 3 
 
4 3 4 3 3 
13 4 
 
3 3 4 3 4 
14 4 
 
3 3 3 3 4 
15 4 
 
4 3 4 3 4 
16 3 
 
3 2 3 0 3 
17 4 
 
3 3 4 3 3 
18 4 
 
3 3 4 3 3 
19 4 
 
3 3 4 3 4 
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Assessment Scores from Group 2 Assessors for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.9 
 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Reference 
Behavioural Tendency Score for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.9 
 
Assessor 
1 
Assessor 
2 
Assessor 
3 
Assessor 
4 
Assessor 
5 
Assessor 
6 
1 4 
 
3 3 4 2 3 
2 4 
 
3 3 4 3 4 
3 3 
 
1 1 3 0 3 
4 3 
 
3 3 3 2 3 
5 4 
 
3 1 2 3 3 
6 4 
 
2 2 3 1 3 
7 3 
 
2 2 3 1 4 
8 3 
 
3 2 3 0 3 
9 4 
 
2 1 3 0 3 
10 3 
 
2 1 3 0 3 
11 3 
 
3 1 3 0 3 
12 3 
 
3 2 3 1 4 
13 4 
 
2 2 3 2 3 
14 3 
 
2 1 2 1 3 
15 4 
 
3 2 3 1 3 
16 3 
 
3 3 3 1 3 
17 3 
 
2 2 3 1 4 
18 3 
 
2 2 3 1 3 
19 4 
 
2 2 3 1 4 
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Assessment Scores from Group 2 Assessors for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.10 
 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Reference 
Behavioural Tendency Score for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.10 
 
Assessor 
1 
Assessor 
2 
Assessor 
3 
Assessor 
4 
Assessor 
5 
Assessor 
6 
1 1 
 
3 3 2 4 2 
2 1 
 
4 3 2 4 2 
3 2 
 
3 1 1 1 1 
4 1 
 
3 3 2 3 3 
5 1 
 
4 0 2 2 2 
6 2 
 
3 3 1 3 3 
7 1 
 
3 2 1 2 2 
8 1 
 
3 2 2 0 1 
9 2 
 
3 1 2 0 2 
10 1 
 
3 2 1 0 2 
11 2 
 
2 2 2 0 2 
12 1 
 
3 3 2 1 3 
13 2 
 
3 3 2 3 3 
14 1 
 
2 2 2 1 2 
15 2 
 
4 2 1 1 1 
16 1 
 
3 3 2 0 3 
17 1 
 
3 2 1 1 2 
18 1 
 
3 2 2 1 2 
19 1 
 
3 2 2 1 3 
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Assessment Scores from Group 2 Assessors for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.11 
 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Reference 
Behavioural Tendency Score for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.11 
 
Assessor 
1 
Assessor 
2 
Assessor 
3 
Assessor 
4 
Assessor 
5 
Assessor 
6 
1 4 
 
3 4 4 4 3 
2 4 
 
4 4 4 3 4 
3 4 
 
3 4 4 4 4 
4 4 
 
3 4 4 3 3 
5 4 
 
3 4 4 3 4 
6 4 
 
4 4 4 4 3 
7 4 
 
3 3 4 3 3 
8 4 
 
3 3 4 0 4 
9 4 
 
3 4 4 4 3 
10 4 
 
3 4 4 3 3 
11 3 
 
4 4 4 0 4 
12 4 
 
3 4 4 3 3 
13 4 
 
3 4 4 4 3 
14 4 
 
3 4 4 3 4 
15 4 
 
4 4 4 3 4 
16 3 
 
3 4 4 3 3 
17 4 
 
3 4 4 3 3 
18 4 
 
4 3 4 3 3 
19 4 
 
3 4 4 2 4 
 
                                                                                                                                                         Appendices 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Behavioural Markers for the Assessment of Competence in Crisis Management                               223 
BEHAVIOURAL MARKERS FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF COMPETENCE IN CRISIS 
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Assessment Scores from Group 2 Assessors for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.12 
 
Behavioural 
Marker 
Reference 
Behavioural Tendency Score for Chief Engineer in Video Scenario No.12 
 
Assessor 
1 
Assessor 
2 
Assessor 
3 
Assessor 
4 
Assessor 
5 
Assessor 
6 
1 2 
 
4 3 2 2 3 
2 1 
 
3 3 2 2 3 
3 1 
 
4 1 1 0 3 
4 1 
 
3 3 2 3 3 
5 1 
 
3 1 1 0 3 
6 2 
 
4 3 3 3 3 
7 1 
 
3 3 1 3 3 
8 2 
 
3 1 1 0 3 
9 2 
 
3 1 1 0 3 
10 1 
 
3 1 2 1 3 
11 1 
 
3 2 1 0 2 
12 1 
 
3 3 1 1 3 
13 3 
 
4 3 3 2 3 
14 1 
 
3 1 1 1 3 
15 2 
 
4 3 1 1 4 
16 2 
 
3 3 2 1 3 
17 2 
 
3 3 1 2 4 
18 2 
 
3 3 1 1 3 
19 1 
 
3 3 1 2 3 
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Group 3 – Assessor Data 
 
  
Rank Order 
of 
Competence 
in Crisis 
Management 
  
 
Chief Engineer in Video Scenario Number 
  
 
Assessor 
1 
 
Assessor 
2 
 
Assessor 
3 
 
Assessor 
4 
 
Assessor 
5 
 
Assessor 
6 
 
Assessor 
7 
BEST 
1 
 
 
11 
 
11 
 
11 
 
11 
 
11 
 
8 
 
11 
 
2 
 
9 
 
8 
 
8 
 
8 
 
1 
 
11 
 
4 
 
 
3 
 
4 
 
6 
 
4 
 
3 
 
8 
 
6 
 
3 
 
4 
 
8 
 
9 
 
1 
 
 
6 
 
4 
 
4 
 
1 
 
5 
 
1 
 
 
4 
 
3 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
5 
 
6 
 
3 
 
12 
 
9 
 
7 
 
3 
 
2 
 
8 
 
7 
 
12 
 
3 
 
12 
 
12 
 
10 
 
5 
 
7 
 
8 
 
6 
 
10 
 
2 
 
9 
 
9 
 
3 
 
12 
 
9 
 
2 
 
1 
 
5 
 
5 
 
12 
 
9 
 
6 
 
10 
 
5 
 
5 
 
6 
 
10 
 
7 
 
12 
 
10 
 
11 
 
10 
 
7 
 
7 
 
4 
 
5 
 
7 
 
9 
 
12 
WORST 
 
7 
 
2 
 
10 
 
2 
 
6 
 
10 
 
2 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                         Appendices 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Behavioural Markers for the Assessment of Competence in Crisis Management                               225 
APPENDIX 4 
 
Publications 
 
 
Habberley, J., Barnett, M., Gatfield, D., Musselwhite, C. and G. McNeil. 2001. Simulator Training 
for Handling Escalating Emergencies. United Kingdom Maritime and Coastguard Agency Research 
Project 467. Southampton: Maritime and Coastguard Agency. 
 
Barnett, M., Gatfield, D. and J. Habberley. 2002. Shipboard Crisis Management: A Case Study. In: 
Proceedings of Human Factors in Ship Design and Operation Conference. London: Royal Institution of 
Naval Architects. 
 
Barnett, M., Gatfield, D. and C.Pekcan. 2003. A Research Agenda in Maritime Crew Resource 
Management. In: Proceedings of International Conference on Team Resource Management in the 21st 
Century. Daytona Beach, Florida: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.  
 
Gatfield, D. 2004. Behavioural Markers: A framework for the objective assessment of competence 
in crisis management. In: Proceedings of 6th International Conference on Engine Room Simulators. 
Wuhan, China: Wuhan University of Technology. 
 
Barnett, M., Pekcan, C. and D. Gatfield. 2004. Recent Developments in Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) and Crisis Management Training. In: Proceedings of 2nd LSM Manning and 
Training in China Conference. Shanghai: Lloyd’s List Events. 
 
Pekcan, C., Gatfield, D. and M. Barnett. 2005. Content  and Context: Understanding the 
Complexities of Human Behaviour in Ship Operation. In: Proceedings of Human Factors in Ship 
Operations Conference. London: Royal Institution of Naval Architects. 
 
Gatfield, D. 2005. Using simulation to determine a framework for the objective assessment of 
competence in maritime crisis management. In: Proceedings of the Society for the Advancement of 
Games and Simulations in Education and Training 2005 Conference. Portsmouth: University of 
Portsmouth. 
 
Gatfield, D, Pekcan, C. and Barnett, M. 2006. The Janus Principle in Maritime Safety: Looking 
Backwards to Look Forward. In: Proceedings of Learning from Marine Incidents 3 Conference. London: 
Royal Institution of Naval Architects. 
 
Barnett, M.L., Gatfield, D.I., & Pekcan, C.H. 2006. Non-technical skills: the vital ingredient in 
world maritime technology? In: Proceedings of the International Conference on World Maritime 
Technology, London: Institute of Marine Engineering, Science and Technology. 
 
